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ABSTRACT 
 
Intersectoral, interorganizational, and intergovernmental cooperation is becoming a more 
common practice in economic development, breaking political boundaries to establish 
networks across organizations with similar economic structures, assets and opportunities.  
This dissertation used a survey research method approach to analyze intergovernmental 
collaboration in the Chicago metro area by exploring the social network structure of 
cooperation, the conditions under which local governments cooperate and the resulting 
outcomes of cooperation.  The results suggests that communities in the Chicago metro area 
are spatially aware of the roles of neighboring communities in the socio-economic structure of 
the region, as well as the role that each community plays within the region. However, the 
results also reveal the presence of a sparse network between communities; primarily 
because intergovernmental networking is not dense in Chicago.  A logistic regression model 
was used to test the extent to which a combination of community characteristics and 
intergovernmental network resources influenced voluntary cooperation.  The findings 
suggest that some of the factors influencing cooperation include collaborative norms and 
trust, network centralization, the competitive development activity of local governments, and 
whether the leading development agency is a public-private entity.  Finally, collaboration was 
found to be a great resource for building consensus; making the region socio-economically 
stronger, more efficient; and facilitating experimentation, learning and evolution in 
economic development.  The current study aims to explore and provide a better 
understanding of the interorganizational efforts in the Chicago metro area, a region where 
research has suggested significant levels of independence and limited intraregional 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Cooperative norms additive index: is based on 7 questions with a 5 points answer scale, with 
7 being the lowest and 35 the highest, indicating the extent to which parties usually act in a 
collaborative fashion because of the existence of certain levels of trust, commitment, and 
reciprocity (Hawkins, 2007; Olberding, 2002).   
Joint Venture: for economic development is meant by both formal and informal cooperative 
agreements established between local governments of 2 or more communities that are 
intended to encourage development and improve economic and fiscal conditions. 
Lieberson’s Index of Diversity: is a probability of encountering consecutive individuals from 
the same ethnicity, using replacement sampling.  
Network Betweenness: is an indicator of a node's centrality in a network. It is equal to the 
number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that node. A node 
with high betweenness has great influence over what flows -- and does not -- in the 
network. 
Network Centralization: is whether the network is dominated by one or a few very central 
nodes, meaning a very dependable network; or it has no single points of failure, meaning 
that many nodes or links can fail while allowing the remaining nodes to still reach each 
other over other network paths. 
Network closeness: is a measure of the degree to which an individual is near all other 
individuals in a network.  It is the inverse of the sum of the shortest distances between each 
node and every other node in the network. 
Network Cohesion: means that a social network contains many ties; more ties between 
people yield a tighter structure, which is, presumably, more cohesive.  
Network Degree: refers to the number of ties a node has to other nodes. 
Network Density: is the number of lines in a simple network, expressed as a proportion of 
the maximum possible number of lines.  
ix 
 
Network Reciprocity: directed dyadic relationships where ties are reciprocated; A gives to B, 
and B gives to A.  
Network Size: refers to the number of nodes or edges in a network. 
Network Transitivity: gives the density of transitive triples in a network; three vertices A, B , 
C taken from a directed graph are transitive if whenever vertex A is connected to vertex B 
and vertex B is connected to vertex C then vertex A is connected to vertex C.  
Transaction costs: are the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements 
between parts in an economic transaction. These costs include those incurred in 
determining that the required good is available on the market, which has the lowest price; 
the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the 
transaction, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on; and the costs of making sure the 
other party sticks to the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action (often through 
the legal system) if this turns out not to be the case. 
Spatial awareness index: measures the ability to be aware of oneself in space through an 
index based on 7 questions with a 5 points answer scale, with 7 being the lowest and 35 the 
highest. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The Chicago Tri-State metro-region constitutes one of the largest metropolitan 
economies among the metropolitan areas encompassed by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, the OECD (2012) warned us that Chicago 
is at a tipping point, because despite its economic strengths, it faces considerable challenges 
to compete with the best in the world economy. The problem is that the region is 
converging on the technological frontier, slowing down its growth. The keys for getting into 
the next level is state-wide collaboration that ends up in policy advances, especially in the 
encouragement of innovation-driven growth based on knowledge and skills (OECD, 2012).  
In regards to collaboration, the OECD (2012) is crystal clear about the issue of 
functional regions not collaborating to advance policies on innovation, technology, inter-
state integrated transportation planning, and other third wave policies. There is no policy 
conditionality or financial incentives to encourage cooperation among public authorities, 
which is crucial to articulate common region-wide goals and implement region-wide 
strategic plans to achieve them. Key institutional actors across the tri-state region, including 
federal funders, state and municipal governments, and firms and the academia need to 
improve collaboration among themselves and between themselves (OECD, 2012).  
The OECD (2012) Chicago study is the frame of this dissertation.  OECD wants to 
promote greater cooperation across the 3 states that form the Greater Chicago region, but 
they do not focus on intra-state connections and the nature of those connections. They first 
suggested that the region needs to remove barriers to more systematic inter-state 
collaboration aimed at enhancing the region’s economic development and growth capacity, 
but they do not dig deeper into what the barriers are. Then, they claimed that although 
Chicago’s legal mandates are geographically limited, there is no barrier to their discussing 
and collaborating with each other to ensure coherence at the regional level.  
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This dissertation examines the social network structure of collaboration, the conditions 
under which local governments collaborate, the barriers of collaboration, and the outcomes 
of collaboration in the Chicago metro area under the jurisdiction of the Chicago 
Metropolitan Agency of Planning (CMAP),1 including the 284 municipalities within this 
jurisdiction.    Not only is this dissertation exploring collaboration among communities in 
Chicago but also how aware development officials are of their dependence on nearby 
communities and how that affects collaboration.  In addition, among those communities that 
engage in collaborative practices, this dissertation investigates how these practices 
translate into better development outcomes.   
Research in regional economic development has focused on examining comparative, 
competitive, and cooperative advantage approaches from multidisciplinary perspectives 
(Gordon, 2007; Hewings, Feser and Poole, 2009; Malizia and Feser, 1999; McGuire, 2000). 
Since the 1960s, there have been shifts in development strategies going through 
comparative, competitive and cooperative approaches and more recently, a blend of all 
three in multi-sector strategic planning environments (Malizia and Feser, 1999). Related 
literature suggests that intersectoral, interorganizational, and intergovernmental 
collaboration is inevitable due to the way local authorities and policy responsibilities are 
divided or partitioned (Feiock, 2004, 2005, 2008; Hawkins, 2007; McGuire, 2000). For 
instance, Hewings and colleagues (2009) suggested a complex web of integrated 
approaches to regional development, comprising of spatial interdependence between a vast 
array of federal, state, and local government agencies.  Therefore, one government’s 
decisions on specific functional areas are likely to impact other governments and the way 
they function.  
                                                             
1 CMAP is the official regional planning organization for the northeastern Illinois counties of Cook, 
DuPage, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will.   
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Another factor facilitating the shift towards cooperation is the changing demographic 
composition of working households (dominated by 2 wage-earners) – so even if 
communities ignore the interdependence, worker-consumers have already embraced it. 
(Hewings et al., 1998; Hewings, Okuyama and Sonis, 2001; Hewings and Parr, 2007). 
Unfortunately, some local development officials may not be fully aware of what is 
happening in nearby areas within their regions due to a lack of “regional perspective”.  
(OECD, 2012).  For example, how many of their residents work somewhere else or what 
percentage of the local labor force is made up of non-residents?  Becoming aware of 
different levels of interdependence is very important not only for competition but for 
collaborative efforts and effective institutional arrangements (OECD, 2012).   
Current local economic development efforts encourages that practitioners coordinate 
intersectoral, interorganizational, and intergovernmental development and formulate more 
effective policy strategies (McGuire, 2000).  Collaboration maximizes benefits for the 
neighboring communities by nurturing their respective strengths, combines those strengths 
and uses them together to maximize gains and provide a better environment for business 
and quality of life. If worker-consumers are already exploiting interdependence, then it 
makes competitiveness less practical in facilitating economic development. If policy makers 
or development officials are aware of how dependent their community is on other 
communities, they will be more willing to cooperate (Hawkins, 2007; McGuire, 2000). 
Research on cooperative efforts in local economic development has been primarily 
embedded within the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework.  The ICA proposes 
that there is a set of institutional units working collectively to achieve shared policy 
objectives and to solve problems that cannot be effectively achieved by single organizations 
(Feiock, 2005, 2007; Hawkins, 2007; McGuire, 2000).   This framework suggests the idea of 
bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Bilateral refers to ties between two communities or 
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entities. Multilateral refers to relationships of more than two. These are a function of 
transaction costs (a function of the characteristics of services), characteristics of 
communities, political institution, and policy networks (Feiock, 2004, 2007, 2008).  This 
framework is useful to identify and examine the factors that facilitate collaboration.  From a 
cost-benefit approach, collaboration is likely to occur when benefits exceed transaction 
costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreement.  
The policy networks portion of the function of the ICA framework can be further 
explained from a Social Capital framework.  Social Capital is the process where norms and 
networks facilitate collective action for mutual benefit.  It focuses on who knows whom 
(social networks), the character of these networks, the strength of the ties in the network, 
and the levels of trust and reciprocity (Knack, 2001; Putnam, 1995; Sander and Lowney, 
2006).  This framework helps to better understand and explain expected networks in the 
Chicago area, as well as their characteristics and impact on collaboration and development.  
The shift towards collaboration is dramatically impacting traditional economic 
development initiatives and pushing development minds to think outside the box.  This 
dissertation digs deeper into these practices. Political boundaries everywhere are being 
crossed to identify surrounding areas with similar economic structures, assets, and 
opportunities.  While collaboration is becoming a more popular practice in the analysis of 
economic development across the nation, including the Midwest, the impact of this shift in 
the Chicago metro area has been largely unexplored. The OECD (2012) calls for more 
collaboration but does not provide more insight on factors affecting collaboration.  
Collaboration research has primarily focused on cities in Georgia, Florida, and Michigan 
(Feiock, 2008; Hawkins 2007).  This research highlighted the importance of identifying the 
conditions that positively or negatively influence collaboration among local governments 
given the fragmented structure of metropolitan areas. However, Chicago has not been 
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evaluated under this framework, though Gordon (2007) did a statewide research on the 
collaborative perceptions of decision makers in economic development in Illinois. Gordon’s 
conclusions suggest that cities in Illinois do cooperate, understand the benefits of 
collaboration and their willingness to engage in more collaborative efforts is increasing. 
However, competition is still a big problem besides metropolitan fragmentation (division 
into too many jurisdictions) and transaction costs.  
The rationale for focusing on Chicago is use the ICA framework as applied by Hawkins 
(2007) to complement the OECD (2012) study by understanding the collaboration setting in 
Chicago. Uncertainties and challenges related to the analysis of Chicago’s transition and 
modernization create the need to investigate the current characteristics of economic 
development in this area.  Macroeconomic factors, technology, human capital, 
infrastructure, transportation, and cultural and political shifts seem to influence this 
transition, mainly caused by demographic changes (Chicago Urban League, 2008).  
Moreover, CMAP is creating various economic development programs (that involve 
intraregional collaboration) expected to be implemented over the next 30 years. Therefore, 
the scope and timing of this dissertation is very appropriate.   
1.1 Objectives  
The key objectives of this dissertation are to: 
1. Study the level of awareness of spatial interdependence and interaction among 
economic development practitioners in the metro area. 
2. Explore any existing network or set of networks related to collaborative activities 
between practitioners within the metro area. 
3. Identify and test significant factors influencing the collaborative setting and explain 
conditions under which cooperative efforts are initiated. 
4. Investigate how collaboration translates into development outcomes; i.e., the impact 
of collaborative activities in facilitating capacity and consensus building. 
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1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Table 1 displays the research questions guiding this study and the expected outcomes 
or hypotheses. 
 
 
Table 1: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Number Research Questions Hypotheses 
1 Do communities engage in 
collaborative activities? If so, 
how complex are these social 
relationships? What is the 
network structure of these 
collaborations? How do 
cooperative norms 
strengthen these networks? 
Most of the communities in the Chicago 
metro area are expected to engage in 
collaborative activities. These social 
relationships are expected to result in 
complex and dense networks.  In addition, 
cooperative norms such as trust, 
reciprocity, and commitment are expected 
to strengthen these networks. 
 
2 What are the factors 
explaining the creation of 
voluntary cooperative 
arrangements among local 
governments in the Chicago 
metro area? 
Community and metro area 
characteristics, local political institutions, 
and intergovernmental networks are 
factors that have significantly impact the 
likelihood of collaboration among local 
governments. It is expected that 
collaboration would be positively related 
to the following variables: poverty, 
manufacture jobs, development policies, 
strategic plans, public-private partnership, 
full-time lead official, increasing budget, 
high spatial awareness level, being an 
employment center, strong networks, and 
demand-side policies. 
 
3 What is the awareness level 
of economic development 
practitioners about spatial 
interdependence and 
interaction among the 
communities in the Chicago 
metro area? 
The region is fairly spatially aware and it 
is expected that there will be significant 
differences between the communities that 
cooperate and the ones that do not.  
Besides, spatial autocorrelation in the 
responses is expected among those closer 
to the city of Chicago and located in the 
Northeast being more aware. 
 
4 Are collaborative activities 
facilitating capacity and 
consensus building in the 
local economic development 
process? If so, how is 
everyone benefiting? 
Collaborating activities are expected to 
facilitate capacity and consensus building 
in the local economic development 
process. Those with denser and more 
centralized networks are expected to 
benefit the most. 
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1.3 Contributions, Implications and Limitations 
The Chicago metro area has traditionally been characterized by a significant level of 
independence among its communities. A major contribution of this dissertation is that it 
explored intraregional, interorganizational, and intergovernmental collaboration efforts in 
this metro area, which has been largely neglected in the literature of collaboration. Also, this 
study goes beyond the ICA framework by incorporating spatial components, much deeper 
analysis and social network discussions.  Further, this study provides additional narratives 
to explain the impact of collaboration on economic development outcomes and the findings 
have the potential to influence policy making.  
Some limitations were taken into consideration during the data analysis. First, data was 
obtained through a self-reported survey.  Survey research can seldom deal with “context” 
and there are problems of dealing with links with non-respondents. Another limitation is a 
low response rate, but it is consistent with most of the studies with similar scopes. Also, 
participants’ responses may be compromised in extent and details by any disclosure policy 
from their agencies.  Moreover, intentional deception, poor memory, or misunderstanding 
of the question can all contribute to inaccuracies in the data.   
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
In the following chapter, a literature review is provided discussing the theories and 
frameworks (e.g., ICA and Social Capital) guiding this study, as well as relevant research and 
future directions. Chapter 3 describes the methods used in this dissertation, including the 
unit of analysis, data collection process, survey instruments, and analysis.  Chapter 4 
presents the results from the statistical analyses, as well as the descriptions and 
observations of the municipalities represented in the study.  Finally, Chapter 5 synthetizes 
and interprets the findings, along with a discussion of the conclusions and opportunities for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the focal points of President Obama in his State of Union address (Obama, 2011), was 
the role of collaboration in economic development.  Traditionally, the two major goals of 
local economic development efforts include building quality jobs and diversifying the local 
employment base (Blakely and Green-Leigh, 2009; Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002).  However, 
policies and strategies to pursue development and growth have to be congruent and 
consistent with this collaborative advantage era (Obama, 2011; Malizia and Feser, 1999).  
The advocacy for collaboration has roots in a wide range of empirical work that includes 
social capital and collaborative policy making.  Furthermore, interdependency between 
regions at different scales is linked and sustained by different socio-economic processes.  
This review of literature discusses the definition of development and the transition in local 
economic development policy, policy adoptions, and the role of developers and 
practitioners.  In addition, an overview of social capital, research on regional 
interdependency and local government collaboration approaches and conceptualization are 
reviewed.  Finally, the literature review discusses the theoretical frameworks and a 
discussion of how this work will fill existing gaps in the literature.  
2.2 Definition of development  
The definition of economic development is complex and lacks consensus, as it varies 
depending on policy or research purposes and approaches (Peters and Fisher, 2004; 
Mathur, 1999; Flammang, 1979).  There are two main barriers for agreeing on a more 
comprehensive definition.  One is the differentiation between economic growth and 
economic development, and understanding their meanings and implications (Flammang, 
1979, 1990).  The other barrier is the scope of the definition.  Understanding these barriers 
and how they operate in practitioners’ perceptions of development by may be important in 
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understanding policy decisions, like engaging in collaborative practices (Mielke and 
Schetter, 2007; Abernethy, 1999).   
Although, both development and growth are often used to define or explain the same 
thing (Flammang, 1979), these terms are not identical (Nafziger, 2006).  Research has 
argued that development is more complex than growth (Hosseini, 2003).  Flammang (1979) 
reviewed a wide selection of diverging views about both development and growth, 
suggesting that in the short run, they are competitive, but in the long run they are 
complementary.  In a more formal definition, Nafziger (2006) explained that economic 
growth “refers to the increases in a country’s production or income per capita (p.15),” while 
economic development “refers to economic growth accompanied by changes in output 
distribution and economic structure (p.15).”  Basically, growth is necessary but not 
sufficient for organic and sustainable development (Nafziger, 2006). Growth is only one 
subset of the complex concept of development (Hosseini, 2003; Sen, 1983, 1988).  
Flammang (1990) agrees with this statement and adds that growth is more like “niche 
filling,” whereas development is “niche changing,” a broader concept that keeps changing 
over time, impacted by different processes including growth.  Accordingly, growth may be 
seen to involve short to medium term policy strategies, whereas development may imply 
more long term and broader views.     
The U.S. Economic Development Administration defines economic development as a 
process to enhance “the factors of productive capacity – labor, capital, and technology – of a 
national, state or local economy (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003).”  Malizia (1994) 
refers to economic development as “the on-going process of creating wealth in which 
producers deploy scarce human, financial, capital, physical and natural resources to 
produce goods and services that consumers want and are willing to pay for (p.84).”  Pages 
and Poole (2003) tie economic development with business and jobs creation, the attraction 
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and creation of new companies, and the retention and expansion of existing companies.  In 
this process, economic development agencies become entrepreneurship avenues.  Among 
the strategies for this kind of development approach are regulatory and permitting policies, 
tax and incentive policies, non-financial assistance, and direct financial assistance (Pages 
and Poole, 2003).  Currently the most popular avenue to achieve development as defined 
above is education, technology and creativity (see Obama, 2011).  
Alternatively, the field of community economic development offers new meanings and 
strategies for economic development focusing on the improvement of the economic well-
being of low income and marginalized struggling communities.  Thus, the definition of 
development has to do with a participatory development approach.  The objective is to 
increase people’s control over their resources and economic lives, and to build community 
power and decision-making capacities. Under this spectrum, different local economic 
development concepts and strategies can be seen, such community and cooperative 
business development (Zeuli and Radel, 2005); self-employment and micro-businesses; 
community and micro (revolving) loan funds and credit unions; bartering and local 
currencies (Diochon, 2003; Malveaux, 1990; Pinilla, 1995; Rodriguez, 1995; Villalobos, 
1995); diverse economies (Gibson et al., 2004; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Leyshon, 2005; Smith, 
2006); and asset-based community economic development (Cameron, 2003; Mathie and 
Cunningham, 2003; Kretzmann and Mcknight, 1993).   
Top-down and bottom-up approaches are embedded in any definition of development.  
The most important aspect of this review is to be sensitive and open-minded about the 
diversity and complexity of the definition of development.  This may impact the data 
analysis process in this study, especially in maintaining a clear and well-balanced 
perspective on the potential issues.  The working definition of development used in this 
study is to increase a region’s ability to satisfy its own socioeconomic needs. 
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2.3 The evolution of economic development in the U.S.  
Table 2 summarizes the evolution of state and local economic development policy in the U.S. 
with the three waves of economic development and their historic context.  This evolution 
can be traced since the 1930s, where the focus of the Federal Government was national 
planning, a very top-down development approach (Eisinger, 1988).  The Federal 
Government policy objectives have changed since the 1930s, focusing later on the welfare 
state, then in restoring competitiveness and lately in reinforcing global trade.  After the 
Great Depression, economic development processes began to change with the rise of 
regionalism and new challenges of poverty and relief (Malizia and Feser, 1999).  Late in the 
1930s, the aim for balancing agriculture with industry began to grow and during the 1940s, 
the first wave of economic development arose at the same time of the World War II, with 
subsequent repercussions in the economic development process of the U.S (Bradshaw and 
Blakely, 1999).  That was the era of acquisition, with policies oriented toward place 
marketing, prospecting, incentives, exports, tourists, retirees, and infrastructure.   
Bradshaw and Blakely (1999) claim that industrial attraction efforts, or smokestack 
chasing of the first wave, gave way to new strategies, according to most analysts of state 
policy.  The first wave was dominated by programs designed specifically to attract footloose 
firms from old industrial areas to growing regions, such as the South or West.  The typical 
tools of the first wave were subsidized loans or direct payments to firms for relocation 
expenses, tax reductions, subsidies applied to the cost of plant facilities or utilities, and 
competitive and expensive industrial recruitment programs. 
By the middle of the 1940s, there was a post-war housing boom and in the late 1940s, 
the government began to recognize the issue of urban decay and it released the Housing Act 
(1949) to open the doors for urban renewal and downtown development coalitions 
(Eisinger, 1988).  By the 1950s, the Federal focus began to change toward a welfare state  
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Table 2. Summary of the evolution of state and local economic development policy in the U.S. 
ED Wave Focus Origin Methods Historical Context Problems 
First 
Wave 
Business 
attraction
; 
“Smokest
ack 
Chasing” 
Attraction 
models in 
Southern 
states 
Discount location 
assets to attract 
outside businesses to 
create jobs for local 
unemployed people; 
Community base 
equals physical 
resources; Establish a 
positive business 
climate by lowering 
costs of doing 
business through 
loans, tax cuts, no 
unions, free 
land/infrastructure 
1950s to early 1980s. 
World War II; Era of 
acquisition, with 
policies oriented 
toward place 
marketing, 
prospecting, 
incentives, exports, 
tourists, retirees, and 
infrastructure; Lack 
of industry in the 
South; Fordist social 
contracts; A broadly 
growing national 
economy 
Zero-sum game; 
Major public 
giveaways; 
Long-term 
ineffectiveness; 
“But for” 
question  
Second 
Wave 
Retain, 
expand 
and grow 
local 
businesse
s; Grow a 
strong 
local 
economy 
Internal 
economy, 
high 
businesse
s and high 
technolog
y 
Reduce taxes and 
provide incentives to 
all business, 
especially small/local 
ones; Training 
programs; Business 
incubators; High-tech 
development; Local 
Entrepreneurship; 
Community base 
equals social and 
physical resources 
Early 1980s to early 
1990s. Reduction of 
federal role; Local 
focus began to grow 
with neighborhood 
reinvestment 
policies; Most new 
jobs created in small 
businesses; 
Emergence of high 
technology 
Market failures 
in small 
businesses; 
Apathy for this 
kind of 
development; 
Higher risk 
public 
interventions; 
Still a business-
centered 
approach 
Third 
Wave 
The 
Entrepren
eurial City 
Global 
economy: 
the need 
to link 
capital, 
human 
capital 
and 
technolog
y 
Building regional 
collaboration; Create 
context for better 
relations among 
firms; Workforce 
training directed to 
build businesses; 
Community base 
equals leadership and 
development of 
quality environment; 
Public-private 
partnership; 
economic 
development through 
quasi-public 
agencies; Ad-hoc 
market-based 
initiatives 
Early 1990s to 
present. New 
Federalism equals 
less Federal 
intervention; 
Globalization; Human 
Capital; Increase of 
the practice of 
economic 
development as a 
field 
Still based on 
business-
centered 
approach, using 
market criteria, 
not holistic 
criteria to 
define success 
and it is still 
based in 
competition 
with other 
places 
Based on Blakely and Bradshaw (2002), Bradshaw and Blakely (1999), Eisinger (1998)
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policy orientation and during the decade of activism, the 1960s, the history of economic 
development in U.S. saw the establishment of the so-called Great Society (Malizia and Feser, 1999).  
This period saw the rise of Central Business Districts (as promotional organizations), the Economic 
Development Administration and the Appalachian Regional Commission, among other 
organizations. It also saw the release of assistance programs to attack poverty such as the 
Cooperative Assistance Fund (Ford, private corporations) in 1968 as a legal vehicle for social 
investment; and finally growth poles (Malizia and Feser, 1999).  In the late 1960s, the new 
federalism began under Nixon’s administration (Markusen, 1994).  This new federalism was a 
system that directed money and power away from the federal bureaucracy and toward states and 
municipalities. The rationale was to respond more efficiently to the needs of the people.  
The new federalism dominated the decade of the 1970s too, though that decade saw a reduction 
of federal role in housing and the simultaneous creation of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 
1975 (Malizia and Feser, 1999; Markusen, 1994).  Late in the 1970s, a retrenchment, local focus 
began to grow with neighborhood reinvestment policies such as the Community Reinvestment Act 
in 1977 (Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).  Basically, the era of the 1960s and 1970s worked towards a 
comparative advantage focus of economic planning strategy.  
The beginning of a second wave was seen during the late 1970s and early 1980s with a focus on 
competitiveness. Policies towards small firms, education/training, universities, science and 
technology, venture capital and incubators began to be popular.  Monetarism thoughts shifted the 
focus of economic policy to value-adding strategies to seek growth from within, from a lighter top-
down to a more bottom-up development approach (Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).   
Bradshaw and Blakely (1999) explain that by the early 1980s, states began operating many 
second-wave incentives that shifted focus from attracting out-of-state firms to retaining and 
expanding existing firms.  Second-wave strategies created programs to increase capital for small 
and medium-size businesses, accelerate technology transfer, or to expand workforce-training 
  14  
 
programs (Ross and Friedman (1990), as cited in Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).  Cities that adopted 
second-wave strategies were characterized by a strong investment and entrepreneurial approach 
(Clarke and Gaile (1992), as cited in Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).   
During the 1980s, the U.S. conducted economic development policies also in the awareness of 
the rise of Japan as an economic power (Malizia and Feser, 1999).  That decade saw a contraction in 
intergovernmental grants, but many tax reform oriented policies to help mostly income and 
housing.  Turning into the 1990s, the third wave of economic development policies began replacing 
polices that did not work anymore.  New strategies such as clusters, networks and benchmarking 
became more popular (Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).  The focus was on reinventing the 
government participation with more demand driven policies, public-private partnership, 
leveraging, competition, evaluation and feedback. Leadership, information and brokering became 
more important.  Under third-wave programs, new organizational approaches were created, 
adopting lessons and strategies from first- and second-wave strategies, but providing specific 
purpose and focus to the use of these techniques.  The key to third wave programs was a supportive 
economic development marketplace rather than payments to firms.  It reduced high-stakes 
incentives and promotions and has shifted emphasis from firm-based programs to broader regional 
programs (Ross and Friedman (1990), as cited in Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999). 
Maliza and Feser (1999) explained that economic development from the 1990s to our times has 
experienced different transformations such as:  
1. the reshaping of housing development,  
2. the creation of empowerment zones,  
3. welfare reforms,  
4. new markets initiatives,  
5. the rapid growth of globalization,  
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6. the abandonment, degradation and deprivation of the downtowns (though downtown 
revitalization has been growing recently) 
7. the development in the suburbs with huge shopping centers and department stores, 
8. an internet-based network and market that has been growing rapidly (Malizia and 
Feser, 1999).   
There are still problems with third-wave economic development initiatives.  These initiatives 
are still based on a business-centered approach, using market criteria, not holistic criteria to define 
success and it is still based on competition with other places.  The current economic crisis and the 
new trends in economic development (e.g., sustainability, climate change, the new economic 
geography, and community-based development efforts) set the basis for a new wave. The practice 
of economic development needs to be reinvented.  Nonetheless, Reese and Ye (2011) suggested that 
the waves or phases of economic development  are cumulative rather than evolutionary. 
Suggestions of a new wave have been offered in some academic research.  Clark and Gaile 
(1992) claimed that a new wave of post-federal local economic development strategies has been 
developing. Their study reveals that these strategies are characterized by community 
empowerment, the reliance of community own-source revenues, risk-taking rather than risk-
aversive approaches, and the fostering of indigenous growth and job-creation strategies.  Willard 
(2005) suggested that the new wave of economic development was the sustainability revolution.  In 
this wave, economic development is influenced by sustainable development that include alternative 
energy systems, green jobs, sustainable agriculture, industrial ecology, and community-based 
strategies, among others.  
2.4 General theories of regional economic development 
 “The economic developer’s role is to participate in the process of national wealth creation for the 
benefit of local consumers and producers by facilitating either the expansion of job opportunities 
and the tax base or the efficient redeployment of local resources (Malizia, 1994, p.84)” Generally, 
  16  
 
the economic developer pursues this approach by following different concepts and strategies from 
existing economic development theories.  These theories are reviewed in this section.  Economic 
development approaches are mainly two-fold; the normative concept of development per se and 
economic growth.   Policy and decision-making processes in economic development are based on a 
three-fold framework:  (1) supply- or demand-side approaches, (2) people- or place-based 
approaches, and (3) public or private leading roles.   
Eisinger (1988) distinguished between supply-side traditional driven strategies and demand-
side, entrepreneurial and innovative strategies.  On the one hand, demand-side approaches focus on 
new capital, new markets and businesses, and once they are found, the goal is to expand and 
develop them, maximizing their benefits.  Development assistance is offered, but only if it is 
deserved, matching strategic goals and well-developed plans.  Government’s role in the economic 
development process is not to work for and follow the private sector as in supply-side strategies, 
but to identify new product, market and industry opportunities overlooked by the private sector.  
Under demand-side approaches, governments invest time and money in high-risk enterprises and 
initiatives (Eisinger, 1988).  On the other hand, supply-side strategies promote growth through 
subsidies of capital and land as well as tax cuts.  The focus is on existing capital, making efforts to 
retain and relocate capital, competing sometimes with other regions for this capital.  Government 
invests in low-risk opportunities and the availability of development assistance is there for every 
employer (Eisinger, 1988). Accordingly, inquiries over the efficacy of supply-side strategies have 
caused regions to become more demand-side adopters of development strategies rather than 
supply-side. 
Bolton (1992) distinguishes between people- and place-based economic development polices.  
He described people-based policies as those aimed to improve “the welfare of deserving people as 
individuals, regardless of where they live (p.187)” and place-based policies as those focused on “the 
welfare of groups of deserving people defined by their spatial proximity in places (p.187).”  He 
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emphasized that this distinction occurs under the scenario of an economically impoverished and 
declining place.  Policies aimed to encourage people to move out of those places through subsidies 
or grants are people-based policies. Alternatively, employing resources to improve infrastructure 
and the competitive advantage of regions are place-based policies (Bolton, 1992).  In a broader 
context, people-based strategies are exemplified by training/education efforts, housing assistance 
programs, and welfare programs, among others; in contrast, place-based initiatives include 
enterprise zones, business improvement programs, infrastructure and neighborhood investments, 
urban (and downtown) development, etc. (Glaeser, 2000).    
The role of public and private sector in development has been widely discussed as well.  
Throughout different waves of economic development, the role of government has evolved from 
being an infrastructure and social and human capital facilitator to an entity that compensates for 
market failures (Krueger, 1990).  Currently, in an era of research and development, the public 
sector has been a source of research funding, though funding from private sector sources has been 
increasing at a very fast pace (Graham and Woo, 2009).  Generally, the private sector has been the 
decision maker, the entities that truly rule the economy in the U.S., the job creators, the money-
makers, and those responsible for the nation’s prosperity.  However, in the current crisis, more 
debate have been generated in regards to the role of governments as a “band-aid” for the market 
failures by the banks and other private institutions.  More people are challenging this (public-
private) balance of role in the economy, especially with the successful central role of public 
institutions in capitalist development in the East-Asian countries (Evans, 1999).   
Approaches either on the supply- or demand-side, people- or place-based, top-down or bottom-
up, among others have been promulgated under different economic development theories.  These 
theories are going to be used as the framework to categorize and analyze the survey responses.  
Table 4 summarizes each theory based on table 2.1 in Malizia and Feser (1999, p. 26-28).  
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Table 3. Summary of economic development theories 
Theory Basic  
Categories 
Definition of 
Development 
Essential 
Dynamic 
 
Strengths 
 
Weaknesses 
 
Applications 
 
References 
Export Base 
Theory 
Basic vs. Non-
Basic sectors 
A quantitative 
increase in the 
rate of growth 
of output 
(products), 
income, or 
employment 
 
External demand 
for a region’s 
products drives 
the local 
economy; 
Economic base 
multiplier effects 
 
Very simple to apply; 
Data available to 
measure these 
changes; Very 
popular theory ; 
Good for short-term 
prediction; 
Emphasizes the 
importance of most 
critical local 
industries 
 
Overemphasis on 
the basic sector; 
Inadequate for 
understanding 
long term ED; 
Ignores that 
regional 
economies are 
integrated by 
mutually 
dependant 
activities 
Industrial 
recruitment and 
promotion; 
Expansion of 
existing export 
industries; Free 
Trade; Improve 
efficiency 
through 
infrastructure 
upgrades 
 
Krikelas (1992); 
North (1955, 
1956); Parr 
(1999a); Tiebout 
(1956a, 1956b) 
Staple Theory Exporting 
industries 
Export-led 
economic 
growth 
Successful 
production and 
marketing of 
export staple(s) 
in world markets  
A historical and 
political perspective 
for ED; Provides 
insights into local 
values, politics, and 
wealth; Explains 
growth over time (in 
the early stages) 
often due to a local 
staple 
 
Hard to apply the 
theory; Better at 
explaining past 
development than 
providing 
guidance for local 
actions 
 
Export 
specialization; 
Focus resources 
and policies 
upon the local 
staple as long as 
it remains 
competitive;  
competitiveness 
of the staple is a 
public task 
Altman (2003); 
Grant (1974) 
Sector Theory Primary, 
Secondary and 
Tertiary 
sectors 
 
Greater sectoral 
diversity and 
higher 
productivity 
per worker 
Per capita 
increases and 
labor 
productivity 
drive technology 
which leads to 
sectoral 
diversity 
Empirically focus on 
the internal 
economic structure; 
Provides theory and 
measures structural 
change in the local 
economy 
Very simplified 
categories, too 
general; Does not 
directly take into 
account role of 
exports in growth 
Promote 
sectoral shifts; 
Attract and 
retain producers 
of income elastic 
products 
Henderson 
(1974); Hoover 
and Fisher (1949); 
Pred (1977); 
Thompson (1968). 
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Theory Basic  
Categories 
Definition of 
Development 
Essential 
Dynamic 
Strengths Weaknesses Applications References 
Growth Pole 
Theory 
Industries Propulsive 
industry 
growth leads to 
structural 
change 
Propulsive 
industries are 
the poles of 
growth 
General theory of the 
initiation and 
diffusion of 
development based 
on domination effect.  
Although insights 
drawn from the 
theory are useful, 
it has failed as a 
general theory of 
development 
Growth center 
strategies; 
Concentration of 
winners and 
successful 
industries 
Parr (1999b, 
1999c); Perroux 
(1950) 
Regional 
Concentration and 
Diffusion Theories 
Commodities 
and factors or 
industries 
Diffusion of 
growth; Higher 
income per 
capita 
Propulsive 
industries 
attract growth 
(poles of 
growth) which 
leads to trickle-
down effects (or 
backwash) for 
surrounding 
areas 
Spatial analysis of 
growth; Account for 
agglomerative 
tendencies of firms; 
Address the 
dynamics of 
development 
Highly abstract; 
Unclear definition 
of what a growth 
center is; 
Assumes strong 
linkages between 
individual cities 
and their 
periphery 
Growth center 
policies have 
long been a 
hallmark of 
economic 
development 
efforts to 
mitigate 
backwash 
effects and 
reduce 
inequalities, and 
spur 
development 
Hirschman 
(1958); Myrdal 
(1957) 
Neoclassical 
Growth Theory 
Looks at entire 
economy as a 
whole 
Increasing rate 
of growth (per 
capita) at the 
regional or 
national level 
 
Savings and 
investment 
promote capital 
formation, which 
drives the 
economy 
A supply-side model; 
Widely popular 
theory 
 
Ignores the role of 
the demand-side; 
Accepts decline of 
areas; Implies a 
limited 
governmental 
role 
Free trade, lack 
of government 
role only for the 
benefit of 
business 
development 
Government 
should promote 
economic 
integration both 
tolerate social 
inequality and 
spatial dualism 
 
McCombie (1988); 
Solow (1956) 
Table 3. Cont. 
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Theory 
Basic  
Categories 
Definition of 
Development 
Essential 
Dynamic 
 
Strengths 
 
Weaknesses 
 
Applications 
 
References 
Interregional 
Trade Theory 
including 
attributes of 
price and 
quantity 
 
Growth leading 
more spending 
and continued 
growth (and 
more consumer 
welfare) 
Equilibrium is 
arrived at 
through the 
trade of goods 
 
Unique emphasis 
upon consumer 
welfare and price 
effects 
 
Ignores dynamics 
of development 
and negative 
social effects of 
growth that are 
not included in 
the prices of 
goods 
Governments 
should promote 
free trade 
(infrastructure 
investments, 
lowering tariffs) 
and be more 
efficient 
Barnes (1985); 
Leamer (1995) 
Product Cycle 
Theory 
Product 
stages: New, 
Maturing, 
Standardized, 
Declining 
Continuous 
creation and 
diffusion of 
new products 
Innovation; 
Creative 
destruction; A 
good product 
mix is the 
foundation of a 
strong economy 
 
Describes 
relationship between 
innovation, 
structural change, 
and economic 
development 
outcomes; Describes 
the research and 
production process 
very well;  
Poor at explaining 
the services 
sector; Does not 
take into account 
product 
differentiation; 
Unclear on issues 
of ownership and 
control 
To determine its 
ability to 
compete for 
either new or 
standardized 
products; 
Promote 
product 
innovation and 
further diffusion 
Norton and Rees 
(1979), Vernon 
(1966), 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Theories 
Entrepreneurs
; Innovative 
Milieu  
Resilience, 
Diversity 
Innovation 
process; New 
products and 
new 
combinations 
Important role of 
entrepreneurs; 
Importance of capital 
in business 
formation 
Ignores high rate 
of entrepreneurial 
failure and 
existing economic 
structure, ability 
to innovate 
Support 
Entrepreneurs 
and business 
development 
strategies 
Bellandi (1996); 
Harrison (1992); 
Kamann (1997); 
Maillat (1991) 
Flexible 
Specialization 
Production 
regimes; 
Industrial 
organization 
Quantitative 
increases 
(growth) 
through agile 
production, 
innovation, and 
specialization 
Flexibility 
among 
producers 
allows for 
competitiveness 
and growth 
Emphasizes 
structure and fast-
changing 
characteristics of the 
post-modern 
economy; Industrial 
organization matters 
Ignores that 
business 
flexibility leads to 
worker and 
community 
hardship; Ignores 
local economic 
structure 
Encourage 
flexibility and 
technological 
upgrades; 
Develop 
industry 
networks and 
clusters 
 
Piore and Sabel 
(1984); Porter 
(1990); Sabel 
(1989); Storper 
(1989) 
        
Table 3. Cont. 
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Theory Basic  
Categories 
Definition of 
Development 
Essential 
Dynamic 
 
Strengths 
 
Weaknesses 
 
Applications 
 
References 
Human/Social 
Capital 
Innovation; 
Education; 
Creative 
Workforce; 
Networking 
Value-Added 
Services and 
Goods 
Development is 
based on the 
skills and value–
added capacity 
of the workforce 
and social 
networks 
Clear connection 
between skills of 
workers/education 
and economic 
growth; Emphasis on 
cultural and 
economic diversity 
and openness  
Expensive and 
complex to 
implement; Social 
capital theory has 
been found to be 
ineffective at 
predicting 
economic 
development 
success 
Support skill-
building in the 
workforce; 
Invest in people 
through 
education and 
skills training; 
Investments in 
amenities for 
individuals, not 
businesses 
(Quality of Life) 
Becker (1964); 
Florida (2002); 
Putnam (2000); 
Storper (1993) 
CED-led Theories 
and Strategies 
Diverse 
economies, 
asset-based, 
micro-
business, local 
currency, 
cooperatives, 
collaborative 
networks 
Community- 
and local-level 
empowerment 
in terms of 
income, self-
sufficiency, 
decision-
making and 
other 
capabilities 
Development is 
based on the 
assets, skills and 
organizational  
capacity of the 
community; 
bottom-up 
development 
It is locally focused; 
Merges social and 
economic goals; 
Guided by strategic 
planning; Better 
achieves equity; 
multi-functional 
strategy or 
development system 
Is a changing and 
complex field; not 
yet fully 
systematized 
conceptually; 
Different and 
contrasting 
meanings of 
“community” 
Improved 
community 
tools; New 
businesses 
based on local 
talents; 
Training; 
Education; 
Organizing; 
Improved local 
facilities, 
Changed 
practices by 
established 
institutions like 
banks; Making 
the community 
a better place to 
live and work 
Zeuli and Radel 
(2005); Diochon 
(2003); Malveaux 
(1990); Pinilla 
(1995); Rodriguez 
(1995); Villalobos, 
(1995); Gibson et 
al. (2004); Gibson-
Graham (2006); 
Leyshon (2005); 
Smith (2006); 
Cameron (2003); 
Mathie and 
Cunningham 
(2003); 
Kretzmann and 
Mcknight (1993) 
Based on Malizia and Feser (1999, p. 26-28)
Table 3. Cont. 
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 Each of these theories frames local and regional economic development efforts nationwide.  Their 
uses and applications vary case-by-case, place-by-place, but all are implemented in relationship or 
function with each area’s capacity for development (economic, social, technological and political) 
and it’s physical and social resources (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002).   These resources include 
natural resources, location, labor, capital investment, entrepreneurial climate, transportation, 
communication, industrial composition, technology, size, export market, international economic 
status, and government spending.  
The practice of economic development should be guided by theory, though it should not 
beholden to it (free will).  It is important to understand these theories because economic 
developers use them. Besides, theories “determine, either explicitly or implicitly, how these 
developers understand economic development, the questions they ask about the process, the 
information they collect to analyze development, and the development strategies they pursue” 
(From EDA’s Overview of Economic Development web page based on Malizia and Feser, 1999).  
Economic development theories help provide a better understanding of the realities and workings 
of the economic development process and how others may think about and approach economic 
development.   
2.5 The economic development practitioners 
Defining, explaining and understanding the practice of economic development is a difficult task, as 
complex as the concept per se in its nature and different strands.  However, it is important to 
understand its context and different dynamics in order to understand the findings in this 
dissertation. In the quest for this task, it is important to state first that the field of economic 
development lacks a unifying theoretical framework and the extent of power that practitioners 
have is yet unclear.  Even the definition of the practitioner profession is sometimes ambiguous.  
Rowe (2009) lamented this issue. He alerted the need for a better understanding of the practice of 
local economic development and called for the respect the field deserves.   
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Rowe (2009) encouraged practitioners to mobilize and let the academic and professional 
organizations know how important and vigorous the field of economic development is.  
Furthermore, Rubin (1988) wrote about the frustrations of the economic development 
practitioners because of the uncertainties and dependence that characterize their professions.   
Economic development practitioners are still criticized and underestimated, and this is often 
because of the hallmarks of the “shoot anything that flies; claim anything that falls” point of view, 
described in details by Rubin (1988).  The practice per se is often absent of standards and 
obstructed by internal and external factors); Blakely and Green-Leigh (2009) demonstrated that 
awareness and motivation of the economic development profession have increased.   
Policy for regional and local economic development and the role of practitioners have 
undergone numerous changes since 1960s (Malizia and Feser, 1999; Rowe, 2009; Stimson et al., 
2002).  Activities by local economic developers have changed progressively and diversified as a 
result of the different changes in economic development approaches (Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999).  
Furthermore, the role of the practitioner and the dynamics of the practice of economic development 
vary depending on the type of organization, government agencies, private development 
associations, local development corporations and community development organizations (Blakely 
and Bradshaw, 2002).  
Malizia and Feser (1999) defined the practice of local economic development as “facilitating 
community development that supports business development (p.4).”  Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) 
and Levy (1990) also supported this market-based definition.  Levy (1990) found that 
sales/marketing activities dominate much of economic development practice.  Based on survey 
responses, 65 percent of the economic developers said that the most important activity of their 
agency was publicizing the area and providing information. Providing sites and financing were the 
next most popular answer.  These are basically the activities on which economic development 
agencies spend most of their time and thus consider them to be the most productive use of their 
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resources (Levy, 1990).  Again, the goal is to support business development for the welfare of the 
community.  Yet, there are more detailed visions, perceptions and descriptions of what an economic 
development practitioner is supposed to accomplish.   
Kaplan (1996) saw the economic development practitioner as a very necessary and important 
professional, alternatively apolitical welfare worker, activist and fieldworker.  He asserted that an 
economic development practitioner is a crucial element in assisting communities towards capacity 
building, self-reliance, and empowerment.  In the same line of thinking, Rubin (2000) brought a 
more stirring version of the practice of economic development captured through a series of 
interviews he conducted.  Their interviewees coincided in their belief that practitioners exist to 
empower, educate, advocate, improve, and revive the socio-economic base of their communities.  
Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) and Blakely and Green-Leigh (2009) expanded on this by claiming 
that the practitioner must be able to provide expertise and problem solving skills; the objective is to 
be a facilitator and organizer.  These different descriptions help to provide a clearer picture on the 
practice of economic development.  However, the roles of practitioners have been intensified, 
diversified and professionalized with time. 
2.6 Economic development planning: Shifting focus by practitioners 
The economic development practitioner face “has evolved from the good salesman to a higher 
skill professional with a greater understanding of the multiple disciplines that interact in the 
coalface of daily practice (Rowe, 2009).”  From the postwar era to the mid-1970s, the focus by 
practitioners was based on Keynesian thought, in public economic development agencies and 
regulatory and mixed economic development policies.  Planning was infrastructure oriented with 
clear and primary goals and objectives.  It was the era of the comparative advantage (Malizia and 
Feser, 1999).  From the mid-1970s to the 1990s the focus shifted towards value-added strategies 
and more structure and strategic planning, incorporating workforce and technology change 
(Malizia and Feser, 1999).  It was the era of a monetarism thought centered on competitive 
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advantage.  Practitioners were engaged in initiatives to reduce social disparities by incorporating 
disadvantaged groups into the mainstream economy (Malizia and Feser, 1999, Blakely and 
Bradshaw, 2002). 
From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, rationalist thought centered on collaborative advantage 
started to dominate the field (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002, Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999, Eisinger, 
1998).  Practitioners began to carry out a more (multi sector) integrated strategic planning, 
worried about improving the quality of life of their communities and regions to attract highly 
skilled workers and firms (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002).  Finally, Stimson et al. (2002) claimed that 
within the current cooperative advantage focus, sustainability is becoming the new focus of 
economic policy and everything is working in in accord with sustainability principles.   However, 
this dissertation is focused on collaboration and intergovernmental dependency. 
2.7 Regional interdependency and intergovernmental collaboration 
Places, cities, and regions are connected in different ways. Migration and differences in place of 
work and place of residence are classical examples.  People moving around cities in a metro area, 
driving from one city to another to work, or earning money in one place but spending in another 
are factors that need to be considered by local and regional policy makers and development 
practitioners. Hewings  and colleagues  (2009) argued for the existence of a complex web of 
integrated approaches to regional development that entail spatial interdependence between a vast 
array of federal, state and local government agencies.  
This is an era of regional collaboration following an era of competitiveness, softening or even 
ignoring political boundaries to identify surrounding areas with similar economic structure, assets 
and opportunities (Hewings et al. 2009; Rondinelli et al., 1998).  The idea is to accept the 
interdependency between regions and use it to advantage through collaboration.  Under this 
collaboration approach, scholars and practitioners advocate for an increase of intra- and inter-
metropolitan interaction with the aim to restructure urban economies and reduce fragmentation 
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and competition among communities (Bartik, 2003; Bradshaw, 1993; McCarthy, 2003; Rothblatt, 
1994).  
Interregional dependence has been demonstrated empirically in different ways. One way is by 
analyzing the changing relationship between establishments and firms and the “hollowing out” 
thesis (Hewings, 2007; Hewings et al., 1998; Okazaki, 1987).  This thesis explains a process of 
transformation.  Various products produced by a firm in a local area are spread over establishments 
in nearby areas as part of a multi-regional operation, thus increasing interregional trade and 
interregional dependence.   
Hewings and Parr (2007) showed how this spatial interdependence process works in the 
Chicago metropolitan area setting.  They divided the metro area in four zones and ran input-output 
models to calculate the spatial interactions. Considering inter-sectoral trade, labor mobility and 
consumption-expenditures patterns, 51 percent of the system-wide production of the central 
business district of the city of Chicago (zone 1) owes its existence to signals generated in the rest of 
the metro area (the other zones).  The same happens with the rest of the city of Chicago and the 
suburbs. However, in the outer suburbs zone, only 35 percent depends on the rest of the metro 
area, making this zone more independent than the others. Still, the research community may 
witness an important level of interdependency that must be considered for regional and local policy 
making. The Hewings and Park (2007) paper confirmed and extended on the nature and strength of 
economic interdependence between inner-city communities and suburbs within the Chicago metro 
area that was revealed in Hewings and colleagues (2001).  
Kim and Hewings (2011) challenge some of the micro-macro issues in intersectoral, 
interorganizational and intergovernmental collaboration and/or competition. For example, it is 
appropriate to have 300 communities independently responsible for land use control.  However, 
the changing demographic composition of working households (increasingly dominated by 2 wage-
earners) will continue to change the geography of interaction – so even if communities ignore the 
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interdependence, worker-consumers have already embraced it. Essentially, community-level 
decision-making (especially related to land use) may compromise the ability of the region to absorb 
population and employment growth; hence, the need for greater region-wide collaboration. 
Another similar process that contributes to the body of knowledge about interregional 
dependence is fragmentation.  This occurs when production is spatially split into different nodes of 
distinctive activities often located in different local areas. They are connected by service links 
making a region interdependent.  Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001, 2006) present 
bibliographical and empirical evidence of fragmentation, whereas Hummels  et al. (1998, 1999) 
describe a similar process, vertical integration of production, that also leads to enhanced 
interregional dependence.  Furthermore, Hewings (2007) advises on how fragmentation and the 
“hollowing out” process may also affect migration that ultimately will also affects the dynamics of 
interdependence in a region.  
Other scholar works have also argued in favor of regional interdependence.  Ihlanfelt (1995) 
and Voith (1992) raise doubts about economic dependence and competition and lean more towards 
an interregional dependence thesis.  Downs (1994, 1996) describes important economic linkages 
between the city and the suburbs suggestion high levels of interdependency.  Moreover, Bradbury 
and colleagues (1980); Chang and Coulson (2001), Gottlieb (2000), Hollar (2003), Leichenko 
(2001) and Voith (1998), among others have tested empirically the interrelationships between 
cities and suburbs in a regional economy.  These works have demonstrated that population and 
employment, income levels, house prices, among other variables are spatially related.  This 
interregional dependence framework may provide incentives for collaboration efforts between 
communities to exploit and enhance the benefits from derive from this interdependence.  
As mentioned above, the era of regional collaboration ignores political boundaries to identify 
surrounding areas with similar economic structure, assets and opportunities.  In doing so, cities are 
relying on a multiple variety of organizations (public, private and even non-profit) to deal with local 
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economic development challenges (Reese and Rosenfield, 2002). This has led to the formation of 
strategic interdependent networks among different sectors in a complex web of socioeconomic 
policy making (Hawkins, 2007).  Therefore, networks and intergovernmental activities have 
become the norm in public management of many regions and cities (Agranoff, 1996; Agranoff and 
McGuire, 1998a, 1998b; Lynn, 1996; Mandell, 1988, 1999a, 1999b; O’Toole, 1993, 1996).  Work by 
Agranoff and McGuire (2003) and Rondinelli  et al. (1998) claim that networks and collaborative 
efforts between different local economic development organizations in a region are needed.  
Bradshaw (1993) advises that spatially interdependent communities should share resources 
for the welfare of all the local economies.  This is intergovernmental collaboration. Cities cooperate 
with others to enhance the welfare of their economies, to become more efficient and reduce costs.  
Hawkins (2007) provide several examples of such outcomes citing, among others, the work  of 
Bartik (2003), Clarke and Gaile (1998), Collins (1994), Frisk and Norris (2000), Olberding (1997), 
Savitch and colleagues (1993), Steinback (1991), Voith (1996), Weissbourd (2001) .  Local 
governments cooperate with one another through bilateral and multilateral agreements and under 
vertical and horizontal networks (Agranoff and McGuire, 1998a, 1998b; Hawkins, 2007).  These 
collaboration efforts and networks are complex and typically linked to specific functions.  The ICA 
framework and the Social Capital framework provide the organizational framework and this will be 
elaborated in a later section.  
In other studies, Cigler (1994, 1996) explores the pre-conditions for multi-community 
collaboration.  Further, Littleton (2005) describes the reasons for inter-local collaboration in the 
Bluegrass Area Development District and the factors that lead to success in regional projects.  
Among these factors were the numbers of jurisdictions involved in the project, the amount of grants 
received and whether or not a project resulted from a state or federal mandate, among others.  
Gordon (2007) explores the perceptions of economic development practitioners in Illinois in 
regards to collaboration and competition in their regions.  The main findings were that cities do 
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cooperate, understand the benefits of collaboration and their willingness to engage in more 
collaborative efforts is increasing. However, obstacles to collaboration are still very influential.  The 
bottom line is that collaboration is mostly beneficial for metropolitan and regional economies, 
though that does not mean that there are no costs from and barriers to collaboration with other 
cities.  Among the barriers to regional collaboration are the legacy from the era of competition, 
metropolitan fragmentation (division into too many jurisdictions) and transaction costs (Hawkins, 
2007).  
In the United States, there are different examples of intergovernmental collaboration efforts 
such as the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, an agency created to integrate planning for 
land use and transportation in the Chicago Metro Area.  Hawkins (2007) provides more examples of 
metropolitan governance (a multi-tiered approach to governing the metro area) such as the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul and the Portland multi-purpose districts and the Pittsburgh tax-sharing plan.  
He also highlights examples of regional organizations such as the Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations, the Regional Council of Governments, etc.  The fact is that 
intergovernmental collaboration is a reality and the understanding of intra-metropolitan area 
collaboration is very important for public policy and needs further exploration in regional science 
and economic research.   
Finally, Pettit and Kingsley (2013) urged for some collective actions from communities in the 
Chicago Metro Area. They found great data availability in the region and a fast moving environment 
underscoring the need for communication among data-related organizations and thoughtful 
strategies to take advantage of the potential synergies among the various community information 
efforts. Pettit and Kingsley (2013) proposed a network linking Chicago’s community information 
assets and stimulating the urgency to explore collaboration across issue silos. They go further and 
recommend collective planning and action to strengthen the provision and use of community 
information that would position the Chicago area as a model for other cities.  The next section will 
  30  
 
elaborate more on the theoretical framework used in this dissertation to study intergovernmental 
collaboration in the Chicago Metro Area.  
2.8 Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation combines and extends the ICA and the Social Capital frameworks to the economic 
development research arena to explore collaborative activities between practitioners in the Chicago 
Metro Area.  It relies on these frameworks to construct a model to identify significant factors 
influencing the collaborative setting and explain under the conditions under which cooperative 
joint ventures are formed.  This section provides the necessary details about both frameworks.  
2.8.1 Institutional Collective Action (ICA) 
The ICA framework establishes a comprehensive approach for cooperative interlocal service 
agreements among governments in a region, typically within metropolitan areas.  The aim is to 
capture the benefits of regional service provision through a collective action mechanism (Feiock, 
2004, 2007, 2008).  The ICA presents an outline of the characteristics of and conditions for 
collaboration among local governments. Basically, bilateral and multilateral collaboration are 
functions of transaction costs, that are ultimately a function themselves of the characteristics of the 
services provided, the characteristics of the communities, political institutions and policy networks 
(Feiock, 2004, 2007, 2008).  Taking a basic cost and benefit approach, cooperative agreements 
occur when benefits exceed transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements.  
Thus, collaboration among local governments becomes an institutional collective action (Feiock, 
2004; Ostrom et al. 1961).     
The architecture of this framework has evolved from earlier theories into a diverse set of 
empirical and theoretical works such as Agranoff and McGuire (2003), Feiock (2004), Feiock, 
Steinacker and Park (2009), Gerber and Gibson, 2005, Hawkins (2007), Mandell (1988, 1999a, 
1999b), Kreuger (2006), Steinacker (2004), among other scholars.  This research has challenged 
the traditional competitive notion of economic development with detailed descriptions and case 
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studies that respond to the collaborative era. Ongoing research on collaboration and ICA is also 
developing with case studies in different metro areas throughout the nation and specific cities in 
Michigan, Florida and Georgia (see the list in Feiock, 2008).  The analytical techniques vary from 
descriptive analysis to OLS, probit, Heckman/HLM and others.  However, the ICA does not stand by 
itself.  It has its foundation on two bodies of knowledge: the Coase theorem (1937) and Olson’s 
economic theory of collective action (Olson, 1965).  
The Coase theorem states that under free trade with zero or minimum transaction costs, 
voluntary bargaining between rational entities will achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation (Coase, 
1937; Feiock, 2005).  In a later work, Coase (1960) referred to the allocation of property rights and, 
under similar assumptions, stated that two entities will collectively deal with any externalities 
between them (Feiock, 2005).  Coase (1988) extended this reasoning and analysis to larger groups 
and to collective goods besides property rights (Feiock, 2005).   
Olson’s economic theory of collective action states that members of a group with interests in 
common will act collectively to achieve them, especially when the possibility of a better utility and 
efficiency is high by acting collectively.  Thus, this theory is concerned with the provision of public 
goods through the collaboration of two or more individuals or entities.  It also states that 
collaboration will be possible with selective collaborative incentives, because groups are dealing 
with public goods; non-excludable and non-rivalrous (like forming regional partnerships as 
explained in Hawkins, 2007).  Furthermore, the costs of organizing and collaborating will be as high 
as the size of the group, making larger groups gaining less per capita.  Conversely, in the absence of 
collective incentives, it is concluded that the larger the group the smaller the probability of 
collaboration among members of the group. Another concern in this theory is the impact of 
externalities on group behavior.  Olson warns that in collective action, individuals with more 
resources will carry a higher burden in the provision of a public good than the poorer ones.  There 
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is also the issue of the “free riders”, i.e. individuals or entities in a group benefiting without 
contributing, increasing the probability of collective action of becoming inefficient.  
The ICA framework illuminates the fields of public management and economic development on 
the transaction costs and factors that affect governments’ willingness to collaborate (Feiock, 2005, 
2008; Hawkins, 2007).  It focuses on the perceptions of local government officials about 
intergovernmental collaboration, its cost and its benefits (Feiock, 2008).  The benefits include 
greater efficiencies and economies of scale in services production and provision as well as the 
internalization and addressing spillover problems (Feiock, 2008).  Furthermore, individual local 
entities may benefit from collective action if they can reach their development goals faster than if 
they act individually.  
Feoick (2008) adds that “a decentralized system of governments enhances allocative efficiency 
if it produces a match between community preferences for quantities and qualities of services and 
actual service choices and resource allocation; but it can also result in diseconomies of scale in 
service production and inter-jurisdictional externalities (p. 303).” Economies of scale are a force 
behind inter-local agreements, especially between fragmented governments, because of the relative 
low cost given the large output.  The constraint of fragmented governments is their size, so the 
service provision cost is relatively higher. Nonetheless, in a collaborative setting, the greater is the 
output, the more efficient is the service and the lower is the cost (Feiock, 2008).  
Beyond political ambition (Feiock, 2007), competition and geographical barriers (Hawkins, 
2007), the problem with inter-local collaboration is the cost associated with the collective action.  
According to the ICA framework and its Coasian foundation, transaction costs need to be kept low 
and outweighed by the benefits of collaboration (Feiock, 2007; Feiock, Steinacker, and Park, 2008).  
As stated above, these transaction costs are affected by characteristics of services, characteristics of 
communities, political institution and policy networks (Feiock, 2004, 2007, 2008). Four of the main 
sources of transaction costs are described next. 
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First, there are information costs, suggesting that transparent information on preferences, 
outcomes, pros, cons, costs and benefits about all participants in a collaborative agreement is 
crucial (Feiock, 2008; Hawkins, 2007).  The lack of information and clear communication negatively 
impact motivations and trustworthiness of potential partners (Feiock, 2008).  Information costs are 
affected by the governmental structure of the metro area, number of governmental units and their 
economic, political and demographic composition, as well as their spatial dispersion (Feiock, 2008). 
Hawkins (2007) added that the structure of networks also affects information costs and cited 
studies in support of this finding. 
Secondly, agency costs imply that the agencies and their bargaining agents must accurately 
negotiate cooperative agreements that depart from the preferences and interests of the citizens 
they represent (Feiock, 2008).  If these preferences and interests are too heterogeneous, then the 
greater will be the differences in terms of preferred outcomes, timing of the outcomes and 
cost/benefits evaluations by the bargaining agents, thus making cooperative agreement more 
difficult.  The factor that impacts the most these agency costs is demographic 
homogeneity/heterogeneity; the more homogenous the better (Feiock, 2008).  
Thirdly, negotiation/division costs mean bargaining agents must know how to divide the gains 
and the costs.  Low disparities in bargaining power will increase the probability of collaborative 
agreements (Feiock, 2008).  Otherwise, Olson’s warnings about disparities in power in his 
economic theory of collective action become important.  
Fourthly, there are enforcement costs. Monitoring and enforcing a collaborative agreement 
should not be too costly.  Clear and plausible commitments are very important to keep these costs 
low. Geography is another important factor.  Feiock (2008) stated that close geographic proximity 
and long-term interactions on different common issues reduce these costs.  
Overcoming these costs means having the ability to overcome the problems associated with 
these costs that ultimately affect collective action.  Feiock and Park (2005) stated that given sources 
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of transaction costs, “it is not surprising that much of the literature assumes that centralization of 
authority and consolidation of decentralized governmental units is necessary for effective action 
(p.15).”  Feiock (2008) offered some advice on how to overcome these costs.  As noted in the 
explanation of the transaction costs, it was evident that the characteristics of services, communities, 
political institutions and policy networks are very important factors in predicting collaboration, 
because they impact the amount of transaction costs in collaborative efforts.  Details on these 
factors are explained in the methodology section, where the variables used to measure them are 
described.  Nonetheless, when dealing with the policy network factors, the social capital framework 
becomes relevant to explain collaboration. The next section offers a brief overview of this 
framework.   
2.8.2 Social Capital 
The social capital framework was identified in studies such as Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) and 
Jacobs (1961), and has been developed most extensively since in pioneering work such as Burt 
(1992), Coleman (1987, 1990), Portes (1998) and Putnam (1995).  Nowadays, the dimensions of 
social capital go beyond a specific scope, being popularized, empirically tested and philosophically 
analyzed in fields like economics, geography, sociology, political science, among others.  The aim of 
this section is to provide a general overview of the specific ties with the topic of this dissertation. 
Social capital is the process where norms and networks facilitate collective action for mutual 
benefit.  It focuses on who knows whom (social networks), the character of these networks, the 
strength of the ties in the network, and the levels of trust and reciprocity (Knack, 2001; Putnam, 
1995; Sander and Lowney, 2006).  Ceteris paribus, the expectations from members of communities 
with high social capital are to be more creative, efficient and responsive, to better address public 
(common) issues, to monitor one another’s behavior with trust and no rivalry, to achieve and 
enforce contractual agreements, and to resolve disputes more amicably (Putnam, 1995).  
Consequently, communities are safer, cleaner, wealthier, stronger, more literate, better governed 
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and happier than those without high order social capital.  Therefore, one of the policy goals in 
economic development should be establish, nurture and sustain social capital at the community and 
institutional levels.  
Portes (1998) identifies four sources of social capital, where the basic idea is that social capital 
is inherent in the structure of their relationships.  He distinguishes between two consummatory 
and two instrumental sources.  The consummatory sources are value introjection and bounded 
solidarity, whereas instrumental sources are reciprocity exchanges and enforceable trust.  These 
increase the ability to secure benefits through membership in networks and other social structures 
(Portes, 1998).  The benefits are for both the individual members of a network and the community 
(socioeconomic development). Furthermore, Woolcock (1998) and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) 
conclude that the structure of the state, its different civic and corporate networks and the 
organizational ability of its society together constitute key factors for development.  The extent of 
relations within and between social groups at different levels of society impacts its participatory 
level, sustainability level and growth ability.  
In order to put to work social capital strategies, it is important to have trust-growing elements 
such as repeated exposure and shared spaces, honesty in communications, follow-through on 
commitments and consistency in behaviors (Knack, 2001; Sander and Lowney, 2006).  This is 
virtually consistent with some of the discussion above on ICA.  Cohen and Prusak (2001) argue that 
high levels of social capital within and between organizations strengthen and sustain them in a 
volatile market through elements like trust, mutual understanding and commitment.  Tsai and 
Ghoshal (1998) investigate intrafirm networks and conclude that social interaction and trust 
among them significantly impact their interunit resource exchange and innovation.  Furthermore, 
Knack and Keefer (1997) provide more evidence on how social capital matters for measurable 
economic performance through trust and other civic norms.  
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In this dissertation, the most important thing of this framework is how social capital and the 
resulting social networks affect collaborative efforts.  Networks are very important because 
socioeconomic policies and outcomes are affected by the way actors are embedded in networks, 
their structures and the relationship between them.  Embededness is the degree to which 
individuals, entities or firms are entangled in a particular network (Granovetter, 1992). Hawkins 
(2007) refers to the work of Granovetter (1992) to state that a high level of embededness generates 
trust.  He also expands on the fact that, trust in institutionalized social networks influences the 
formation of industrial clusters.  Ultimately, embededness and social integration influence business 
collaboration, stronger relationships and regional economic development (Cooke, 1997; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984).  Thus, social networks with active local governments embedded in them are crucial 
for collective action. 
The structure of networks and social capital research move in tandem with the study of 
collective action.  For example, Ostrom and Ahn (2005) describe trustworthiness, networks and 
formal and informal rules and institutions as the most important forms of social capital that are 
particularly relevant in this discussion.  Moreover, they are crucial to reduce transaction costs, 
because strong networks reduce uncertainty, reducing information costs and increasing 
communication and accessibility (Butt, 1992, 1997; Coleman, 1990).  As explained earlier in this 
literature review, economic development practitioners face many uncertainties and ambiguities in 
their profession, ultimately affecting policy-making (Blakely and Green-Leigh, 2009; Blakely and 
Bradshaw, 2002; Rubin, 1988).  Therefore, the importance of social networks goes beyond the 
scope of overcoming problems of collaboration and collective action (Gulatti, 1995), and it also 
affects the practice of economic development per se.  
Hawkins (2007) elaborates more on the literature of network structures and its influences on 
social capital.  Among his most appealing references, he dedicates a few paragraphs on how the 
configuration of networks (closed or with structural holes) impacts not only goal achievement 
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among their actors but also social capital in general.  In addition, he describes different types of 
network closures (closed, cohesive and dense), centralized networks, brokers and the structural 
hole theory.  Network closure refers to a measure of the completeness of relational triads (i.e., to 
what extent or degree your friends are also friends). Closed, cohesive and dense networks refer to 
the number of social ties, the type of tie and whether or not members of a group are close to each 
other, how close they are and how many close friends you have in a network. A centralized network 
refers to a system where all the users connect to a central collaborator that is the acting agent for 
all communications. When we talk about brokerage, we are talking about networks as structures of 
exchange (information or material) with certain advantage over other agents or network due to a 
lot of structural holes (i.e. non-redundant ties) in their network.  The common ground of all of these 
sub-topics is the importance of cooperative norms like trust, commitment, consensus and 
reciprocity, plus the frequency of interaction within and between networks.  The methodology 
section that follows this literature review offers additional details on social network, specifically 
relevant to the model.  
2.9 The Chicago Metro Area 
Appendix A presents a set of statistics about the study area to offer an overview of the main 
characteristics of the region.  The Chicago metro area, under the jurisdiction of CMAP, has a 
population of 8,431,386 as estimated by the 2010 Census Redistributing Data (Public Law 94-171) 
Summary File.  This represents a 3.5 percent (or 285,122 persons) increase, compared to the US 
Census 2000.  However, the period 2000-2010 experienced a lower population growth, compared 
to the 1990-2000 increase of 11.58 percent or 845,675 persons.  The city of Chicago, which 
accounts for 31.9 percent of the population of the metro area, lost 6.9 percent of its population, and 
Cook County (61.5 percent of the metro area) lost 3.4 percent.  However, the rest of the counties 
grew and Kendall County experienced the largest increase rate (110.4 percent).  Will, Kane, 
McHenry, Lake and DuPage counties grew 34.9, 27.5, 18.7, 9.2 and 1.4 percent respectively.  The 
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primary contributor of the region’s population growth over the past 10 years has been the growing 
number of Latino residents (more than 25 percent increase).   
At the time the survey was administered, the region’s economy had an unemployment rate of 9 
percent (IDES: Nov 2010) and 12.5 percent of the population were living below the poverty level 
(ACS: 2009).  Unemployment is reasonably consistent across the 7 counties in the region from 8.4 
percent in DuPage County to 10.3 in Kane and Cook counties.  However, patterns of poverty are 
notoriously uneven; Cook County has 14.8 percent of the population living below the poverty level, 
in contrast with 9.5, 7.7 and 6.6 percent in Kane, Lake and Will counties.  Kendall County has the 
lowest percentage (1.9). Overall these statistics remained consistent in 2013. Although the 
unemployment rate was as high as 9.6 percent in the transition between 2010 and 2011, the US 
Census reported a rate of 8.1 percent last year and the Bureau of Labor Statistic reported a rate of 
8.1 percent last August. Nonetheless, poverty increased to 14.5 percent, which surpasses the 
national unemployment rate of 7.3 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics), while the national poverty 
level is higher with more than 16 percent (U.S. Census Bureau). In reference to levels of formal 
education, 40.8 percent of adults aged 25 or older in the Chicago Metro Area have at least an 
associate degree mirroring the national trend (U.S. Census Bureau).  An average of 39.2 percent of 
the same population has at least 4 years of college, which is more than 8 percentage points higher 
than the national trend.  
In regards to coordinated planning, 41 percent of surveyed municipalities adopted their most 
recent comprehensive plan after 2002. In developing that plan, they considered regional plans like 
the 2030 Regional Transportation Plan developed by CATS or the 2040 Regional Framework Plan 
developed by NIPC (CMAP: Municipal Plan Programs and Operations Survey)2. This suggests the 
practice of interregional coordination.   
                                                             
2 CATRS and NIPC were merged into CMAP in 2005. 
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CMAP is undergoing an ambitious set of economic development programs to be implemented 
into the region for the next 30 years.  For example, they have been working on the 2012 Community 
Planning Program, which is a competitive grant program that provides funding for communities to 
participate in projects linking land use and transportation.  CMAP is also initiating local planning 
assistance projects and providing training sessions to equip planning commissions in local areas 
with guidance and resources for better decision making.  They are also offering local technical 
assistance throughout the metro area; assisting with water management and energy innovation 
projects; supporting regional employment clusters through strategic investments in education, 
workforce development, and other human capital projects.  
CMAP has also been working on a comprehensive regional plan called GO TO 2040, which is a 
great example of collaboration, encouraging local officials, businesses, and other stakeholder 
groups to implement recommendations on various action areas of development with broad 
implications for residents' daily lives in the metro area. These action areas are organized under four 
themes: Livable Communities, Human Capital, Efficient Governance, and Regional Mobility.  Livable 
Communities, discusses how to improve the region’s “livability” – what attracts people to a 
particular community. This involves improving efficiency in areas, such as land use and housing, 
water and energy resources, recreation, and sustainability. Human Capital discusses the ways in 
which the region’s economy can thrive based on the availability of their creative class. 
Recommended actions include improving education and workforce development and supporting 
economic innovation. Efficient Governance deals with accountability and transparency of local 
governments. This is obtained by improving access to information, pursuing coordinated 
investments, and reforming state and local tax policies. Finally, Regional Mobility refers to the 
vitality of the region’s transportation system. This is challenged and acknowledged as a crucial area 
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of improvement for economic prosperity and quality of life. More information about GO TO 2040, 
including the full version of the plan, is available at www.cmap.illinois.gov/2040.3  
2.10 Filling the gaps 
This dissertation looks to fill three gaps in the literature.  First, it is necessary to know first-hand if 
communities in the Chicago Metro Area are aware of the advantages of collaboration and if they 
already collaborate from planning and decision-making perspectives. Incidentally, no research has 
been done on this topic in the Chicago Metro Area, though Gordon (2007) wrote about perceptions 
of collaboration and competition among economic development decision makers in Central Illinois. 
If communities are found to collaborate, the variables impacting their willingness to collaborate 
needs to be analyzed. Second, interregional dependence as discussed in this literature review needs 
to be linked with existing intergovernmental collaboration.  Existing research has not looked at the 
impact of awareness of that interdependence on the willingness to collaborate.   Finally, the impact 
of collaborative activities in facilitating capacity and consensus building in the local economic 
development process needs to be assessed.  Actually, Hawkins (2007) stated that little consensus 
has been reached on the degree to which collaborative policies result in measurable benefits.  
The next chapter elaborates more on the methodology used in this dissertation to fill in the gaps 
discussed above. This chapter describes the study area and data collection strategy. It also 
discusses the methodological approaches used. It describes the social network analyses performed, 
the logistic regression model used and the exploratory analyses that were undertaken to meet the 
objectives of this dissertation as well as answering the research questions posted in section 1.1.  
                                                             
3 This plan was nominated for the National Association of Regional Councils 2011 General Achievement 
Award. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Unit of analysis, sampling criteria, and data collection 
The unit of analysis is the Chicago metro area. Since the focus on sampling is place not people, 
this dissertation considers all communities/municipalities under the jurisdiction of CMAP (see 
Figure 1). These regions being under the same regional planning umbrella of CMAP and sharing the 
same state boundaries, made it more attractive than the Chicago Tri-State Metro Region for the 
purposes of this dissertation. Besides, this unit of analysis is comparable and consistent with 
Hawkins (2007), Hewings and colleagues (1998), Hewings, Okuyama and Sonis (2001) and 
Hewings and Parr (2007).  
In regards to the sampling criteria, a list of economic development officials was constructed by 
collecting information from CMAP, the Regional Economics Application Laboratory (REAL) 
database, an online search and the city of Chicago. Potential participants were selected if they were 
leaders in economic or community development in one of the communities within the unit of 
analysis. A convenience sampling was used where a sample from the target population were 
contacted via email and/or phone informing them about the survey study and inviting them to 
participate.  If they could not be reached by these methods of communication and a mailing address 
was available, the survey packet was sent to them. 
Data was collected using two different surveys drawing from Hawkins (2007): one for 
communities using a collaborative approach and another for communities that do not. To increase 
the response rate, flexibility in survey distribution is important.  Therefore, the survey was made 
available in hard-copy and online through Survey Gizmo.  The surveys were mailed and/or emailed 
to local development officials from a total of 283 communities.  Survey packets included a cover 
letter and pre-survey (mailed surveys also included a prepaid envelope, so that participants could 
easily send back the completed surveys).  A total of 211 officials responded to the request, but only 
91 completed surveys were returned, representing a 32% response rate.  
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Figure 1: Study Area  
  
 
Although 32 percent is a relatively low survey response rate compared to similar studies, it is 
higher than the average rate of 30 percent suggested by the International City/Council Management 
Association surveys (ICMA, 1989, 1999, 2004) and the 26 percent proposed by Reese and 
Rosenfield (2003). A t-test with unpaired difference in means was used to determine if local 
governments that returned the survey were significantly different from others in the study region. 
The pre-survey was a Situation Awareness Index and included seven items assessing the extent 
to which communities and development officials aware of what is going on around them as a way to 
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measure interregional dependence.  Survey respondents answered each question on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all aware) to 5 (extremely aware). A sample item was: Are you aware of how many of 
your residents work in your community and how many of them work in other communities? See 
Appendixes B and C for further details.  
Respondents were asked to complete Survey 1 if they used a collaboration approach or Survey 
2 if they did not.  Survey 1 (see Appendix B) comprised of 31 closed-ended questions, asking 
respondents to list the communities that they collaborate with, whether they had established 
agreements with the nearby communities, when the agreement was established, reasons for 
establishing the agreement, the entities that engaged in the collaboration, how the terms of the 
agreement were specified, whether there is a governing board that oversees the collaboration, 
budget and characteristics of the agency, and a demographic profile.  It also included a section 
where respondents identified, from a list of 38 economic development policies, the ones used in 
their local government to encourage development.  Survey 2 (see Appendix C) included 20 closed-
ended questions and is similar to Survey 1, with the exception of the questions on collaboration.  
Survey responses were confidential and none of the questions were anticipated to be sensitive 
or threatening. Therefore, participants were expected to cooperate and answer all the questions 
without major concerns.  Participation was strictly voluntary and participants had the right to quit 
at any time while answering the survey without penalty or retribution.  They were informed that 
the results will be published and presented in aggregate form. It was guaranteed that identifying 
information about the participant and the agency would also be kept confidential, and instead code 
numbers were used. The data obtained from the surveys were safely stored in a safe place. 
3.2 Data Analysis 
Three different types of analysis were conducted in order to answer the research questions.  First, a 
set of social network analyses were performed to examine the characteristics of the 
intergovernmental collaborative network structure in the Chicago metro area.  This was followed 
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by a logistic regression analysis to identify the factors that influence the potential for 
intergovernmental collaboration.  Finally, an exploratory analysis was performed to describe the 
extent to which collaborative activities facilitate capacity and consensus building.  Mean t-tests 
were used to identify differences between the communities that engage in collaboration efforts and 
those that do not. .   
3.2.1 Social network analysis 
The social network analysis measured three areas: intergovernmental interaction frequency, 
collaborative norms, and characteristics of the network structure.  In order to measure the 
frequency of interaction between local governments, the following survey question was used: In the 
past 2 years, how often has your community/municipality communicated with other communities in 
the Chicago metro area to discuss economic development issues? Answer choices were: 1-2 times a 
year, 3-10 times a year, monthly, weekly, daily. See Appendixes B and C for further details. The 
resulting descriptive statistics are shown in chapter 4.2 and 4.6. The responses were also used as an 
independent variable in the logistic regression explained in the next section.  
Collaborative norms indicate the extent to which communities act in a collaborative fashion 
because of the existence of certain norms of trust, commitment, and reciprocity (Hawkins, 2007; 
Olberding, 2002).  This variable was measured with a 7-item additive index of perceptions of 
intergovernmental relations based on the items in the survey used in Hawkins (2007) and 
Olberding (2002). A sample item was: Local governmental officials in the Chicago metro area are 
committed to positive change for the entire region. Each item was measured on a 5-point response 
scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always), thus the additive index ranges from 7 to 35.   See 
Appendixes B and C for further details. The resulting descriptive statistics are shown in chapter 4.3 
and 4.5 (Table 7), and used in the logistic regression model.   
The characteristics of the network structure were assessed using two different methods to 
generate related variables.  First, survey respondents were asked to review a list of all the 
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communities/municipalities of the Chicago metro area considered in this study and to mark the 
ones that their local government has relied on, or collaborated with, in the last two years.  See 
Appendixes B and C for further details. This resulted in a binary matrix coding as ‘one’ the 
communities/municipalities that have a network structure and as ‘zero’ those that do not. Second, 
survey respondents were asked to identify the top 3 government or non-government organizations 
that their local government has relied on the most in their economic development efforts in last two 
years.  The results provided entries into a 2-mode matrix, with rows representing the 
communities/municipalities and the columns representing their responses.  
The two matrices explained above were examined using different levels of measurement that 
represent the characteristics of the network structure. These are size, density, and degree of the 
network; reciprocity; transitivity; clustering; distance; and centralization.  The statistical software 
used to calculate these measurements is UCINET.  This software allows for data and matrix import, 
manipulation, description and operationalization. The equations (1-6) embedded in the software to 
perform the network analysis, as well as the commands are labeled in Figure 2.  
The size of network is often critical to understand its behavior, exchange of resources, and 
capacities (Carrington et al., 2004; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It represents a unique ordered 
paired of actors and it is displayed in Equation (1).  The density of a network is the degree of 
linkage among the individual nodes in a graphical representation (Carrington et al., 2004; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  It reflects the overall proportion/strength of connections among 
network members and it is displayed in Equation (2).  As Hawkins (2007) noted, “measuring the 
density of a network provides an index of the degree of dyadic connection in a population.” (p.87)  
The degree of a network is the number of connections or edges from a node to the other nodes 
(Carrington et al., 2004; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  If a network is directed (i.e., edges point in 
one direction from one node to another), then the nodes have two different degrees: the in-degree 
(i.e., in-coming edges or parties collaborating with the focused node) and the out-degree (i.e., out-  
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Figure 2: Diagram of equations embedded in network analysis4 
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4 These equations were run as functions or command in UCINET. For example, to describe the data and see 
the matrix, the command is Data>Describe. 
5 Network>Properties>Density  
6 Network>Centrality>Degree 
7 Network>Properties>Transitivity 
8 Network>Centrality>Betweenness 
9 Network>Centrality>Closeness 
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coming edges or parties with whom the focused node collaborates).  This is illustrated in Equation 
(3).  Another measures for the network are reciprocity and transitivity. Reciprocity measures the 
tendency of vertex pairs to form mutual connections between each other. Transitivity describes a 
node through which communication travels, e.g. {
 
k
12
,
 
k
23
,
 
k
13
}.  This measure provides the density 
of transitive triples in a network; the triples can be ordered or unordered (Carrington et al., 2004; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  This is illustrated in Equation (4).  
In regards to clustering in network analysis, it provides a coefficient that measures the degree 
to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. The distance in a network is also important 
because it tells how close or distant communities are in this particular case study. If A tells B, and B 
tells C (and A does not tell C), then actors A and C are more distant than A and B or B and C. These 
characteristics are examined through centralization measures due to the nature of the data 
(Carrington et al., 2004; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Network centralization examines the overall network structure, indicating whether it is 
organized around one or a few central actors (very centralized), or no dominant actors (less 
centralized).  Two different measures were used here: betweenness and closeness.  Betweenness is 
the extent to which a node lies between other nodes in the network, bridging clusters, connecting 
actors indirectly through their direct links. For example, if actor A lies between each other pair of 
actors and no other actors lie between A and other actors, then actor A has an advantage in the star 
network since A is more powerful. If A wants to contact D, A may simply do so. If D wants to contact 
F, they must do so by way of A. On the other hand, Closeness is the extent to which an actor is near 
all other actors in a network.  For example, if actor A is closer to more actors than any other actor, 
then actor A has an advantage in the star network, A is more powerful (Carrington et al., 2004; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Equations (5) and (6) display a mathematical representation of these 
concepts.  
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 3.2.2 Logistic regression analysis 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the extent to which variables identified 
from the literature influence collaboration.  This model draws extensively on Hawkins (2007) and 
McGuire (2000). Equation (7) displays the regression model and Table 4 provides a description of 
the independent variables in the model with the hypothesized direction of the relation between 
these variables and collaboration.  The Statistical STATA SE 10.0 was used to perform this part of 
the analysis. 
The dependent variable represented whether or not a community has a joint venture or 
collaboration (Hawkins, 2007).  The term joint venture was defined in the cover letter and as a 
footnote to the question as follows: A joint venture for economic development is meant by both 
formal and informal cooperative agreements established between local governments of 2 or more 
communities that are intended to encourage development and improve economic and fiscal 
conditions.  Each survey respondent answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the following question: Has your 
community voluntarily established a joint venture with other local governments for economic 
development purposes?  Thus, consistent with previous research, this study used a binary dependent 
variable (Feiock and Clingermayer, 1992 and Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong, 1992 as cited in 
Hawkins, 2007).  If the respondent indicated ‘yes’ to having joint ventures, the variable was coded 
‘one’; otherwise, it was coded ‘zero’. See Appendixes B and C for further details. 
The first variable, geography, has been found to affect economic policy decisions. This 
demonstrates that space matters, not only to economic development and growth indicators, in 
general, but also to attitudes and practices (Gallup et al., 1998).  Moreover, Hawkins (2007) cites 
several studies demonstrating that location within a metro area influences the extent of economic 
development and policy adoption by local governments.  Therefore, geography, or the community’s 
relative location with respect to the main economic center (i.e., Chicago metro area), was expected 
to increase the probability of establishing collaborative efforts.       
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Table 4: Model explanation 
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Variables: 
Model Label 
Variables: Definition Expected 
Sign 
Logodd Dependent binary variable whether or not a community has a joint 
venture: 1 yes, 0 no. 
… 
Geog Distance from the City of Chicago - 
PopLog Total Population (Log) - 
Pov Percent of population in poverty + 
Diversity Lieberson's Index of Diversity - 
Fiscal Long term debt  - 
Manu Percentage of manufacture jobs + 
DevActive Total # of development policies + 
DiffPov Difference between community and metro area (percent in poverty) - 
DiffDiv Difference between community and metro area (percent in diversity) - 
Plan Dummy: strategic plan in force (1) yes; (0) no + 
Pubpri Dummy: lead agency is public-private partnership (1) yes; (0) no + 
Dir Dummy: lead official is a full time director (1) yes; (0) no + 
Budget Dummy: development budget increasing (1) yes; (0) no + 
Income Median household income - 
Aware Spatial interdependency situation awareness + 
Emplbed Dummy: (1) employment center; (0) bedroom community + 
Norm Cooperative norms: trust, commitment and reciprocity additive index + 
Cohesion Network cohesion + 
Central Network betweenness centralization + 
SupDem Dummy: (1) Demand-side policies; (0) Supply-side policies + 
Edu Percentage of persons with a bachelor degree or higher - 
 
Population size has been found to impact collaborative efforts, but findings have been 
inconclusive.  For example, Clingermayer and Feiock (1990) concluded that population size 
positively impacted the adoption of development policies.  However, Hawkins (2007) found that 
population size negatively impacted on joint venture formation.  Moreover, McGuire (2000) 
suggested that the population size variable is not significant at all.  This dissertation expected that 
the larger the population size, the lesser the likelihood of establishing a collaboration, because 
larger communities are expected to have more resources and independence (Hawkins, 2007).   
A negative relation was also expected when measuring the impact of racial diversity through 
the Lieberson’s Index of Diversity.  Communities that are more similar may find it easier to 
collaborate, so increased diversity may lead to decreased collaboration (Hawkins, 2007).  
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Collaborating may represent a transaction cost given the potential complexity in coordinating 
across communities that are different, particularly if different in terms of their socio-economic 
status.  In order to measure diversity, the Lieberson’s composite diversity index displayed in 
Equation (8) was used.  The index ranges from ‘zero’ (perfectly homogenous) to ‘one’ (perfectly 
heterogeneous).  



N
i
ipD
1
21
,                 (8) 
 p = proportion of individuals in an ethnic category 
 N = number of categories 
Other factors in the logistic regression function have to do with the economic condition of the 
communities.  Specifically, percent of the population in poverty, long term debt, expected budget, 
economic base, median household income, and level of formal education.  A positive relation was 
hypothesized between poverty level and collaboration. Communities with high levels of poverty 
were expected to be more willing to collaborate given their efforts for implementing innovative 
approaches to improve their economic development status, as suggested in the literature 
(Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong, 1992; Goetz, 1993); however, others have found poverty level to 
be an insignificant factor (Hawkins, 2007).  Fiscal stress (long term debt) was expected to be 
negatively related to collaboration because communities with severe fiscal stress may not be 
attractive to more affluent communities for collaborative efforts (see Hawkins, 2007).  This study 
used long-term debt outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year for non-utility purposes. 
In regard to community budget, this dissertation only considers the expectation of an upcoming 
higher or lower budget.  See Appendixes B and C for further details. McGuire (2000) used both 
current and expected budget, but his data set was larger.  In addition, almost half of the survey 
respondents in this research did not provide information on current budget.  Therefore, it was 
better to focus on the expected budget perception data.  The expectation was that if the budget is 
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expected to increase, then a higher probability of establishing a cooperative agreement was 
expected based on previous research (McGuire, 2000). 
Economic base or the strength of the manufacture sector was expected to be positively related 
with collaboration, as found in previous studies (Greene and Kwong, 1992, as cited in Hawkins, 
2007; Hawkins 2007).  The stronger the manufacturing sector in the community, the more likely 
the community will collaborate. Communities with a strong manufacturing sector enjoy higher 
wages and the multiplier effects on the local economy are higher (Hawkins, 2007).  Therefore, 
communities may be willing to adopt different innovative approaches to development and even 
collaborate with nearby communities to develop strategies good enough to strengthen the sector. 
Median household income was expected to be negatively related to collaboration.  It was assumed 
that the wealthier the community, the less need to engage in collaborative efforts. The same 
rationale was used to predict a negative relation between education and collaboration.   
Employment center was a dummy variable used to identify whether the community is an 
employment center or not. In order to be classified as an employment center, there should be more 
workers working in the place than living there. Therefore, the qualifiers are those cities with a ratio 
of 1 or more of workers working in the city divided by people living in the city.  Employment 
centers attract employees from different communities with the expectation that this would enhance 
the probability of establishing collaboration, so a positive relation was expected.  
Differences between particular characteristics of a community and the characteristics of other 
communities in the region “indicate the homogeneity among potential partners in economic 
development joint ventures (Hawkins, 2007, p.83).”  These differences are linked to transaction 
costs that ultimately determine the probability of engaging in collaboration.  The same measures of 
poverty and demographic diversity were calculated for the metro area.  Then, differences in 
poverty and demographic diversity between the community area and the metro area were 
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calculated and used in the model as DiffPov and DiffDiv.  Both variables were expected to have a 
negative impact on the probability of establishing a cooperative agreement.  
In regards to policy- and agency-oriented variables, the model included the number of 
economic development policies used in the community and a situation awareness index.  In 
addition, it included four dummy variables that offered information on whether they have a 
strategic plan in force, a lead agency that is a public-private partnership, and a lead official that is a 
full time director; and use supply- or demand-side policies.  Consistent with previous research, 
these variables were expected to be positively related to collaboration (McGuire, 2000).  The 
number of policies indicates how active the community is in that area.  This information was 
obtained asking participants the following: “Please check each policy listed below that your 
community uses to encourage development (check all that applies). The list included 38 economic 
development policies.  See Appendixes B and C for further details. 
The situation awareness index was based on the 7-item pre-survey (addressed in section 3.1), 
to analyze the extent to which communities (or local development officials) are aware of ‘what is 
going on’ around them.  The index runs from 5 (‘not at all aware’) to 35 (‘extremely aware’).  The 
underlying assumption is that the existence of a certain level of awareness on how dependent a 
community is on other communities, it influences the willingness to collaborate.  This is a factor 
that has been often neglected in the collaboration literature.   
In regards to the four dummy variables, the questions asked were the following:  
1. Strategic plan question: Do you have an updated strategic development plan in force (less 
than 2 years old)? 
2.  Public-private partnership question: Is the leading economic development agency in your 
community/municipality a public-private partnership? 
3. Full time director question: Is the leading development official or manager a full-time 
director? 
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4. Supply- or demand-side policies question: What are the most popular policies in your 
community/municipality? 
If respondents answered ‘yes’ to questions 1 thru 3, their answers were coded as ‘one’; and as ‘zero’ 
if they responded otherwise. If respondents answered ‘demand-side’ to questions 4, their answers 
were coded as ‘one’; and as ‘zero’ if they responded ‘supply-side’. See Appendixes B and C for 
further details. 
Research suggests that having a strategic plan and a lead agency that is a public-private 
partnership are positively related to collaboration (McGuire, 2000).The presence of a full-time 
director was positively related to collaboration, but the relation was not significant.   McGuire 
(2000) concluded that “cities with the highest reliance on endogenous instruments [demand-side 
policies] collaborate, on average, nearly twice as much as do the rest of the sample cities.” (p. 283)  
Norm , Cohesion, and Central variables were used on the social network analysis (section 3.2.1) 
and also in the logistic regression to examine their impact on collaboration. It was predicted that 
the greater the communication and the existence of trust, commitment, and reciprocity, the less 
costly will be the collaborative transaction.  It was also expected that the denser and more 
centralized a network or a node is, the better the probability of establishing a cooperative 
agreement.  The reason is that cohesive policy networks and those with central actors reduce 
transaction costs by facilitating information flow, reciprocity and transparency.  Furthermore, 
central actors in a network can be facilitators in a joint venture bringing in trust and a figure of 
authority with capability of providing good information and experience (Coleman, 1990). 
Finally, the descriptive analyses are complemented with a spatial analysis. GeoDa was used to 
run the spatial analyses. This was performed to identify and discuss clusters found in the data 
collected; such as clusters of municipalities with joint ventures, development plans, full time 
director on duty, and centralized networks, among others. This allows us to have a spatial sense of 
the data, complement data discussions and draw further conclusions.  
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3.2.3 Exploratory Analysis 
The final analytical step represents an effort to explore the extent to which collaboration 
translates into capacity and consensus building in the local economic development process.  This 
was assessed through a set of 6 items, where the respondents indicated their level of agreement 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), thus the additive index ranges from 6 to 30.  A 
sample item was: “Institutional collective action among communities of the Chicago metro area 
makes our communities and the region itself stronger.” See Appendixes B and C for further details. It 
was predicted that a significant number of development officials consider collaboration as an 
effective policy making tool. In addition, those with denser and more centralized networks are 
expected to benefit the most from collaboration.  A mean difference t-test was performed to prove 
this assumption. 
Healey (1998) claimed that collaborative approaches to urban planning build institutional 
capacity and produce more effective and durable policies.  McGuire (2000) suggested that the 
effectiveness of particular economic development policies is determined by the ability of the 
development official to successfully search and engage multiple actors in the process.  Innes (2004) 
stated that the presence of authentic dialogue between stakeholders or policymakers encourages 
collaboration and, ultimately, a healthy consensus building process.  Besides, she added that this is 
true especially in situations of uncertainty and controversy, where the people involved in the 
process have incentives to collaborate.  
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis together with the interpretation and 
discussion.  First, the survey response rate and an analysis of the differences between the 
communities that did and did not respond to the survey are discussed.  General observations about 
the participant communities/municipalities are presented next.  The section entitled Economic 
Development Policies discusses the policies that the responding communities/municipalities used 
to encourage development.  This is followed by sections that elaborate and distinguish between 
communities with and without collaborative efforts; reasons for collaborating or not, and barriers 
to collaboration.  Some of the participants’ textual responses regarding the barriers for 
collaboration are offered.  This is followed by a discussion of Spatial Awareness or how 
knowledgeable are the communities of what is going on around them. The Network Analysis 
section discusses the different forms of collaboration, as well as quantitative characteristics of the 
networks. The results from the logistic regression model used to identify and explain the factors 
that facilitate collaborative efforts are presented in the section that follows.  Finally, the last section 
of this chapter explains the extent to which collaboration translates into capacity and consensus 
building in the local economic development process. 
4.2 Survey Results 
  Figure 3 is a map of the participant communities/municipalities.  Results from the unpaired 
difference t-test showed that the responding communities and municipalities were over-
represented by those with an above average median household income and a higher percentage of 
employment centers (see Table 5). An important finding was that, overall, there were no other 
significant differences between the responding communities and the others in the study region, in 
terms of population, diversity, poverty level, average jobs in manufacturing, and levels of formal 
education. 
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Figure 3: Maps of response rates and municipalities with and without joint ventures 
                    
 
Table 5. Difference in Mean Values of Sample Communities and Region 
Joint Sample¹ Region² 
Average population (2010) 22,119 29,793 
Lieberson's Index of Diversity 0.3845 0.5164 
Average poverty level 6.18 7.69 
Average percent jobs in manufacturing 16.14 13.44 
Average Median Household Income* $85,668 $72,789 
Average percent of education (bachelor's degree or higher) 38.19 35.24 
Percentage of employment centers* 38.46 31.45 
¹ 91 communities   
² 283 communities   
*Unpaired t-test, significantly different at 0.05   
 
The spatial cluster analysis indicated that there were no clusters among the municipalities that 
responded the survey. This is interesting and somewhat surprising based on multiple clusters and 
spatial concentration found in the Chicago Metro Area when analyzing industry clusters (CMAP 
2007, 2009), accessibility clusters (plenty of or lack of; Pettit and Kingsley, 2013), human capital 
spatial mismatches (World Business Chicago, 2012), employment subcenters (McMillen, 2003), and 
even clusters of United Way Partner Communities (United Way, 2013). 
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4.3 General Observations 
Table 6 presents a summary of selected characteristics of the responding communities based on 
their responses to the survey (see Appendixes B and C for further details).  One objective of this 
study was to identify local governments that engage in collaboration efforts, which represented 
49.5 percent of the sample (see Figure 2).  In comparison to non-collaborative communities, the 
communities that engaged in collaborative efforts shared the following characteristics, which were 
consistent with our expectations:  
1. greater awareness of spatial interdependence and interaction;  
2. more updated strategic development plans in force (less than 2 years old);  
3. more full-time leading development officials or directors;  
4. more demand-side policies approaches;  
5. more public-private partnership agencies;  
6. a larger manufacturing base;  
7. less long-term debt;  
8. higher levels of poverty;  
9. farther from the city of Chicago; and 
10. greater awareness of spatial interdependence and interaction;  
In addition and also as expected, communities without joint ventures reported having higher 
median household incomes and levels of formal education, as well as being employment centers.  
Among the 91 community officials who responded to the survey, 35 were employment centers, and 
60 percent of these, were communities without joint ventures. Contrary to expectations, 
communities with joint ventures (vs. those without) had a larger population size and greater 
diversity.  It was believed that a larger population size would decrease the probability of joint 
ventures, because larger communities are expected to have more resources and independence 
(Hawkins, 2007). However, findings suggest that communities with a larger population may have a 
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Table 6. Summary of Selected Characteristics of Responding Communities 
Characteristic Joint No Joint Overall 
Responses 45 46 91 
Level of Spatial Awareness 25.80 24.02 24.90 
Updated strategic development plan in force 15 12 27 
Agency is public-private partnership 13 5 18 
Leading development official or manager is full-time director 32 21 53 
Expect an increase in the development budget 11 13 24 
Average frequency of communication (only joint ventures) 2 0 2 
Cooperative norms additive index (average) 22.29 24.78 23.55 
Demand-side policies 33 26 59 
Average population (2010) 23,138 21,121 22,119 
Lieberson's Index of Diversity 0.3945 0.3747 0.3845 
Average poverty level 6.40 5.96 6.18 
Long term debt $22.4 M $25.4 M $23.9 M 
Average distance to the City of Chicago 29.71 24.39 27.02 
Average % Jobs in manufacturing 17.14 15.16 16.14 
Manufacturing among the top 3 industries 35 30 65 
Average Median Household Income $81,180 $90,059 $85,668 
Average % of education (bachelor's degree or higher) 33.33 42.94 38.19 
Employment Centers 14 21 35 
N = 91         
 
greater need to exchange resources (Clingermayer and Feiock, 1990).  Although it was expected 
that similar communities may find it easier to coordinate collaborative efforts; these findings 
suggest that dissimilar communities may find it important to communicate and collaborate in order 
to take advantage of their diverse population and economies. 
Interestingly, communities without joint ventures scored higher on the Cooperative Norms 
Additive Index, compared to communities with joint ventures. Cooperative norms indicate the 
extent to which parties usually act in a collaborative fashion because of the existence of certain 
levels of trust, commitment, and reciprocity (Hawkins, 2007; Olberding, 2002).  The index 
measured the perceptions of regional intergovernmental relations and, unexpectedly, the results 
suggest that communities without joint ventures have more positive perceptions about 
collaboration than those with joint ventures.  It is possible that these communities may be 
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interested and willing to collaborate, but do not have a joint venture because of reasons out of their 
control or characteristics that may not be attractive to other communities.  Among those 
communities with a joint venture, the average frequency of communication to discuss economic 
development issues was 3-10 times a year.   
These general observations are consistent with the expectations of the logistic regression 
model discussed in chapter 3.2.2.  However, it is important to test whether these variables are 
significant predictors and not mere or insignificant trends among communities engaging in 
collaborative efforts. Section 4.11 discusses the results from the logistic regression analysis.  
4.4 Spatial Observations 
Most of the data by municipality obtained from the surveys were mapped in GeoDa to explore 
spatial trends.  In particular, seven of the variables exhibited some interesting trends. Six of them 
are included in this section, including clusters of municipalities with joint venture, cluster of 
municipalities with development plans, cluster of cooperative norms, clusters of development 
active communities, clusters of municipalities with full time director, and clusters of centralization 
among communities. The seventh variable, Awareness, is addressed later on this chapter because 
this topic is part of our research questions directly and thus, it is discussed in section 4.9. Figures 
4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e and 4f display the cluster maps of the first six variables. All the cluster analyses 
were run without non-respondent communities (showed in gray) to avoid influences in the spatial 
autocorrelation outcomes. The analyses were performed with 9,999 permutations and a 
significance index of p = 0.05.   
It was expected to observe defined clusters of collaboration predictors due to the defined 
spatial trends in the population of the Chicago Metro Area, characterized by a spatial agglomeration 
of two important socioeconomic variables: income and population.  The Chicago metro area 
exhibits clear segregations of income and race, with the northern suburbs being relatively more 
affluent than the southern suburbs. The city is segregated with the majority of the population in the 
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north being White, and primarily Black in the south. Moreover, in the western area there is a large 
non-English-speaking population that is primarily Latina/o.  The geographical distribution of race 
is largely a result of Chicago's historical housing allocation policy, that forced its Black population 
into the cheaper Chicago South Side.  Besides, as the population of Chicago itself has gradually 
fallen, the population of its wider metro area has grown. This represents both, a natural growth in 
those areas and a gradual outward move of the city's workforce into the surrounding suburbs.  
Other related variables, such as higher levels of formal education and better quality of life, are 
predominant in the more affluent northern areas. So, given the spatial trends with these variables, 
positive spatial autocorrelations or various clusters of collaboration predictors were expected in 
either of these regions of the metro area.   
The spatial cluster analysis showed negative spatial autocorrelations; suggesting patterns of 
differences among neighboring areas (see Figures 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, and 4f).  The resulting maps 
describe Low-High (low values surrounded by high values) and High-Low (high values surrounded 
by low values). These results contradict expectations based on the income and population 
geographical distribution of the communities in the Chicago Metro Area.  However, population size 
and economic development efforts are not homogenous, making the suburbs different from their 
neighbors, even if they share a common racial composition and income level.  Within the suburbs, 
there is a good mix of employment centers, which are likely to be surrounded by bedroom 
communities.  Employment centers have the resources to support more vibrant, dynamic, and 
active economic development departments; in contrast with bedroom communities that do not 
need a leading agency, a full time director, or a comprehensive budget and plan.  Bedroom 
communities are primarily comprised of residential areas available and accessible to employment 
centers’ employees.  Therefore, it is rare to observe positive spatial autocorrelation clusters among 
variables or predictors of economic development.  
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Figure 4: Clustering in survey responses:  
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Figure 4 cont.:  
 
Figure 4a depicts clusters of communities with joint ventures.  The only positive spatial 
correlation found was among a few small communities in the Northwest that are relatively far from 
the city of Chicago.  This was consistent with expectations that farther geographical distance from 
Chicago, small population size, and little diversity would be related to an increased probability of 
establishing collaborative efforts. In addition and in this particular case, clustering is 
linked/dominated by pairs of relationships. Three communities in that area not only have joint 
ventures, but many of those are between each other.  
Larger communities and governments are expected to have more resources and independence 
and, therefore, be less likely to collaborate. Moreover, the communities in the Northwest tend to be 
less diverse, making it easier to coordinate collaborative efforts.  Because coordination may 
represent a transaction cost, it is more complicated to coordinate among dissimilar communities, 
particularly when they are economically dissimilar.  This explains the predominance of the negative 
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spatial autocorrelations depicted in Figure 4. Besides, there is problem of adjacency when 
surrounding communities may be non-respondents or when the joint venture is coordinated or 
governed by a third party organization that have multiple cities around the region engaged in the 
joint venture. Also, collaboration in some communities is not spatially adjacent. Some communities 
collaborate with other communities far from them for convenience, common targets or simply 
because of self-selection of communities neighboring, e.g., bedroom communities.  
Municipalities with an updated economic development plan are also scattered, but a hot spot 
(group of communities with a plan) can be observed in the South, an area characterized by high 
levels of poverty (see Figure 4b). In many cases, this can be a predictor of more active economic 
development .  Poor areas and with severe fiscal stress may not be attractive to other more affluent 
and competitive areas.  However, if they are surrounded by similarly distressed communities, they 
may be more flexible and open to collaborate and create economic development plans to improve 
their current status.  This can be facilitated if community members are willing to actively 
collaborate in improving welfare of the region.  Nonetheless, this is the only positive spatial 
autocorrelation pattern observed across the different maps in Figures 4.  Negative spatial 
autocorrelations were more prevalent given the dissimilarities among most of the suburban 
communities, and the reasons already discussed above.   
Figure 4c is somewhat different from other maps, evidencing clusters with positive spatial 
autocorrelations and “hot spots,” specifically concentrated in the central-north region nearby the 
O’Hare International Airport. The map shows a cluster of high collaborative norms in the central 
region and in the East, right above the city of Chicago; and this is another case of clustering  linked 
by dominating pairs of mutual neighboring relationships. Given their proximity to the airport as 
their main economic engine, these communities shared several characteristics, including joint 
transaction-specific investments, observability, transportation and environmental profiles and 
challenges, residents that primarily work at the airport or at airport-related jobs, and demographic 
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homogeneity.  The communities farther from the airport (towards the East and towards the North) 
may share similar characteristics related to few but strong industry clusters in their regions. On the 
other hand, these hot spots are very collaborative communities but with different joint ventures 
across the region, not necessarily between themselves.  
In regard to the total number of development policies (see Figure 4d), four small clusters of 
very active communities were found in the South, Northwest, and center-North regions.  The South 
cluster is the same one found when identifying communities with an economic development plan, 
and mainly based on joint ventures with farther communities and small projects among the 
neighboring municipalities.  These communities are organized, share some common distresses, and 
are more flexible and willing to put together different ideas to advance their development and 
improve their condition.  The Northwest clusters or “hot spots” is the same one found when 
identifying communities with joint ventures.  These communities are similar in their demographics, 
income, accessibility, governance, industrial composition, and distance from the city.  They 
cooperate between themselves. The other cluster of communities using development policies was 
found in the center towards the North, close to the airport.  These communities are likely to be 
active in their economic development efforts due to their proximity to the airport.  However, there 
joint ventures are characterized by collaboration with other municipalities outside that zone. 
Figure 4e depicts similar patterns of negative autocorrelation in regards to having a full-time 
development director.  The only “hot spot” was found in the central metro area where there were a 
few communities similar in size and economic complexity. These communities required a more 
defined structure of their economic development efforts and someone leading them in that process. 
They collaborate between themselves.  
Figure 4f depicts network centralization. Clusters of high centralization are found in the 
Northeast and Northwest regions (the same “hot spots” as in developing active municipalities).    
Network centralization measures the extent to which the network supports or is dominated by a 
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single node.  It requires high levels of organization and structure, as well as common projects under 
an umbrella organization (e.g., an industry, a development agency, or the Chamber of Commerce) or 
without an umbrella.  “Hot spot” communities share these characteristics. These communities in the 
“hot spots” collaborate having a central actor or in this case, a central neighbor. Clustering is again 
linked/dominated by pairs of relationships and one of these communities is the one linking the rest 
of them. These spatial trends generate interesting ideas to better understand collaboration and 
economic development, thus, these findings will be addressed in subsequent sections to elaborate 
in further results.  
4.5 Economic Development Policies 
An important discussion in this study is about the policies that the responding communities use 
to encourage development.  Participants identified their community policies from a list of 38 based 
on previous research (Hawkins, 2007).  Participating communities were likely to focus on policies 
related to locality, mainly aimed at improving the community’s attractiveness to industries and 
development potential.  Table 7 shows that the top three policies identified were roadway 
infrastructure expansion, inventory of developable land, and land use planning for industry.  In fact, 
these are traditional development policies that are politically attractive and socially popular.  The 
so-called first and second waves development strategies discussed in table 2, section 2.3, are very 
much alive among the most popular responses.  For example, among the top 10 policies were 
industrial and commercial site promotion and tax abatement to businesses; while the top 15 
included land acquisition and assembly, water distribution, and policies focused on improving a 
community’s capacity to support industries.  These policies are typical of export base and growth 
pole theories (see Table 3, chapter 2.4).  Therefore, most of the surveyed communities adopt place-
based initiatives focused on enterprise zones, business improvement programs, infrastructure and 
neighborhood investments, and urban development (Bolton, 1992; Glaeser, 2000). 
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Table 7. Local Policies to Encourage Development 
Rk Policy n Pct.(%) Rk Policy n Pct.(%) 
1 Roadway infrastructure expansion 55 60.44 23 Lobbying 25 27.47 
2 Inventory of developable land 54 59.34 24 Job training for workforce 21 23.08 
3 Land use planning for industry 52 57.14 25 Tourism development 21 23.08 
4 Marketing brochures 50 54.95 26 Business linkage program 19 20.88 
5 Special events planning 47 51.65 27 Job linkage program for residents 18 19.78 
6 Business liaison committees 46 50.55 28 Historic/cultural development 17 18.68 
7 
Industrial/commercial site 
promotion 45 49.45 29 Purchase advertisements 16 17.58 
8 Site development 43 47.25 30 Affordable housing construction 15 16.48 
9 Tax abatements to businesses 43 47.25 31 Low interest loans to businesses 15 16.48 
10 Solid waste collection 42 46.15 32 Developing industry cluster strategy 14 15.38 
11 Trade shows 42 46.15 33 
Non-profit organization 
development 10 10.99 
12 Visits to prospective firms 39 42.86 34 Leadership development 8 8.79 
13 Land acquisition and assembly 38 41.76 35 Public health programs 8 8.79 
14 Water distribution 37 40.66 36 Entrepreneurship training 7 7.69 
15 Utility management 35 38.46 37 Solicit foreign business 5 5.49 
16 Regional promotion activities 35 38.46 38 Export assistance program 3 3.30 
17 Inspection/code enforcement 34 37.36 39 Other: TIF 3 3.30 
18 Improved/expanded parking 33 36.26 40 None of the above 3 3.30 
19 Recreation amenity development 30 32.97 41 Other: Redevelopment Agreements 2 2.20 
20 Rehabilitation of buildings 30 32.97 42 Other: Housing Incentives 1 1.10 
21 Sale of land 28 30.77 43 Other: Enhancement Grant 1 1.10 
22 Revenue sharing 28 30.77        
 
Based on current research, it was expected that surveyed participants would report more 
integrated strategic planning initiatives, beyond the third wave policies discussed in Chapter 2.2 
(Blakely and Bradsahw, 2002; Blakely and Green-Leigh, 2009; Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999; 
Eisinger, 1998; Stimson et al., 2002; and Florida, 2002).  These included policies focused on social 
quality of life, sustainability, regional collaboration, workforce training, human capital 
development, public-private partnerships, and ad-hoc market-based initiatives.  Specifically, it was 
expected that surveyed communities would endorse the following policies: job training for 
workforce, job linkage programs for residents, historic and cultural development, non-profit 
organization development, leadership development, and entrepreneurship training. However, less 
than 25 percent of the surveyed communities actually endorsed them; while less than 10 percent 
used leadership development and entrepreneurship training policies, among others.  These 
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findings, however, are consistent with suggestions that the waves or phases of economic 
development are cumulative, rather than evolutionary (Reese and Ye, 2011). 
Going back to the most popular policies to encourage development as shown in Table 7, the top  
responses by the surveyed communities are consistent with survey findings from the ICMA (1999, 
2004, 2009).  In their recent survey, the ICMA (2009) reported that policies related to 
infrastructure, trade shows, and promotional activities were used by more than 50 percent of the 
surveyed communities.  Moreover, more than 40 percent of their respondents reported partnering 
with other communities or municipalities, which is consistent with the 49.45 percent of joint 
ventures reported in this dissertation.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a recent trend of regions increasingly adopting demand-side 
development strategies, compared to supply-side strategies.  Therefore, the expectation was that 
surveyed communities would also follow this trend. Findings supported this expectation with 64.84 
percent of the communities reporting that demand-side policies are the most popular in their 
region.  
4.6 Communities with Joint Ventures 
Forty five of the participating communities reported having joint ventures for economic 
development purposes. About a third of the joint ventures were established between 2 and 5 years 
ago, 26.67 percent more than 5 years ago, 22.22 percent less than 2 years ago, and 17.78 percent 
are currently being established.  Forty percent of the joint ventures had a governing board that met 
an average of 3 to10 times per year to discuss the collaborative efforts, along with their costs and 
benefits. Meetings discussing the rules governing the joint ventures were less frequent.  These 
communities were likely to establish legal terms of agreement (68.89 percent), although face-to-
face agreements were also common (44.44 percent), followed by written agreements (28.89 
percent), and phone agreements (17.78 percent).   
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It was also important to identify the reasons why communities establish joint ventures, which 
survey respondents identified from a list of 12 items. Table 8 presents the frequency of responses 
and the percentage of endorsements for each item.  Results indicated that the reasons for 
establishing joint ventures vary.  The top three reasons identified included to improve the city’s 
economic advantage (56.56 percent), secure resources that the city cannot obtain otherwise (42.22 
percent), and implement problem- solving activities (40 percent).  Understanding collaboration as 
an advantage for advancing economic development is consistent with literature suggesting that 
spatially interdependent communities should share resources for the welfare of the local 
economies (Bradshaw, 1993; Hawkins, 2007). Communities are likely to collaborate with others 
that can enhance their potential for economic growth, in order to reduce costs and become more 
efficient (Hawkins, 2007). 
 Securing resources that the communities cannot obtain otherwise is also a common motivation 
to collaborate (Post, 2004).  For instance, securing resources to address common issues like traffic 
congestion, environmental problems, criminal activity, emergency services, and unemployment, 
may represent a benefit of collaboration. Additionally, other identified reasons for collaborating, 
such as decreasing service delivery costs (24.44 percent) and addressing the actions of other 
communities that are harmful (11.11 percent) are examples of the benefits of collaborating when 
addressing common issues.   
Implementing problem solving activities was the third most popular reason for establishing a 
joint venture. Collaboration is done to solve problems that span jurisdictional boundaries. The key 
institutional actors of these communities often have to reconcile divergent interests in order to 
address complex and interrelated environmental, public health, economic, and social problems in 
local communities. In the Chicago Metro Area, rapid population growth, the tight fiscal 
environment, externalities such as traffic congestion and environmental problems are examples of  
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Table 8. Reasons for Establishing a Joint Venture 
  # % 
To improve your city's economic advantage  25 55.56 
To secure resources that your city cannot otherwise obtain  19 42.22 
To implement problem solving activities  18 40.00 
State/federal incentives 13 28.89 
To attain public visibility, goodwill or prestige  12 26.67 
To decrease service delivery costs  11 24.44 
To increase scale economies  10 22.22 
Government management is improved  8 17.78 
To address the actions of other communities that are harmful to yours  5 11.11 
Third party agreed to oversee the agreement 5 11.11 
None of the Above 4 8.89 
Change in political climate 3 6.67 
External fiscal pressures, including restrictions placed on raising revenues  1 2.22 
 
those problems. Establishing joint ventures may be a mechanism to address these negative 
externalities (OECD, 2012).  
The main three reasons for collaborating are consistent with findings from a similar study 
(Hawkins, 2007); however, implementing problem solving activities was ranked fourth in the other 
study, just below increasing scale economies, which was ranked seventh (22.22 percent) in this 
study. However, this study is focused on one metro area, whereas Hawkins (2007) focused on 
different metro areas across the U.S. Prestige and good reputation have also been supported in the 
literature (Gulati, 1998), and 26.67 percent of survey respondents identified attaining public 
visibility, goodwill, or prestige as one of the reasons for establishing joint ventures. Gulati (1998) 
and Hawkins (2007) stressed that collaboration make elected officials more visible as agents of 
change in their communities, especially those undergoing fiscal stress.  
In order to assess the existence of collaborative norms among communities with joint ventures, 
officials from collaborating communities were asked to complete the Cooperative Norms Additive 
Index. The average score was 22.29 (out of a maximum of 35) and participants’ responses are 
displayed in Table 9.  Most of the statements were endorsed as occurring “sometimes” and  
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Table 9. Perceptions of intergovernmental relations for communities with joint venture 
Count numbers (percentage)      
  Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always 
Local governmental officials in the 
Chicago metro area are committed to 
positive change for the entire region. 
0           
(0.00%) 
7         
(15.56%) 
20         
(44.44%) 
17        
(37.78%) 
1        
(2.22%) 
In the Chicago metro area, it is expected 
that local officials in one jurisdiction keep 
those in other jurisdictions informed of 
changes that may affect them. 
1        
(2.22%) 
18        
(40.00%) 
18        
(40.00%) 
8        
(17.78%) 
0           
(0.00%) 
Local governmental officials from 
different jurisdictions in this region fulfill 
promises and commitments they make. 
0           
(0.00%) 
2         
(4.44%) 
20         
(44.44%) 
21       
(46.67%) 
2         
(4.44%) 
Economic problems in the Chicago metro 
area are addressed jointly by local 
officials across the region. 
2         
(4.44%) 
14        
(31.11%) 
21       
(46.67%) 
8        
(17.78%) 
0           
(0.00%) 
Local officials from various jurisdictions 
across this region frequently 
communicate face-to-face with one 
another and/or via phone calls or email. 
0           
(0.00%) 
7         
(15.56%) 
15      
(33.33%) 
22         
(48.89%) 
1        
(2.22%) 
In the Chicago metro area, local 
governmental officials from different 
jurisdictions trust one another. 
0           
(0.00%) 
4           
(8.89%) 
23       
(51.11%) 
18       
(40.00%) 
0           
(0.00%) 
After receiving resources from other local 
governments, communities provide equal 
or more resources in return. 
2         
(4.44%) 
5           
(11.11%) 
16         
(35.56%) 
21       
(46.67%) 
1        
(2.22%) 
 
“usually.” Results suggest that there are significant levels of trust among the communities that are 
collaborating, commitment to work on issues that result in joint benefits, and reciprocity in 
exchange relations among economic development officials. 
 Policies prevalent in collaborative efforts are important in describing communities with joint 
ventures.  From the list of 38 policies (Section 4.5), respondents identified the ones representing 
the most recent collaborative efforts. The top five policies are depicted in Table 10 and are 
consistent with previous studies (Hawkins, 2007).  These policies are rooted on the export base 
theory aimed at improving the community’s attractiveness to industries.  Among the applications of 
this theory, are industrial recruitment and promotion, as well as efficiency improvement through 
infrastructure upgrades.  These applications underlie the resulting top-ranked policies from the 
survey responses.  Other applicable theories explaining the selected policies include growth pole  
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Table 10. Local Policies of Cooperative Efforts to Encourage Development 
Rk Policy n Pct. (%) Rk Policy n Pct. (%) 
1 Roadway infrastructure expansion 18 40.00 21 Developing industry cluster strategy 4 8.89 
2 Land use planning for industry 14 31.11 22 Visits to prospective firms 4 8.89 
3 Land acquisition and assembly 11 24.44 23 Affordable housing construction 4 8.89 
4 Regional promotion activities 10 22.22 24 Inspection/code enforcement 4 8.89 
5 Industrial/commercial. site promotion 10 22.22 25 Lobbying 4 8.89 
6 Tourism development 10 22.22 26 Sale of land 3 6.67 
7 Site development 9 20.00 27 Solid waste collection 3 6.67 
8 Special events planning 8 17.78 28 Improved/expanded parking 3 6.67 
9 Inventory of developable land 7 15.56 29 Purchase advertisements 3 6.67 
10 Water distribution 7 15.56 30 Solicit foreign business 3 6.67 
11 Business liaison committees 7 15.56 31 Public health programs 2 4.44 
12 Marketing brochures 6 13.33 32 Rehabilitation of buildings 2 4.44 
13 Historic/cultural development 6 13.33 33 Low interest loans to businesses 2 4.44 
14 Tax abatements to businesses 6 13.33 34 Export assistance program 1 2.22 
15 Utility management 5 11.11 35 Entrepreneurship training 1 2.22 
16 Trade shows 5 11.11 36 Job linkage program for residents 1 2.22 
17 Job training for workforce 5 11.11 37 Leadership development 1 2.22 
18 Revenue sharing 5 11.11 38 Non-profit organization development 1 2.22 
19 Recreation amenity development 4 8.89 39 Other: Secure Contracts for Services 1 2.22 
20 Business linkage program 4 8.89 40 Other: Housing Incentives 1 2.22 
 
and regional concentration, as well as diffusion theories. Both theories have industrial development 
as a basic principle and are related to growth center strategies that seek concentration of successful 
industries.  In order to map the survey responses with the theories, Figure 5 depicts a diagram 
including a set of significant policies mapped within their relevant theories. 
Contrary to expectations that human/social capital theories would be popular among 
communities with a joint venture, policies encouraging innovation, education, and creative 
workforce were not highly endorsed.  For example, job training for workforce was only used by 5 of 
45 communities with joint ventures (11.11 percent) and entrepreneurship training and leadership 
development was endorsed once (2.22 percent).  Similarly, policies such as low interest loans to 
businesses (4.44) and non-profit organization development (2.22), which are related to theories of 
community economic development, were also unpopular.  Finally, developing industry cluster 
strategies, typical of flexible specialization theories, were also surprisingly unpopular with only 
8.89 percent of the respondents endorsing this policy.  
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Figure 5: Mapping the responses into theories 
 
Some of the survey respondents provided examples intergovernmental agreements. This 
narrative summary is based on participants’ open statements written in the in the surveys and/or 
in follow-up calls or emails. The purpose is to illustrate how joint ventures advanced the 
development of some communities.  
The respondent from CHI11 noted that localism is strong in that area of the suburbs. However, 
there have been some agreements in emergency interconnections of water systems, boundary 
agreements and some tourism initiatives. Besides, the respondent mentioned major regional 
initiatives such as the extension of Interstate 355, the creation of the “Illiana” expressway, the 
inland port development, and a third airport. Curiously, the perception from this respondent is that 
most of the “joint ventures” have been efforts not yet translated into concrete action.  
CHI62 filed an application a few years ago with another city to create an Enterprise Zone over 
portions of both their communities.  The Enterprise Zone is a tool that allows each city to offer 
incentives to businesses that locate in either city.  These incentives include sales tax rebates on the 
purchase of construction materials, property tax abatement, and various job and tax credits.  This 
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program is administered through the state.  While they filed that application jointly, they act 
separately to try and attract businesses to their communities.  For the respondent who shared this 
experience with us, this basically levels the playing field for the two cities when trying to attract 
new businesses.   
CHI37 was the lead agency that participated in a huge intergovernmental agreement to fund a 
Full Interchange at I-90 and Route 47.  The Illinois Route 47 Interchange Project will create more 
opportunity for continued economic development along Illinois Route 47 and will open up access 
between the Tollway and a regional north-south transportation route. Currently, existing ramps 
(constructed in the early 1970’s) only provide access for drivers traveling to and from the east on I-
90.  The new ramps will provide full access in all directions.  The project is estimated to cost $69 
million with the Tollway funding half the cost, and IDOT, McHenry County, Kane County and CH20 
funding the remainder.  CH20’s financial participation in the project is approximately $5.4 million. 
CHI82 formed an intergovernmental agreement with another community along with Lake 
County of Lake after 2-4 years of meetings. The rationale was an effort to establish a consistent set 
of development standards and land use policies for a particular geographical area in northern Lake 
County that centered on the Interstates 94 and 73.  Quite simply, in the event that any of the areas 
within that zone is developed in the future, one set of rules applies.  Therefore, a developer cannot 
play one government off against another in order to obtain the best deal possible.  After the 
establishment of the joint venture and changes in the applicable zoning codes, the bottom fell out of 
the real estate market. 
Few communities shared valuable information though they did not complete the survey. One of 
them is another example of collaboration. That city serves 12 municipalities with water; 11 with 
emergency communications, and others with sign fabrication.  More traditional in nature, that city 
delivers fire-rescue services using mutual aid with their neighboring communities and they have 
sought to expand that effort through a consulting pact with the Chicago Area Mayors' Caucus. This 
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is an the other examples displayed above suggest that joint ventures seem to be useful and 
beneficial provided the existence of shared interests, common planning efforts, high cooperative 
norms, transparency, efficiency (costs and benefits), and some extent of homogeneity.   
4.7 Communities without Joint Ventures 
The survey responses revealed that 46 communities have not established an intergovernmental 
joint venture.  Table 6 in section 4.3 displays a snapshot of these communities versus those with a 
joint venture. One of the most surprising findings was that the average cooperative norms additive 
index is 24.78 for communities without joint venture. This is 2.49 points higher than the score 
obtained by the group of communities with a joint venture.  Table 11 displays the count responses 
for cooperative norms. Most of the statements were marked as occurring “sometimes” and “usually” 
as occurred among the responses of the communities with a joint venture.  Nonetheless, more 
respondents without joint ventures marked “always” in comparison with communities with 
established joint ventures.  This suggests that some of these communities without a joint venture 
have higher levels of trust and they are willing to cooperate with the right scenario and 
opportunities, or that cooperation in joint venture is for watching each other instead of trusting 
each other.  
Table 12 displays the reasons for not establishing a joint venture, notwithstanding the higher 
levels of cooperative norms. The main reasons are that they have limited resources to provide 
needs that might be beneficial to other communities and coordination with other communities is 
difficult.  One of the basic conditions to establish a cooperative agreement is that every part of the 
cooperation equation obtains benefits.  If a community has limited resources then it has nothing to 
offer to a cooperative agreement.  Not coincidentally, some of these communities with limited 
resources are bedroom communities.  For example, CHI38 does not actively engage in development 
activities because the community is primarily residential and does not pursue non-residential 
development proposals. 
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Table 11. Perceptions of intergovernmental relations for communities without joint venture 
Count numbers (percentage)      
  Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always 
Local governments fulfill promises and 
commitments they make to one 
another. 
0           
(0.00%) 
5        
(10.64%) 
14        
(29.79%) 
19       
(40.43%) 
9       
(19.15%) 
Local governments carry out their 
responsibilities and obligations. 
0           
(0.00%) 
3          
(6.38%) 
5        
(10.64%) 
23         
(48.94%) 
16        
(34.04%) 
Intergovernmental relations are 
productive and generate benefits that 
all share. 
1          
(2.13%) 
4         
(8.51%) 
14        
(29.79%) 
16        
(34.04%) 
12         
(25.53%) 
Local government officials from 
different jurisdictions trust one 
another. 
1          
(2.13%) 
10        
(21.28%) 
17         
(36.17%) 
16        
(34.04%) 
3          
(6.38%) 
After receiving resources from other 
local governments, communities 
provide equal or more resources in 
return. 
3          
(6.38%) 
6         
(12.77%) 
23         
(48.94%) 
13         
(27.66%) 
2          
(4.26%) 
There is competition and conflict 
between governments. 
1          
(2.13%) 
7           
(14.89%) 
18        
(38.30%) 
10        
(21.28%) 
11        
(23.40%) 
Local governments are generally 
cooperative. 
1          
(2.13%) 
5        
(10.64%) 
19       
(40.43%) 
15        
(31.91%) 
7          
(14.89%) 
  
Table 12. Reasons for not Establishing a Joint Venture 
  # % 
Your community has limited resources to provide to other communities 22 47.83 
Coordination with other communities is difficult 22 47.83 
Your community can adequately undertake development efforts by itself 15 32.61 
Those development efforts are done by organizations not affiliated with your 
community  10 21.74 
There is no need to secure additional resources 6 13.04 
Other: Competition for development 3 6.52 
The geographic distance between communities is too great 2 4.35 
Other: Do not have an economic development program 2 4.35 
Other: Political Reasons 1 2.17 
Other: No opportunities this far 1 2.17 
Other: Never contemplated/discussed 1 2.17 
None of the Above 1 2.17 
Other: State's distribution of sales tax revenue  1 2.17 
 
Among those communities that expressed difficulty coordinating with other communities, this 
coordination issue may be in a similar line of competition for development, which was an item 
added by 3 respondents (6.52 percent) in the “other” item. Some projects are difficult to coordinate 
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because of competition, as well as other reasons such a lack of resources.  Political reasons may be 
an underlying factor that influences other reasons indirectly, though it only received 1 response 
(2.17 percent).  
One of the respondents that declined to participate expressed a very interesting viewpoint 
about cooperation in the Chicago Metro Area that is somehow related to what has been discussed. 
The statement was that to prove that inter-local cooperation fosters economic opportunity was like 
proving oxygen is good for breathing, a foregone conclusion. The respondent claimed that the battle 
everywhere, and especially Chicago, is to encourage municipalities and levels of government to 
work together.  However, it often boils down to a politician’s personal relationships and perceived 
competition.  The respondent admitted that the community coordinates with a couple neighboring 
communities, but with others they avoid all communication.  They have no formal partnerships and 
he/she was very pessimistic in saying that they probably never will have agreements, because they 
(agreements) are the exception rather than the rule, most often breaking down after the photo-
opportunities have been exploited.  However, based on the findings obtained through the survey 
responses, it should be recalled that cooperation/non-cooperation communities were evenly split.   
Another popular reason for not cooperating was that those development efforts are often 
undertaken by organizations that are not affiliated with the community per se. Rather than 
encouraging development through collaboration with other communities, assistance is obtained 
from organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, an economic development organization or 
bureau that works regionally or at the state level, the county, etc. For example, the participant from 
CHI01 explained that Choose DuPage is their regional economic development entity that 
coordinates activities for many of the municipalities in DuPage County.  Another example is CHI71 
that was awarded a Local Technical Assistance (LTA) grant from the CMAP.  CHI71 will receive 
planning services from CMAP to develop an economic development plan for their Central Business 
District.  
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For communities that did not establish a joint venture, the survey respondents were asked to 
identify the reasons that would increase the likelihood of collaborating.  The responses for these 
communities are presented in table 13.  Similar to communities with joint ventures, more than half 
of the communities noted that if a joint venture would improve their community’s economic 
competitiveness it would increase the likelihood of their community establishing one.  
Communities without a joint venture also agree that securing resources that their communities 
cannot otherwise obtain is another strong reason that would increase the likelihood of 
collaborating.  As discussed before, this supports the conclusions by Post (2004). However, in 
contrast with the low popularity among the communities with joint ventures (22.22 percent), 
increasing scale economies is a very important pull factor (44.68 percent) in establishing a joint 
venture for those that have not done it yet.  In parallel to Hawkins’ (2007) findings, neither 
communities that have not established a joint venture nor the ones that have established one, 
consider third party involvement a major factor.  Hawkins (2007) pointed this out as a major 
reason noted in previous research but neither among his findings nor this research’s findings was 
this important.  
A change in political climate was also among the main reasons that increase the likelihood of 
forming a joint venture.  This was not important at all for those with a joint venture.  The political 
climate is deemed to be an obstacle to engage in a cooperative agreement, but once a community 
has one, then it may become less important.  The same happens with external fiscal pressures and 
decreasing service delivery costs. These are important to improve the likelihood to cooperate but 
once a community is engaged in a joint venture, it becomes less important.  These consistencies and 
discrepancies among preferences between communities with and without a joint venture are 
important enough to be noted.  These should be considered for policy purposes if governments 
want to increase cooperation or initiate an intergovernmental joint venture. The reasons for 
attracting joint ventures are not necessary the same reasons for keeping an existing joint venture.  
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Table 13. Reasons that Increase Interest in Joint Venture 
  # % 
City's economic advantage is improved 30 63.83 
Need to decrease costs of service delivery 25 53.19 
Resources are secured that your city cannot otherwise obtain 25 53.19 
Scale economies are increased 21 44.68 
Change in political climate emphasizing more regional cooperation 20 42.55 
State/federal financial incentives tied to cooperation 18 38.30 
Problem solving activities are implemented 18 38.30 
Standard operating procedures are established 16 34.04 
Relation is written down in detail 15 31.91 
External fiscal pressures, including restrictions placed on raising revenues  15 31.91 
City management is improved 13 27.66 
Public visibility, goodwill or prestige are obtained 12 25.53 
Formal channels of decision making are followed 9 19.15 
Environment is protected 9 19.15 
Harmful effects from other city actions are mitigated 6 12.77 
Pressure from business group interests 4 8.51 
Third party oversees the agreement 1 2.13 
None of the above 1 2.13 
 
4.8 Obstacles of Cooperation 
In section 2.7, the issue of transaction costs was reviewed.  There were information costs 
(transparent information among all participants in a collaborative agreement), agency costs 
(accuracy in negotiations between agencies and their bargaining agents), negotiation/division costs 
(how to divide the gains and the costs), and enforcement costs (monitoring and enforcing a 
collaborative agreement).  According to the ICA framework and its Coasian foundation, transaction 
costs need to be kept low and outweighed by the benefits of collaboration (Feiock, 2007; Feiock, 
Steinacker, and Park, 2008).  Therefore, taking a basic cost-benefit approach, cooperative 
agreements occur where benefits exceed transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing 
agreement. 
Table 14 displays different issues that act as barrier to establishing a joint venture.  Transaction 
costs associated with coordinating and negotiating an agreement are sometimes or usually present.   
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Table 14. To what extent do the following act as a barrier to establishing joint ventures? 
Count numbers (percentage)      
  Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always 
Difficulty formulating rules that 
govern the agreement  
5             
(5.43%) 
18    
(19.57%) 
38    
(41.30%) 
23    
(25.00%) 
8        
(8.70%) 
Lack of agreement among 
communities on development goals 
7          
(5.43%) 
9         
(9.78%) 
36         
(39.13%) 
32     
(34.78%) 
8         
(8.70%) 
Difficulty dividing up benefits that 
result from an agreement  
5            
(5.43%) 
13     
(14.13%) 
50     
(54.35%) 
17     
(18.48%) 
7         
(7.61%) 
Lack of agreement on the ways 
work/services are to be provided 
8        
(8.70%) 
12       
(13.04%) 
42        
(45.65%) 
23       
(25.00%) 
7        
(7.61%) 
Potential that some communities 
will not uphold the agreement 
9        
(9.78%) 
31        
(33.70%) 
33        
(35.87%) 
15        
(16.30%) 
4        
(4.35%) 
 
Coordination costs was expected to exist, not only because of the review of literature, but also 
because it was identified as a top reason for not establishing a joint venture (see table 12, section 
4.7).  Negotiation costs were also expected.  This is after finding that communities tend to focus on 
locality development policies, mainly aimed to improve a community’s attractiveness to industries 
and development potential.  This is extremely costly and transactions are usually complex.  
In addition, transaction costs associated with enforcing an agreement are sometimes or 
rarely present.  It is important to note that for all the statements presented in this question (see 
table 14), the second most popular response was “usually,” with the exception of the enforcement 
costs.  When asked if the potential that some communities will not uphold the agreement act as a 
barrier for collaboration, 35.87 percent marked “sometimes,” whereas 33.70 percent marked 
“rarely.”  This may be due to the fact that neither communities with joint venture nor communities 
without it identified third party oversight as a reason for cooperation.  Hawkins (2007) cited 
Ostrom (1998) to claim that third parties mainly exist as a way to monitor and enforce agreements.  
Therefore, if communities barely noted that third party involvement was a key factor in forming a 
joint venture, then it is to be expected that they do not consider enforcement costs as a major 
obstacle with coordination and negotiation costs. 
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The extent to which there are differences between local governments with a joint venture and 
those without it in regards to these collaboration obstacles was tested.  A difference in means test 
was used.  However, there is not a significant difference between the two groups of local 
governments in any of the problems that pose a barrier to joint venture formation (see table 15).  
This is different from the results of Hawkins (2007), who found a statistically significant difference 
between the two groups in coordination costs and negotiation costs.  These differences were 
attributed to some discrepancies in descriptive statistics such as population, development policies, 
and so forth.  
Before moving on with the rest of the analyses, two examples of obstacles to joint venture 
formation in the Chicago metro area are provided.  One is the creation of a development district 
around the proposed South Suburban Airport located in eastern Will County.  The five communities 
surrounding the airport and Will County negotiated a land use plan, architectural standards, 
revenue sharing, and a governing board.  This would allow all local governments to have a say in 
major developments around the airport, eliminating the need for competition and the use of 
incentives.  However, for this to happen, they needed legislation for the authority to impose land 
use regulations.  Although this proposed bill passed in the State Senate, it died in the House since 
this legislation was erroneously tied with the airport authority bill which became a non-starter.      
Other obstacles to joint venture formation were shared by CHI58.  The participant claimed that 
in Illinois, when it comes to economic development, communities are very competitive.  The sales 
tax distribution process is a “winner takes all” system that does not encourage cooperation.  Also, 
many water and sewer systems are community enterprises that do not share capacity very well.  
The participant remembered that many years ago (in the 1970s), they did establish a service 
agreement with another community, whereby they serviced a section of that community with 
sewer treatment, but cooperative agreements like this one have become rare over time.  There is a 
fierce competition for underdeveloped, unincorporated parcels.   
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Table 15. Barriers to Cooperation between Joint Venture and Non-Joint 
Venture Local Governments 
 
  Mean Value Significant  
  JV No JV Difference† 
Coordination/information costs    
Difficulty formulating rules that govern the agreement  3.04 3.19 0.327 
Lack of agreement among communities on development goals 3.22 3.32 0.231 
Division/negotiation costs    
Difficulty dividing up benefits that result from an agreement  3.00 3.17 0.399 
Lack of agreement on the ways work/services are to be provided 3.04 3.15 0.459 
Defection/enforcement costs    
Potential that some communities will not uphold the agreement 2.82 2.62 0.166 
†There were no statistically significant differences in mean values between JV and No JV.  
Based on the two examples discussed above, one may suggest that cooperation obstacles 
transcend beyond competition, coordination and negotiation to a more systematic problem; i.e. 
bureaucracy and the way the system works.  In section 2.7, it was noted that transaction costs 
associated with cooperative agreements are function of the characteristics of services, 
characteristics of communities, political institution and policy networks (Feiock, 2004, 2007, 2008; 
Hawkins, 2007).  Evidence in this section suggests that these transaction costs exist.  Therefore, the 
question that remains to be addressed later in this chapter is what factors reduce transaction costs 
and influence the establishment of joint venture. 
4.9 Spatial Awareness 
Spatial awareness is the ability to be aware of oneself in space.  This is an era of regional 
cooperation as political boundaries are softened and even ignored to identify surrounding areas 
with similar economic structure, assets and opportunities (Hewings  et al. 2009; Rondinelli et al. 
1998).  Communities need to be aware of their roles and the roles of neighboring communities in 
their regional socio-economic structure.  This awareness may maximize development 
opportunities, by knowing one’s advantages and disadvantages, similarities and differences in 
relation to other communities.  Table 16 displays the count numbers and percentage of the 
responses that measure level of awareness on intraregional/intercommunity dependence.  
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Table 16. Level of awareness on intraregional/intercommunity dependence 
Count numbers (percentage)      
  Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always 
Are you aware of how many of your 
residents work in your community and 
how many of them work in other 
communities? 
6        
(6.52%) 
12        
(13.04%) 
31        
(33.70%) 
33          
(35.87%) 
10        
(10.87%) 
Are you aware of how much your 
community can be affected by decision 
making processes in nearby communities? 
0             
(0.00%) 
5        
(5.43%) 
15        
(16.30%) 
31        
(33.70%) 
41         
(44.57%) 
Are you aware of the (intercommunity) 
interaction between households the 
various sectors of economic activity in the 
region? 
17        
(18.48%) 
14        
(15.22%) 
22         
(23.91%) 
22         
(23.91%) 
17       
(18.48%) 
Are you aware of if your community is an 
employment center or a bedroom 
community? 
1           
(1.09%) 
0             
(0.00%) 
6        
(6.52%) 
17       
(18.48%) 
68         
(73.91%) 
Are you aware of the characteristics of the 
flows of goods and services between 
sectors in your community and other 
communities within the metro area? 
8            
(8.70%) 
16          
(17.39%) 
21       
(22.83%) 
36       
(39.13%) 
11       
(11.96%) 
Are you aware of the amount of income 
your community receives at the expense of 
other communities and vice versa? 
13          
(14.13%) 
15        
(16.30%) 
29        
(31.52%) 
27        
(29.35%) 
8         
(8.70%) 
Are you aware of the patterns of spatial 
interdependence between communities in 
the Chicago metro area, including yours? 
(i.e., how dependent on other communities 
you are) 
6        
(6.52%) 
16          
(17.39%) 
23        
(25.00%) 
28        
(30.43%) 
19        
(20.65%) 
  
The trending answers for most of the items were “sometimes” and “usually.”  On the question 
about whether the community is aware of its role as an employment center or a bedroom 
community, 73.91 percent answered “always.”  This was expected, because identifying or 
perceiving urban communities that are primarily residential versus those that are centers of 
employment is easier than more complex spatial trends. Actually, knowing whether or not a 
community is an employment center is crucial for any basic development strategy and urban 
planning. The other question that was mostly responded as “always” (44.57 percent) was about 
awareness of how much the community can be affected by decision-making processes in nearby 
communities.  Acknowledging other communities’ impacts may motivate them to collaborate or at 
least to communicate more often than those with lower awareness of that particular situation.  
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The item where the survey respondents demonstrated a relatively lower awareness level in 
relation to the other items was about intercommunity interaction between households in the 
various sectors of economic activity in the region.  The combined percentage of responses “never” 
and “rarely” is 33.70 percent.  This was unexpected, because this kind of interregional dependence 
has been demonstrated empirically in different ways for the Chicago Metro Area as reviewed in 
chapter 2.6 and 2.7.  For example, Hewings and Parr (2007) talked about the process of various 
products produced by a firm in a local area spreading over establishments in nearby areas as part 
of a multi-regional operation, thus increasing interregional trade and interregional dependence. 
They showed how this spatial interdependence process works in the Chicago metropolitan area 
setting, confirming earlier findings such as in Hewings and colleagues (2001).   
Communities should be aware of intercommunity interactions and dependence so that they can 
take advantage of it.  Acknowledging this spatial socio-economic relationship, communities may 
exhibit more willingness to collaborate with each other to exploit its maximum potential.  
Unawareness may limit the possibilities of a collaboration mindset.  Actually, from a total of 26 
respondents that answered “never” or “rarely” of that question, 76.92 percent of them were from 
communities without a joint venture. Consequently, an unpaired difference in means t-test was 
used to see if lower awareness was seen more in communities without a joint venture than in 
communities with a joint venture.  Although, the mean score of that question for communities 
without a joint venture was lower (2.89 versus 3.29), this difference was not statistically significant 
(p-value equals 0.1685). 
The spatial awareness additive index was mapped in figure 6 to explore clusters of awareness.  
A cluster of high awareness levels is found in the central region towards the Northwest (where a 
positive spatial autocorrelation of cooperative norms were observed) as well as in the Northwest 
(where a positive spatial autocorrelation of development policies and centralization was found).  
The same line of thinking was applied to make sense of these clusters. In the central region  
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Figure 6: Awareness spatial clusters 
  
 
towards the Northwest, O’Hare International Airport acts as a strong economic engine for the 
region. These communities are expected to know what is going on among their neighboring 
communities because are affected by the same sector (air transportation).  Most of these 
communities share time together in meetings and projects as well. In the case of the communities in 
the Northwest, there are very local but affluent communities with similar interests who know 
exactly what is happening in the broader geographic area.  
A cluster of low awareness is found in the Southeast, precisely in the same region where “cold 
spots” or clusters of low values were found for cooperative norms, development policies and 
centralization. Given the characteristics of a region with low education, low income, high incidence 
of poverty, high crime, lack of community involvement, and other less than positive socio-economic 
factors, this is not surprising. A region with very few or no development policies, very decentralized 
(speaking of social capital and networks) and low cooperative norms is expected to be isolated with 
little appreciation of what is happening in their surroundings in regards to development.  They do 
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not have the human and social capital capacities to develop spatial awareness. The rest of the map 
exhibits groups of negative spatial autocorrelation as expected due to the difference among the 
communities on whether they are employment centers or not.  
The underlying assumption here is that the existence of a certain level of awareness on how 
dependent is a certain community on other communities influences the willingness to cooperate.  
Later in this chapter, the logistic regression model expands on this influence.  How awareness act 
together with other variables to affect the likelihood to cooperate is explored. 
4.10 Network Analysis 
The characteristics of the network structure of the intergovernmental relationships are 
explored here.  Survey respondents from communities with a joint venture were asked to identify 
the communities that their local government has relied on or collaborated within the last 2 years.  
Besides, all survey respondents were asked to identify the top 3 government or non-government 
actors that their local government has relied on the most when carrying-out their community’s 
overall economic development activities in last 2 years. Table 17 displays the summary results for 
the two networks, community-to-community and community-to-organization.  
The size of the network of community-to-community interactions of those with a joint venture 
is 7,084, which represents the total of uniquely ordered pairs of actors.  The density, which is a 
measure of the level of connectivity within the network, is 0.040; so the actual number of ties 
present within the network is 4 percent of the potential number of possible ties.  The value of the 
density measure can range from 0 to 1, where 1 represents completely dense network. Therefore, 
this low value suggests a sparse network (very low cohesion).  Figure 8 shows the entire network of 
intergovernmental joint ventures.  
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Table 17. 2-Mode Cohesion Measures for Communities and Organizations  
  Density Avg Dist Radius Diameter Fragment Transit Norm Dist 
MatrixComm2Comm 0.040 5.557 1.000 15.000 0.205 0.643 0.372 
MatrixComm2Org 0.020 5.605 1.000 12.000 0.473 0.525 0.509 
 
Figure 7: Network of intergovernmental joint ventures, Chicago metro area 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This density is consistent with the densities of the metropolitan areas analyzed in Hawkins 
(2007).  The density of the community-to-community network of the Chicago Metro Area is higher 
than the density of the community-to-organization network of Boston (0.0294), Miami (0.0322), 
and Riverside (0.0383) as shown in Hawkins (2007).  In that study, the highest densities were 
exhibited by Salt Lake (0.1384) and Denver (0.1292).  Table 18 displays individual measures for 
every municipality in the community-to-community network of the Chicago Metro Area.  The 
greatest densities were exhibited by the municipalities of CHI46, CHI03, CHI28 and CHI67.  Figures 
8 and 9 illustrate the networks of these 4 municipalities.  
Centrality refers to the position of a node within a particular network. High centralization in a 
network means that a few nodes are connected with many others, so some members have many 
more connections in the network.  Low centralization means that connections are more evenly  
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Table 18. 2-Mode Centrality Measures for Communities with Joint Venture 
N Comm Degree Closeness Betweenness Density Size 
1 CHI01 0.071 0.289 0.117 0.0391 11 
2 CHI02 0.013 0.26 0 0.0071 2 
3 CHI03 0.142 0.298 0.106 0.0783 22 
4 CHI06 0.026 61.25 0 0.0142 4 
5 CHI07 0.013 0.205 0.009 0.0071 2 
6 CHI08 0.013 18.846 0 0.0071 2 
7 CHI10 0.006 0.204 0 0.0036 1 
8 CHI11 0.032 0.232 0.057 0.0178 5 
9 CHI13 0.026 0.246 0.001 0.0142 4 
10 CHI14 0.006 0.212 0 0.0036 1 
11 CHI18 0.019 0.231 0.029 0.0107 3 
12 CHI19 0.032 49 0.001 0.0178 5 
13 CHI22 0.013 0.226 0.006 0.0071 2 
14 CHI24 0.013 0.229 0.009 0.0071 2 
15 CHI25 0.09 0.276 0.037 0.0498 14 
16 CHI28 0.135 0.294 0.103 0.0747 21 
17 CHI33 0.019 0.244 0.044 0.0107 3 
18 CHI35 0.039 0.292 0.022 0.0214 6 
19 CHI36 0.026 0.23 0.012 0.0142 4 
20 CHI37 0.097 0.364 0.325 0.0534 15 
21 CHI42 0.019 0.182 0.018 0.0107 3 
22 CHI44 0.013 0.287 0.002 0.0071 2 
23 CHI45 0.026 0.261 0.019 0.0142 4 
24 CHI46 0.155 0.35 0.244 0.0854 24 
25 CHI48 0.026 0.26 0.065 0.0142 4 
26 CHI53 0.026 27.222 0.001 0.0142 4 
27 CHI54 0.032 0.177 0.027 0.0178 5 
28 CHI56 0.097 0.365 0.219 0.0534 15 
29 CHI58 0.013 0.178 0.009 0.0071 2 
30 CHI59 0.006 245 0 0.0036 1 
31 CHI60 0.019 0.241 0.018 0.0107 3 
32 CHI61 0.013 0.234 0.009 0.0071 2 
33 CHI62 0.045 0.283 0.018 0.0249 7 
34 CHI65 0.039 0.23 0.016 0.0214 6 
35 CHI67 0.135 0.298 0.12 0.0747 21 
36 CHI68 0.032 0.298 0.119 0.0178 5 
37 CHI69 0.013 0.253 0.001 0.0071 2 
38 CHI72 0.013 0.22 0 0.0071 2 
39 CHI74 0.006 0.141 0 0.0036 1 
40 CHI78 0.032 0.291 0.032 0.0178 5 
41 CHI79 0.026 0.268 0.003 0.0142 4 
42 CHI80 0.032 0.215 0.018 0.0178 5 
43 CHI81 0.032 0.238 0.053 0.0178 5 
44 CHI82 0.006 245 0 0.0036 1 
45 CHI84 0.039 0.255 0.027 0.0214 6 
46 CHI85 0.097 0.34 0.143 0.0534 15 
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Figure 8: Network of intergovernmental joint ventures for CHI46 and CHI28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Network of intergovernmental joint ventures for CHI03 and CHI67 
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distributed.  Measures of centrality such as degree, betweenness and closeness for individual 
municipalities in the network were calculated and also displayed in table 18.  For the entire 
network, a centralization score was calculated for every centrality measure.  The score is expressed 
as a percentage and can vary from 0 (every member is connected to every other member) to 100 
(all members are connected to only 1 member).   
The degree in a network is the number of connections or edges a node has to other nodes.  For 
this network, the average degree is 1.634 and the network centralization score is 13.156 percent 
(out-degree) and 1.980 percent (in-degree).  This first centrality measure suggests a low 
centralization and this is what it can be perceived from figure 8 as well. Individually, the 
municipalities of CHI46, CHI03, CHI28 and CHI67 were the ones with the highest degrees.  This may 
suggest certain leadership strengths from these municipalities in intergovernmental cooperation; a 
model for better channels of communication in the region. 
Betweenness is the extent to which a node lies between other nodes in the network, bridging 
clusters, connecting actors indirectly through their direct links.  It measures the degree to which an 
entire network is focused around a few central nodes (Carrington et al. 2004; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994).  For the entire network, the network centralization score is 0.64 percent, suggesting 
low centralization as found with the degree measures.  The municipalities of CHI37, CHI46, CHI56 
and CHI85 exhibited the highest levels of betweenness.  Actors like these are also important in the 
network because they connect municipalities.  Thus, they are also important for future 
intergovernmental relations and cooperative agreements. 
Closeness is the extent to which an actor is near all other actors in a network.  Those actors with 
the highest level of closeness have certain advantages (power) in the star network; a highly 
centralized network where 1 node in the center connects to all other nodes. This particular 
measure was only calculated for each individual member of the network.  The municipalities of 
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CHI59, CHI82, CHI06 and CHI19 exhibited the highest levels of closeness.  However, these results 
have to be analyzed with care because this network is very far from indicating the configuration of 
a star network.  It is completely the opposite.  Therefore, this just means that they are connected to 
only one or very few municipalities in the network.     
Community-to-organizations interactions of those municipalities with and without a joint 
venture were also analyzed.  Figure 10 shows a portion of this network, focused on the 
organizations with the greatest ties.  These organizations are (in no particular order) CMAP, Illinois 
Department of Transportation, Choose DuPage, the International Council of Shopping Centers, the 
IL Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunities, the Lake County Partners, and economic 
development organizations of the counties of McHenry, Cook and Will.  The size of the entire 
network is 10,488, whereas the density is 0.020.  This density is lower than any of the community-
to-organization network cohesion measures in Hawkins (2007), where the lowest density among 
the metro areas analyzed was Boston with 0.0294.   
In regards to the centrality measures of the network, the average degree is 1.025 and the 
network centralization score is 0.740 percent (out-degree) and 3.725 percent (in-degree). Yet 
again, this suggests a very low centralization.  The network centralization score is 0.01 percent, 
confirming the very low centralization found with the degree measures. This results are far from 
comparable to Hawkins (2007), where all the scores greater than 20 percent but lower than 70 
percent. This low centralization found in the community-to-organization network in the Chicago 
Metro Area suggests that the municipalities have a diverse set of resources, entities and/or 
organizations to rely when carrying-out their community’s overall economic development 
activities.  Thus, there is not a centralization of a few organizations that have many more 
connections than others.  Table 19 displays the top 10 individual centralization scores for 
municipalities and organizations. It shows degree, betweenness and closeness measures. 
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Figure 10: Network of the connections between the most dominant organizations and municipalities 
 
Table 19. 2-Mode Centrality Measures for Communities and Organizations 
Municipality Degree Closeness Betweenness 
CHI17 0.026 0.513 0.08 
CHI60 0.026 0.493 0.071 
CHI27 0.026 0.458 0.07 
CHI37 0.035 0.496 0.062 
CHI91 0.026 0.52 0.053 
CHI48 0.026 0.406 0.047 
CHI02 0.026 0.422 0.04 
CHI30 0.026 0.372 0.033 
CHI36 0.026 0.526 0.031 
Organizations Degree Closeness Betweenness 
ILDCEO 0.163 0.596 0.212 
ICSC 0.12 0.585 0.145 
WillEDC 0.13 0.522 0.131 
Local Chamber of Commerce 0.098 0.515 0.119 
CMAP 0.076 0.549 0.099 
Choose DuPage 0.109 0.527 0.077 
IDOT 0.065 0.412 0.076 
Cook County 0.054 0.435 0.07 
Kane County 0.043 0.437 0.061 
McHenryEDC 0.043 0.438 0.042 
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The absence of centrality in a community-to-organization network may be negatively influential 
for the creation and success of cooperative agreements.  A central actor in a network like this can be 
considered a key organization in overcoming collective action problems and coordinating economic 
development more effectively.  Moreover, central actors are important for better information flow, 
exchange of ideas, a mediator for communication between other actors and a perception of 
organization and structure. Although, there are top umbrella organizations like CMAP and Choose 
DuPage, among others, which exhibit the higher centrality scores, these were not perceived as 
highly reliable by the municipalities as expected.  More “centralized” organizations may be more on 
a very local scale rather than regional, like the local chamber of commerce, a neighboring 
community, or a local business, which do not  promote a more regional collaborative environment. 
An additional network analysis was run by adjusting the network to show links with non-
respondent communities as an aggregated node – recalculating the network indices but with 
caution about extrapolation to the whole community space (Figure 11). The rationale is to explore 
the influence of the non-respondent communities as a whole in the network and to have an idea on 
how much the network may change by increasing the response rate with specifically these 
communities mentioned by the respondents but not surveyed in this study. The density of this 
network is 0.069; so the actual number of ties present within the network is 6.9 percent of the 
potential number of possible ties. This is 2.9 percent higher than the regular network discussed 
above. The average degree is 1.935, which is 0.301 higher. However, the network centralization 
scores are much lower, 0.92 percent (out-degree) and 0.933 percent (in-degree).  The non-
respondent node is a receiver but no information is available of the links going out from this node 
as these communities were not surveyed. Nonetheless, it is safe to suggest that the input from those 
“non-respondents” communities will be very useful and will make the network stronger and more 
cohesive. Evidently, those communities are engaging in collaborative actions and may offer valuable 
inputs.  
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Figure 11: Network  showing links with non-respondent communities as an aggregated node 
 
4.11 Logistic Regression 
Based on previous research by Hawkins (2007) and McGuire (2000), a logistic regression model 
was proposed to test the extent to which a combination of factors determines intergovernmental 
cooperation (see chapter 3.2.2).  The statistical package STATA SE 10.0 was used to perform this 
part of the analysis.  However, sample size is an important issue in this dissertation.  Any logistic 
regression had to be run with 91 observations out of the 283 expected from the study area.  
Therefore, the model specified in equation 7 had to be modified.  
The following steps were performed to specify alternative models. First, an appropriate number 
of covariates (the number of independent variables) was used for the alternative logistic regression 
models based on the sample size. Peduzzi and colleagues (1996) suggested a formula for this 
purpose: N = 10k/p, where N is number of cases, k the number of covariates and p the smallest of 
the proportions of negative or positive cases in the population.  Hence, in the current case, simple 
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manipulation resulted in 91 = 10(k)/0.4945; k = 4.5.  Hence, in order to avoid sample size issues in 
the logistic regression calculations, the number of independent variables should be no more than 5.   
Second, variables for municipalities with and without a joint venture were compared, verifying 
correlations among the variables.  Different attempts were made to interact the variables in order 
to see whether the interaction terms were significant. Some of the inspiration came from the 
general observations in sections 4.3 and the spatial observations discussed in section 4.4. The only 
interaction variable that seemed to work was the interaction between the variable ‘development 
active’ with the variable on ‘whether or not the community had an updated plan’. There is a 
significant interaction between communities with higher number of development policies active 
and communities with an updated economic development plan.  
Third, different logistic regression models were run based on the previous steps to determine 
which one explains better the likelihood to cooperate in the study area. Then, after running 
different models, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) were used to choose the best models.  AIC and BIC can be viewed as measures that combine fit 
and complexity.  Fit is measured negatively by: -2*ln(likelihood); the larger the value, the worse the 
fit.  Complexity is measured positively, either by 2*k (AIC) or ln(N)*k (BIC).  Given two or more 
models fitted on the same data, the model with the smaller value of the information criterion is 
considered to be better; it has much greater likelihood, explaining the most variance.  
Table 20 displays the best five models based on their information criterion. In model 1, the 
probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null hypothesis is true is 0.0002, 
which suggests that the model is statistically significant.  Hence, the model can be described as  
log(p/1-p) = 2.9112 – 0.0230*Edu + 156.1750*central – 0.2980*norm. The coefficient for the 
variable Edu is -0.0230.  This means that for a one percentage point increase in the number of 
residents with a bachelor degree or higher in education, one could expect a 0.0230 decrease in the 
log-odds of the dependent variable JV (communities with a joint venture), holding all other  
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Table 20. Logistic Regression Models for Likelihood for Joint Venture (Number of obs = 91) 
Model 1: NormCentralEduJVLogodd 3210)(                                                     Log likelihood = -28.867691 
 LR chi2(3) = 77.95 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0002)                                                                                 Pseudo R2 = 0.6179 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Edu -0.0230 0.0212 -1.090 0.277 -0.0646 0.0185 
Central 156.1750 35.3641 4.420 0.000 86.8627 225.4874 
Norm -0.2980 0.1147 -2.600 0.009 -0.5227 -0.0733 
_cons 2.9112 2.4841 1.170 0.241 -1.9575 7.7799 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 2.57 (p = 0.4630)          AIC (56.1958)          BIC (66.2393 
Model 2: PlanDevActiveNormCentralEduJVLogodd ^)( 43210                 Log likelihood = -23.730528 
 LR chi2(4) = 78.68 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)                                                                                 Pseudo R2 = 0.6237 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Edu -0.0225 0.0218 -1.030 0.302 -0.0652 0.0202 
Central 151.7906 35.2513 4.310 0.000 82.6994 220.8818 
Norm -0.2965 0.1119 -2.650 0.008 -0.5158 -0.0772 
DevActive^Plan 0.0834 0.0626 2.850 0.007 -0.0693 0.1760 
_cons 2.3199 2.5058 0.930 0.355 -2.5914 7.2311 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 2.52 (p = 0.4723)          AIC (57.4611)          BIC (70.0154) 
Model 3: CentralEduJVLogodd 210)(                                                                    Log likelihood = -28.867691 
 LR chi2(2) = 68.41 (Prob > chi2 = 0.000)                                                                                    Pseudo R2 = 0.5423 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Central 155.0002 35.9597 4.31 0.000 84.5204 225.4800 
Edu -0.0396 0.0199 -1.99 0.047 -0.0787 -0.0006 
_cons -3.2263 1.1365 -2.84 0.005 -5.4539 -0.9987 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 1.82 (p = 0.6113)          AIC (63.7354)          BIC (71.2680) 
Model 4: AwareDirGeogNormCentralJVLogodd 543210)(                    Log likelihood = -23.052583 
 LR chi2(5) = 80.04 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)                                                                                 Pseudo R2 = 0.6345 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Central 150.1519 35.9036 4.180 0.000 79.7822 220.5216 
Norm -0.3202 0.1111 -2.880 0.004 -0.5379 -0.1024 
Geog 0.0387 0.0304 1.270 0.202 -0.0208 0.0982 
Dir 0.5316 0.8259 0.640 0.520 -1.0871 2.1502 
Aware 0.0876 0.0925 0.950 0.344 -0.0937 0.2690 
_cons -0.8264 3.1899 -0.260 0.796 -7.0784 5.4256 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 2.33 (p = 0.5061)          AIC (62.0413)          BIC (82.1281) 
Model 5: DirSupDemPlanDevActivePupriAwareJVLogodd 543210 ^)(    Log likelihood = -51.642801 
LR chi2(5) = 22.86 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0004)                                                                                  Pseudo R2 = 0.1812 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Aware 0.0711 0.0500 1.420 0.155 -0.0268 0.1691 
PuPri 1.2079 0.6206 1.950 0.052 -0.0085 2.4242 
DevActive^Plan 0.0926 0.0369 2.510 0.012 0.0203 0.1650 
SupDem 0.7816 0.5171 1.510 0.131 -0.2319 1.7951 
Dir 0.7321 0.5018 1.460 0.145 -0.2515 1.7157 
_cons -4.1203 1.4587 -2.820 0.005 -6.9792 -1.2613 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 3.88 (p = 0.2745)          AIC (117.9959)          BIC (140.5937) 
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variables constant.  However, this coefficient is not statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05 or 
even a p-value of 0.10.  Although it is insignificant, this variable displays a negative sign as expected.  
An opposite (negative) sign is expected with respect to this variable.  It is expected that the 
wealthier and more educated communities have less need to engage in cooperative efforts.  Those 
communities tend to be more economically independent. 
The coefficient for the variable Central, which is a network centralization measure, is 156.1750.  
Nonetheless, this value should be interpreted with care.  One could say that for a one-unit increase 
in Central, it is expected that there would be a 156.1750 increase in the log-odds of the dependent 
variable JV, holding all other variables constant.  The values of Central are mostly decimals with a 
minimum of 0.000, a maximum of 0.181 and a mean of 0.039 in the sample.  A more realistic 
interpretation could be that for 0.001 unit increase in Central, it is expected a 0.1561 increase in the 
log-odds of the dependent variable JV, holding all other variables constant.  
As expected, the variable Central has a positive sign.  As stated in Hawkins (2007), the denser 
and more centralized a network or a node is, the better the probability of establishing a cooperative 
agreement.  The reason is that cohesive policy networks and those with central actors reduce 
transaction costs by facilitating information flow, reciprocity and transparency. Furthermore, 
central actors in a network can be facilitators in a joint venture bringing in trust and a figure of 
authority with capability of a good information and experience provider (Coleman, 1990). 
The coefficient for the variable Norm is -0.2980.  This means that for one-unit increase in the 
cooperative norms additive index, a 0.2980 decrease in the log-odds of the dependent variable JV.  
This is an index with a minimum possible value of 7 and maximum of 35.  This variable Norm refers 
to cooperative norms, which indicate the extent to which parties usually act in a collaborative 
fashion because of the existence of certain levels of trust, commitment and reciprocity (Hawkins, 
2007; Olberding, 2002).  The expected sign was positive, but a negative sign resulted.  
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The hypothesis was that a higher cooperative norm index increases the chances for a 
community to collaborate, mainly because the greater the communication and the existence of 
trust, commitment and reciprocity, the less costly is the collaborative transaction.  However, this 
does not seem to be the case for the Chicago metro area.  The intuition is that the communities in 
this study area have similar perceptions of cooperative norms, but at the time to engage in 
intergovernmental collaboration activities there are other factors that favor or impede 
collaboration.  For example, one of the top reasons for not cooperating identified by the 
communities was that they had limited resources to provide to other communities.  The most 
important factors that will increase the likelihood of cooperating identified by the communities 
were the improvement of the economic advantage of the city and the need to decrease cost of 
service delivery.  Another factor was the political climate.  Therefore, these statements may help to 
understand these results.  Actually, one may suggest that the impact of cooperative norms depends 
on other factors.  
This model was tested for specification errors using the Stata command linktest, with the 
underlying idea that if the model is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional 
predictors that are statistically significant except by chance.  After the logistic regression command, 
linktest uses the linear predicted value (_hat) and linear predicted value squared (_hatsq) as the 
predictors to rebuild the model.  The variable _hat should be a statistically significant predictor, 
since it is the predicted value from the model. This will be the case unless the model is completely 
mispecified.  On the other hand, if the model is properly specified, the variable _hatsq should not 
have much predictive power except by chance.  Therefore, if _hatsq is significant, then the linktest is 
significant.  This usually means that either there are omitted relevant variable(s) or the link 
function is not correctly specified.  For this model, though not all the variables were significant, the 
model is properly specified.  In the linktest, the variable _hat was a statistically significant predictor, 
and variable _hatsq was not. 
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This model was also tested for multicollinearity to check if two or more independent variables 
in the model are approximately determined by a linear combination of other independent variables 
in the model.  The variance inflation factor (VIF – an indicator of how much of the inflation of the 
standard error could be caused by collinearity) was used to detect any multicollinearity issue.  The 
mean VIF was 1.05 and the maximum was 1.08. Therefore, no problems of multicollinearity were 
found. 
Model 2 was the one displaying the next smaller value of the information criterion (see table 
18). In this model, the probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null hypothesis 
is true is 0.0000, which suggest that the model is statistically significant.  The estimated model is:  
log(p/1-p) = 2.3199 – 0.0225*Edu + 151.7906*central – 0.2965*norm + 0.0534*DevActive^Plan. 
The coefficients for Edu, Central and Norm are similar and consistent with the previous model 
displayed in table 18.  Therefore, the interpretation does not vary.  The coefficient for the variable 
DevActive^Plan  is 0.0834.  This means that for communities with an updated plan and highly active 
in development policies their likelihood to engage in a joint venture with other communities is 
higher. The model was tested for specification errors and multicollinearity, but no problem was 
found.  The number of economic development policies indicates how active the community is that 
area. A positive impact was expected on the probability of establishing a cooperative agreement, 
because the more active a community is in regards to economic development policies, the more 
resources are available to share and/or use as a collaborative advantage.  Furthermore, the 
communities without joint ventures identified that having limited resources is an obstacle to 
collaborate with other communities.  Communities with more active policies in favor of the local 
economic development are expected to be willing to use different options to improve its economic 
health, including collaboration.  The same reasoning applies when we talk about having an updated 
development plan.  
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Model 3 was the next smaller value of the information criterion. In this model, the probability of 
obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null hypothesis is true is 0.0000, which suggests 
that the model log(p/1-p) = -3.2263 – 0.0396*Edu + 155.0002*central is statistically significant. 
The coefficients for Edu and Central are similar and consistent with the previous models. .  
However, the removal of the variable Norm made the coefficient for Edu statistically significant in 
this model.  Besides, note that the constant is now negative and significant.  Neither specification 
errors nor multicollinearity were found.  One can assume that Edu and Norm are correlated but that 
is not the case in here. An interaction variable was entered without success.  Therefore, just 
focusing on the significance of Edu in this model, the negative sign was expected because 
communities with more educated residents and employees tend to be more independent. However, 
based on the narratives from the community leaders who responded the surveys, this factor seems 
to be an exception rather than the norm.  
In model 4, the probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null hypothesis is 
true is 0.0000, which suggest that the model log(p/1-p) = -0.8264 + 150.1519*Central – 
0.3202*Norm + 0.0387*Geog + 0.5316*Dir + 0.0876*Aware is statistically significant. As seen in the 
first 2 models, Central and Norm have positive and negative coefficients, and both are significant 
with similar values.  The coefficient for the variable Geog is 0.0387. This means that for one-mile 
increase in the distances from Chicago, a 0.0387 increase in the log-odds of the dependent variable 
JV would be expected.  Hence, the farther from Chicago, the more likely a municipality will 
collaborate.  However, this coefficient is not statistically significant.  The coefficient for the variable 
Dir is 0.5316.  This means that for municipalities with a full-time director in charge a 0.5316 
increase would be expected in the log-odds of the dependent variable JV.  However, this coefficient 
is not statistically significant either.  The same happens for the variable Aware; the higher the 
spatial awareness, the better the chances to collaborate, but no significance was found in this 
statistic. No problems with specification error or multicollinearity were found.  
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While Dir and Aware are statistically insignificant, the signs are positive as expected.  
Specifically with the variable Dir, the findings are consistent with McGuire (2000). He found that 
the existence of a full-time director is positively related to the level of collaboration by the city, but 
it was not significant in his formulation.  In regards to the variable Aware, the underlying 
assumption was that the existence of certain level of awareness or perception on how dependent is 
a specific community on other communities should influence the willingness to collaborate. This is 
the most surprising outcome from this model - the insignificance of spatial awareness as a predictor 
for likelihood to collaborate. One intuition may be that in Chicago the likelihood to collaborate may 
come from the need to do so instead of being aware of the advantages to collaborate and with 
whom to collaborate. Furthermore, as Kim and Hewings (2011) suggests, the fact that the 
composition of working households is becoming dominated by 2 wage-earners and sometimes 3, 
together with the longer commuting distances (in most cases interregional), has been changing the 
geography of interaction. Therefore, even if communities ignore the interdependence, worker-
consumers have already embraced it as discussed earlier. 
The variable Geog was also non-significant but the sign was positive, contrary to what was 
expected.  Hawkins (2007) cites different studies that have shown that location within a metro area 
influences the extent of economic development policy adoption by local governments.  Therefore, 
the intuition was that geography will increase the probability of establishing a cooperative 
agreement; a smaller distance to the main economic active area, i.e., the city of Chicago, increased 
the likelihood of cooperating.   The findings show the contrary, suggesting that the farther from the 
central city the better.   
Although the variable Geog was not significant, one may suggest that the influence of 
surrounding communities might have been stronger than just counting on how far a community is 
from the city of Chicago. The discussions developed in section 4.4 help to understand this outcome 
better. Recall that as the population of Chicago itself has gradually fallen, the population of its wider 
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metro area has grown. This is not only due to natural growth in those areas but also to a gradual 
outward move of the city's workforce into the surrounding suburbs. Communities in these suburbs 
have grown and developed at a point where they do not depends (solely) on the City of Chicago. 
Furthermore, these communities have become important employment centers for themselves and 
nearby communities.  So, instead of worrying on how far a specific community is from the City of 
Chicago, one needs to focus on what is happening in the region and what benefits obtaining 
community could obtain from being close to the most prosperous neighbors. If a community is too 
far from the City of Chicago, perhaps the problem is not the distance from the city but it is that their 
region has not developed well enough or there is no immediate need for strengthening ties.  
Models 1 through 4 were the models smallest value of the information criterion among the set 
of models that were run. They exhibited much greater likelihood, explaining the most variance.  A 
fifth model was run without “collaboration” or “network” related variables, specifying STATA to 
choose variables in a stepwise fashion.  The model resulted in the largest value of the information 
criterion, suggesting a bad fit, though the model was statistically significant (see model 5 in table 
20); the outcomes will now be reviewed.  
The variables DevActive^Plan and PuPri were statistically significant with positive coefficients, 
suggesting that communities with the greater number of development policies and an updated 
development plan, had a better the chance to collaborate; and that the public-private agencies were 
more likely to collaborate. McGuire (2000) also found that the existence of a lead agency that is a 
public-private partnership was positively and significantly related to the level of collaboration by 
the city. The rest of the variables in the model, Aware, SupDem and Dir were also positive but 
statistically insignificant, though their p-values were smaller than 0.160.  Although without the 
“highly statistically significance” back-up, one may suggest that more aware municipalities are 
more likely to collaborate, as well as those with demand-side policies and with a full-time director 
in charge. The signs of the coefficients were consistent with the expected ones.  
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Finally, spatial logistic regressions were run with all five models displayed in table 20.  None of 
them was statistically significant.  However, among other models run in the process with a spatial 
lag component among the independent variables, there was one that came out with a low p-value 
though non-significant. Table 21 shows the model. Lambda had a p-value of 0.016, significant at the 
0.05 level and the coefficient was 0.1858.  Although, spatial dependence was statistically 
insignificant, the p-value was 0.1901. This may suggest that with a larger data set, spatial logistic 
regression may be an important statistic to explore.  With more communities included in the 
regression, spatial issues may assume greater statistical significance.  In essence, the missing values 
(non response communities) generate gaps in the spatial distribution creating significant 
estimation problems.  But focusing on this model despite of failing to be significant at 10 percent, 
the significance of Lambda indicates that not modeling spatial effects will contribute to errors in 
estimation in such models. This suggests that the spatial dimension of social and economic may 
truly be an important aspect of modeling and it needs further attention.  
The other variables suggested in the methodology chapter and displayed in table 4, section 
3.2.2 were not significant in any other models that were run.  Actually, the coefficients were very 
close to zero, their p-values were very high (>0.700) and most of the variables in the models were 
insignificant.  These variables were population, poverty, diversity, manufacture, debt, plan, budget 
and even network cohesion.  Network cohesion, per se, was weak for the region based on the 
response rate of participants; so, it was not a good predictor.  For the rest of the variables, one may 
suggest that sample size might be a factor impeding a better fit and/or significance.  
An alternate explanation might be that the dynamics in the Chicago Metro Area are different 
from other metro areas analyzed in other studies. Chicago has a complex socio-economic structure, 
and a unique set of population dynamics, specifically the racial composition of the city.  In addition, 
the industrial composition of Chicago has changed over the past several decades, with steady 
declines in manufacturing, whereas growth in employment in the service sector has been strong. 
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Table 21. Spatial Error Model 
 R-squared = 0.578901                                                                 Log Likelihood = 5.916881 
Sigma-square = 0.056151                                                            Akaike info criterion = –1.83376 
S.E. of Regression = 0.236962                                                    Schwarz criterion = 16.411110 
JV Coef. Std. Err. z P>z   
Norm  –0.0210 0.00401 –5.2285 0.000 Breush-Pagan Test:  
357.1985 
(0.000) 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test: 
1.7164 
(0.000) 
Devactive 0.01728 0.00365 4.73598 0.000 
Between 2.68641 0.45149 5.95003 0.000 
Aware 0.02658 0.00383 6.94115 0.000 
Lambda 0.18588 0.07719 2.40821 0.016 
_cons 0.00457 0.01934 0.23665 0.813 
 
In addition, the dependence of suburbs within the Chicago metro area on the City of Chicago may be 
different from suburb-central city relations in other metro areas. The non-city of Chicago part of the 
metropolitan area was seemingly unfazed by the economic slowdown of the early 1990s, 
experiencing job growth at the same time Chicago was in the depths of the recession.  Interregional 
commuting among multiple household workers is another fact that adds to the complexity. Worker-
consumers have already embraced interdependence without the need of formal joint ventures or 
top-down collaboration as discussed earlier in this dissertation.  Therefore, the nature of the 
Chicago Metro Area poses a challenge to traditional designs of this type of ICA research.  
4.12 Collaboration outcomes 
The final analytical step in this dissertation is an effort to explore the extent to which 
collaboration translates into capacity and consensus building in the local economic development 
process (see Table 22). Most of the respondents indicated that they agree with the statements 
provided.  The statements that received the most positive affirmation were that institutional 
collective action makes their region stronger and that the communities have benefited from 
economic development cooperation engagement with other communities.  This suggests that 
survey respondents consider that collaboration has been an effective policy making tool.  
Collaboration is a great resource not only for consensus building, experimentation and learning, but 
for making the socio-economic structure of the region stronger and more efficient. This is 
consistent with the claims by Healey (1998) and Innes (2004). 
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Table 22. Collaboration translates into better outcomes and capacity and consensus building  
Count numbers (percentages)      
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Institutional collective action among 
communities of the Chicago metro area makes 
our communities and the region itself stronger.  
0              
(0.00%) 
2               
(4.44%) 
7             
(15.56%) 
29           
(64.44%) 
7             
(15.56%) 
My community has benefited from economic 
development cooperation engagement with 
other communities. 
0              
(0.00%) 
6              
(13.33%) 
7             
(15.56%) 
28           
(62.22%) 
4               
(8.89%) 
Experimentation, learning, change and 
consensus building is easier through 
establishing a cooperative agreement than 
otherwise.  
2               
(4.44%) 
2               
(4.44%) 
15            
(33.33%) 
24             
(53.33%) 
2               
(4.44%) 
Rich social networks generated by institutional 
collective action represent a great resource of 
institutional capital through which new 
initiatives are taken more rapidly and 
legitimately.  
1                
(2.22%) 
0              
(0.00%) 
16             
(35.56%) 
26          
(57.78%) 
2               
(4.44%) 
Collaborative approaches in local economic 
development initiatives in your community 
achieve more effective and durable outcomes. 
0              
(0.00%) 
1                
(2.22%) 
15            
(33.33%) 
22            
(48.89%) 
7             
(15.56%) 
Based on actual facts and tangible outcomes, it 
is better to pursue economic development in a 
cooperative environment than under a 
competitive advantage environment. 
0              
(0.00%) 
4               
(8.89%) 
15            
(33.33%) 
18             
(40.00%) 
8               
(17.78%) 
 
It was hypothesized that those communities with denser and more centralized networks will 
benefit the most from collaboration. Therefore, an unpaired difference in means t-test was used to 
test this hypothesis (see table 23).  The group of communities with a joint venture was divided into 
2 groups; one with the municipalities with the highest densities and the other with the lowest ones.  
In general, the average additive index for the group with denser networks is greater than for the 
group with less dense networks.  However, none of the differences among the statements was 
found to be significant, with the exception of the last statement: ‘Based on actual facts and tangible 
outcomes, it might be better to pursue economic development in a cooperative rather than a 
competitive environment’. The group with denser networks agreed more than the other group, 
because they have more ties and are more powerful. Thus, it is more favorable for them to work in 
collaboration than in isolation. This is consistent with the claim that effectiveness of particular  
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Table 23. Mean Differences in Collaboration Outcomes  
Mean (Standard Deviation)    
  Mean Value   
  Denser Less Dense   
Institutional collective action among communities of 
the Chicago metro area makes our communities and 
the region itself stronger.  
3.90        
(0.79) 
3.92         
(0.64) 
 
My community has benefited from economic 
development cooperation engagement with other 
communities. 
3.65         
(0.99) 
3.68         
(0.69) 
 
Experimentation, learning, change and consensus 
building is easier through establishing a cooperative 
agreement than otherwise.  
3.50        
(0.80) 
3.48        
(0.82) 
 
Rich social networks generated by institutional 
collective action represent a great resource of 
institutional capital through which new initiatives 
are taken more rapidly and legitimately.  
3.75        
(0.55) 
3.52          
(0.77) 
 
Collaborative approaches in local economic 
development initiatives in your community achieve 
more effective and durable outcomes. 
3.95          
(0.60) 
3.64         
(0.81) 
 
Based on actual facts and tangible outcomes, it is 
better to pursue economic development in a 
cooperative environment than under a competitive 
advantage environment. 
3.95¹         
(0.69) 
3.44¹        
(0.96) 
 
Overall Mean 
22.70 
(3.37) 
21.68 
(2.67) 
  
¹Statistically significant at 0.10    
 
economic development policies is determined by the ability of the development official to 
successfully search and engage multiple actors in the process (McGuire, 2000).  However, more 
statistical significant evidence is needed to apply this claim solidly.  
  106  
 
CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY EVALUATIONS 
The first objective of this dissertation was to study the level of awareness of spatial 
interdependence and interaction among economic development practitioners in the metro area. In 
these regards, communities showed that they are more aware of their position in relation to the 
rest of the region than being aware of what neighboring communities are doing. For example, they 
have a clear understanding on whether their communities are primarily residential or employment 
centers. They also know how much the community can be affected by decision-making processes in 
nearby communities. As discussed earlier in section 4.9, this is very important because they can 
relate to others in regards to decision-making and policy-making.  However, communities are not 
aware of every spatial trend in neighboring communities. For example, they are not sure about how 
other communities relate to them and impact their economy or demographics. Most of the 
communities are without knowledge about the intercommunity interaction between households in 
the various sectors of economic activity in the region.  
The second objective was to explore any existing network of collaborative activities. In these 
regards, the Chicago Metro Area has fewer actual numbers of ties present within the network than 
the potential number of possible ties. Communities are not taking advantage of the potential 
networking opportunities as a region. The few connections already established have low-to-
moderate centralization scores. This means that connections are more evenly distributed with the 
exceptions of a few leaders of the networks. For example, CHI46, CHI03, CHI28 and CHI67 exhibits 
the highest network degrees, suggesting that they are the leaders in cooperation in the region. 
CH37, CHI46, CHI56 and CHI85 exhibited the highest levels of betweenness, evidencing their 
relevant presence in the network because they connect municipalities because of their different 
projects or ties with them. CHI59, CHI82, CHI06 and CHI19 exhibited the highest levels of closeness, 
which means they can represent power in potential networks. Finally, organizations such as CMAP, 
Illinois Department of Transportation, Choose DuPage, the International Council of Shopping 
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Centers, the IL Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunities, the Lake County Partners, 
and economic development organizations of the counties of McHenry, Cook and Will exhibit the 
greatest ties with communities in the region. These are key organizations in nurturing collaboration 
in the region.  
The third objective was to identify factors influencing the collaborative setting. The factors that 
influence the most on the likelihood to collaborate in the region are spatial autocorrelation, 
cooperative norms, network centralization, and communities with an updated development plan 
and with various development policies/projects actively running. Therefore, communities in 
Chicago are more likely to collaborate with other communities if these communities are very active 
in economic development.  They are also willing to collaborate if their connections are more evenly 
distributed, but not too many cooperative norms between them. Communities agree that the most 
important factors that will increase the likelihood of cooperating are the improvement of the 
economic advantage of the city in relation to their neighbors and the need to decrease cost of 
service delivery.  They also value transparency and communities that are proactive.  
The fourth objective was to investigate how collaboration translates into development 
outcomes. The consensus among the participant communities in this study is that collaboration 
translates into capacity and consensus building in the local economic development process. 
Community leaders agree that institutional collective action makes their region stronger and their 
economic development improve. Most of them coincide in that collaboration is a good policy-
making strategy.  
5.1 Suggestions for Future Research 
Logistic regression overestimates odds ratios in studies with small to moderate samples 
size (Nemes et al., 2009).  A solution for this problem is to use exact logistic regression.  Similarly, 
this is used to model binary outcome variables in which the log odds of the outcome are modeled as 
a linear combination of the predictor variables (Hirji, 2005).  Nonetheless, it handles small to 
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moderate sample sizes, empty cells in the data set and stratified data better than a regular logistic 
regression.  Another option is to try using factor analytic regression to reduce the variable space.  It 
reduces attribute space from a larger number of variables to a smaller number of factors for data 
modeling. It is especially useful to create a set of factors to be treated as uncorrelated variables as 
one approach to handling multi-collinearity but that was not the case in here. Finally, more spatial 
logistic regressions are suggested, perhaps after a reduction post-factor analysis or gathering more 
data.   The socio-economic nature of Chicago Metro Area make us suspect that models predicting 
likelihood to collaborate should account for spatial dimensions.  
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
The major contribution of this study was to examine collaborative economic development 
efforts in the Chicago metro area, which has been traditionally understood as a region with 
significant levels of independence among its communities.  Therefore, this region has been 
neglected in research assessing intraregional, interorganizational, and intergovernmental 
collaboration.  In order to address this gap in the literature, this study explored the spatial structure 
of collaboration, the variables that are likely to influence collaboration, and the impact that 
collaboration has on economic development outcomes.  Data limitations due to a low response rate 
prevented a more comprehensive analysis; however, this study provided interesting findings that 
suggest the need for further research on collaboration in the Chicago metro area.  These findings 
may have implications in the economic development field and policy making.  This chapter offers 
some concluding remarks drawing on the methodology, results, and analyses discussed in previous 
chapters. 
6.1 Addressing the research questions 
The first research question was: Do communities engage in collaborative activities? If so, how 
complex are these social relationships? What is the network structure of these collaborations? How 
do cooperative norms strengthen these networks?  The hypothesis was that most of the 
communities in the Chicago metro area are expected to engage in collaborative activities, resulting 
in complex and dense networks. In addition, cooperative norms such as trust, reciprocity, and 
commitment are expected to strengthen these networks. This hypothesis was challenged by the fact 
that only 49.45 percent of the participating communities engaged in collaborative efforts.  Although 
the low response rate might have impacted the results, it seems that collaboration is not a popular 
characteristic of the region. Relationships and connections are already established, but either 
communities ignore it, or are not willing to engage in collaborative efforts.  Established social 
relationships resulted in sparse and relatively simple networks, rather than complex and dense 
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networks.  However, cooperative norms resulted in a relevant factor in favor of collaboration and 
stronger ties.  
The complexity and density expected from the networks did not happen. When there is 
collaboration, the characteristics of a network are relatively higher density and betweeness. 
Chicago has a low density for collaboration purposes. Density is a measure of the level of 
connectivity within the network, and for Chicago is 0.040. Thus, the actual number of ties present 
within the network is 4 percent of the potential number of possible ties. This is consistent with 
many cities in the US, but is far from the leaders in Hawkins (2007) that has densities above 0.10. 
Betweenness is the extent to which a node lies between other nodes in the network, bridging 
clusters, connecting actors indirectly through their direct links, and in Chicago, communities with 
the higher betweenness were 0.10 or lower. If Chicago were collaborating more, its density would 
be above 0.13 and its betweenness would be 0.5 or above.  
The suggestion better collaboration translated in stronger networks is very important, because 
that provides empirical evidence of collaboration and identifies the key actors. However, do 
networks always provide positive outcomes? Just like positive network effects cause positive 
feedback loops and exponential growth, negative network effects create negative feedback 
and exponential decay. For example, congestion in the network (too many communities and/or 
organizations cooperating) may decrease the efficiency of a network as more cities use it, and this 
reduces the value to cities already using it.  Another negative externality of collaboration networks 
is when there are policies backed up by a huge collaboration chain and those policies fail. When 
they fail, the domino effect may be enormous. Besides, if there is a miscommunication or a break in 
trust between crucial and central agencies in the network, the whole structure suffers.  
Cooperative norms such as trust, reciprocity, and commitment were expected to strengthen 
these networks, but cooperative norms additive index was lower for communities with joint 
ventures than for those without joint ventures. This suggests that collaborating does not always 
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happen because of trust, but because together, a community can watch the other, like the saying 
“keep your enemy closer.” Another suggestion is that communities without joint ventures have 
higher perceptions of trust, reciprocity and commitment, but either the characteristics of their 
population, employment and industries do not favor them or transaction costs have been higher 
than benefits in certain opportunities.  
Collaboration was popular among First and Second wave policies, especially on policies rooted 
on the export base theory aimed at improving the community’s attractiveness to industries.  
Policies aimed for are industrial recruitment and promotion, as well as efficiency improvement 
through infrastructure upgrades were among the top 10. Collaboration on Third Wave policies 
were low ranked. It seems that collaboration towards development policies by creating the context 
for economic growth through public-private partnerships, networks that leverage capital and 
human resources to increase the global competitiveness is not perceived as important. Curiously, 
OECD (2012) advised the region on not only collaborating but also on promoting innovation-driven 
economic development, job creation, job training, entrepreneurship, leadership, regional-based 
growth, etc. This is what collaboration under Third Wave policies look like (Blakely and Bradsahw, 
2002; Blakely and Green-Leigh, 2009; Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999; Eisinger, 1998; Stimson et al., 
2002; and Florida, 2002).  
 The second research question was: What are the factors explaining the creation of voluntary 
cooperative arrangements among local governments in the Chicago metro area? It was 
hypothesized that community and metro area characteristics, local political institution, and 
intergovernmental networks would significantly impact the likelihood of collaboration.  
Cooperative norms and network centralization were found to be statistically significant factors, as 
well as the number of development policies, being a public-private agencies, and level of formal 
education.  These factors were consistent with expectations, however, not all the variables 
representing community characteristics, political institutions, and networks were significant. 
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Communities interested in maximizing their potential to engage in joint ventures and collaborate 
need to create development policies; update their action plan; seek centralized networks of joint 
ventures; have awareness of their place in the region with respect to other communities, as well as 
to how other communities relate to their own, and exhibit greater flexibility with respect to their 
collaborative norms.  Additionally, the costs of collaboration are important and communities 
interested in collaborating should aim to have low transaction costs. 
One factor considered here, that was not considered in other studies, is spatial autocorrelation. 
Spatial autocorrelation was found in certain areas of this study. For example, municipalities with 
joint ventures have some interesting spatial trends. Given dissimilarities among most of the 
suburban communities in Chicago, it was seen many negative autocorrelations, with the exception 
of a positive autocorrelation in the Northeast, where there are more homogenous communities. 
Positive autocorrelation of municipalities with a development plan was found in the South, where 
there is poverty, crime, unemployment and bad economic environment. Nonetheless, it is very 
important to point out that these spatial analyses do not account for collaboration that is not spatial 
adjacent. This collaboration is normally coordinated by a third agency, an umbrella organization 
and may imply policies related to transportation or education/training (e.g., universities in specific 
cities serving the entire region), etc. If not, then the collaboration may come from personal ties 
previously established or very specific objectives.  
The third research question was: What is the awareness level of economic development 
practitioners about spatial interdependence and interaction among local governments in the 
Chicago Metro Area? The hypothesis was that the region would be spatially aware, but with 
statistically significant differences based on whether or not the communities had joint ventures.  
Spatial autocorrelations were expected with those closer to the city of Chicago and located in the 
Northeast thought to be more aware.  Results revealed that the communities had fair-to-good 
spatial awareness, but contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences between 
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communities with and without joint ventures.  Moreover, communities were more aware of their 
position with respect to other communities in their region; while being less aware of what is 
happening interregionally, which can make the communities more closer than distant.  
Furthermore, clusters with higher levels of awareness were found in the Central region and farther 
from the Chicago metro area, in the Nortwest.  
The final research question was: Are collaborative activities facilitating capacity and consensus 
building in the local economic development process? If so, how is everyone benefiting?  The 
hypothesis was that collaboration activities would facilitate capacity and consensus building in the 
local economic development process. Those with denser and more centralized networks were 
expected to benefit the most.  The first part of the hypothesis was consistent with findings, 
suggesting that collaboration is a great resource for consensus building, as it can make the region 
socio-economically stronger and more efficient.  However, the second part of the hypothesis was 
not supported because mean differences between dense and sparse networks were not statistically 
significant.   
6.2 Closing remarks 
This dissertation sought to address three important gaps in the literature.  First, this research is 
one of the firsts to study collaboration in the Chicago metro area and examine intraregional 
collaboration.  This allows the researcher to focus on one metropolitan area, address more details 
on the subject, and provide a better understanding of the geography (spatial dimension) of 
collaboration.  The Chicago metropolitan area is of particular interest because it has more units of 
local government than any comparable area in the US.  Specifically, it has 2,155 local government 
units, representing one-third of the local governments in Illinois, the state with the highest number 
of local governments in the country (Census of Governments, 2012)10.  
                                                             
10 http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf 
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Second, this study investigated the impact of collaboration in facilitating capacity and consensus 
building in the local economic development process.  This study highlights the need for further 
research in this area.  In fact, Hawkins (2007) argues that there is limited consensus on the degree 
to which collaborative policies result in measurable benefits.  Findings suggest that policy makers 
and researchers should explore this in more depth.  
Outcomes from this dissertation suggest that there might be some barriers to collaboration that 
drive communities to create development strategies in isolation.  Three of the most important 
barriers were difficulty formulating rules that govern the agreement, lack of agreement among 
communities on development goals, and lack of agreement on the ways work/services are to be 
provided. Transaction costs are very important when communities agree on a collaboration deal. 
However, another issue that is worth to be discussed is the possibility of self-selection of 
communities (e.g., bedroom) precluding collaboration. That is communities that have little interest 
in attracting activity because most of their resident work outside and they would not have much 
interest in collaboration. Those should be excluded from deeper discussions on barriers coming 
from collaboration issues. This self-selection issue is commonly spotted in spatial analysis where a 
community not collaborating at all but surrounded by communities that collaborate. There is not 
further reason but that the community itself does not want to collaborate because it is simply not 
convenient. The danger of the barriers comes from collaboration issues because it is the macro 
(region-wide) economy that may suffer (Kim and Hewings, 2011), which makes the shift towards 
collaboration a critical step to consider and be further explored in local economic development 
efforts and research. 
Participating communities seem to be neglecting the interactions among communities that 
intraregional workers, consumers, and residents have already embraced by commuting more 
frequently and crossing communities’ boundaries.  In this process, communities are not taking 
advantage of existing interactions in creating policy and, therefore, missing the potential to 
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maximize their development and growth.  This contradicts Tiebout’s notion that people 
relocate from one political jurisdiction to another in search of a more preferred package 
of government taxes and spending.   
It is believed that people "shop" for compatible government activity in the same way they might 
shop for other goods and services.  However, many people are currently living in one community, 
working in another, and shopping in a third one.  This shows that workers, consumers, and 
residents are already making regions interact without any official policy dictating this collective 
action; and this is not accounting for the constant migration. Further, as two-career households 
become an ever-increasing share of the labor force, it is highly unlikely that both will live and work 
in the same community.  In fact, Hewings and Parr (2007) suggest that collaboration will eventually 
become necessary given the complexity of job-income-consumption dynamics.  Therefore, this 
study makes a significant contribution by examining intergovernmental collaboration, exploring the 
social network structure of collaboration, and identifying the conditions under which local 
governments collaborate, as well as the resulting outcomes of collaboration.  
Collaborative efforts may need to extend beyond state lines.  
This dissertation explored and explained collaboration among communities in the Chicago 
Metro Area. However, the existing institutional collective actions are low and need to be 
strengthened. Communities need to acknowledge the interactions that already happening and 
embrace institutional collective action with a focus on future intercommunity developments. OECD 
(2012) made strong statements about this lack of “regional” perspective in a much broader 
geography – the 14-county Chicago-Naperville Joliet Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), that 
includes South Wisconsin, Northeastern Illinois and Northwestern Indiana. In regards to 
collaboration, OECD (2012) made the following statements: 
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1. There has been no meaningful inter-state integrated transportation planning in the tri-state 
region due to the lack of cooperation in the interests of functional regions that cross state 
lines. 
2. There is no policy conditionality or financial incentives to encourage cooperation among 
public authorities. 
3. Given the current tight fiscal environment, progress in program management must be made 
by improving collaboration between key institutional actors across the tri-state region, 
including federal funders, state and municipal governments, educational institutions, 
training service providers, the workforce boards and the business groups. 
4. Collaboration is needed to articulate common region-wide goals and implement region-
wide strategic plans to achieve them. 
5. Inter-firm and business-academia collaboration could be enhanced.  
6. Existing institutions need to work together on a tri-state regional approach. 
These statements are consistent with the findings and recommendations of this dissertation. 
Moreover, this dissertation discussed and explained some of the factors influencing the lack of 
collaboration and the few collaboration efforts that are already in action.  
 Whereas the OECD (2012) suggested more inter-state collaboration, this dissertation 
focused on intra-state collaboration. At each level of organization, from the departments of 
individual agencies to communities, states, and regions, the collaboration issue becomes 
progressively more complicated. If the literature suggest there is a problem trying to get adjacent 
agencies and communities to work together, imagine trying to do this across multiple states. 
Existing mechanisms for intrastate collaboration and cooperation could serve as a basis for broad 
geographic coordination of economic development.  
Beyond the statements listed above, OECD (2012) also claimed that although Chicago’s legal 
mandates are geographically limited, there is no barrier to their discussing and collaborating with 
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each other to ensure coherence at the regional level. This contradicts the findings in this 
dissertation, because respondents agreed that coordination costs and negotiation costs are barriers 
in their efforts to collaborate. However, OECD (2012) also claimed that true region-wide 
collaboration across state lines by the region’s stakeholders leading to successful outcomes could 
draw state and federal attention to the need for high-level strategic planning that recognizes the tri-
state region as a functional, integrated economic engine of the country’s national and international 
economic performance. This is consistent with our findings that suggest that visibility is a very 
important motivation to collaborate. In this particular case, it is not only for political reasons but for 
economic reasons in attracting funding to the region. This dissertation could be used as a follow-up 
or as a complement of the OECD’s (2012) report. 
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Table 24. Selected Characteristics for Chicago Metro Area Counties and Municipalities 
 Population Unemployment Median House Income Poverty Edu: 4yrs colg. Emp/Res Ratio 
Counties 1990 2000 2010 2000 2009 2000 2007 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 
Cook 5,105,067 5,376,741 5,194,675 5.0 10.3 45922 52564 12.3 14.8 … 36.02 1.08 
DuPage 781,666 904,161 916,924 3.0 8.4 67887 73472 3.8 5.7 … 48.04 1.14 
Kane 317,471 404,119 515,269 4.0 10.3 59351 68484 5.9 9.5 … 35.55 0.91 
Kendall 39,413 54,544 114,736 3.0 10.0 64625 76020 3.4 1.9 … 39.15 0.63 
Lake 516,418 644,356 703,462 4.0 9.8 66973 77834 5.6 7.7 … 42.76 1.03 
McHenry 183,241 260,077 308,760 5.0 9.7 … 73286 3.4 5.4 … 37.71 0.73 
Will 357,313 502,266 677,560 4.0 10.1 62238 71384 5.3 6.6 … 35.07 0.66 
Municipalities                         
Addison 32,058 35,914 36,942 4.2 … 54090 … 9.6 … 19.5 … 1.48 
Algonquin 11,663 23,276 30,046 2.8 … 79730 … 1.7 … 38.7 … 0.50 
Alsip 18,227 19,725 19,277 5.6 … 47963 … 6.6 … 13.7 … 1.29 
Antioch 6,105 8,788 14,430 3.5 … 56481 … 3.9 … 26.7 … 1.00 
Arlington Heights 75,460 76,031 75,101 2.4 … 67807 81527 2.5 … 46.5 … 1.11 
Aurora 99,581 142,990 197,899 5.8 … 54861 62160 8.5 … 29.9 … 0.78 
Bannockburn 1,388 1,429 1,583 5.6 … 150415 … 3.0 … 76.9 … 8.70 
Barrington 9,504 10,168 10,327 3.0 … 145330 … 3.1 … 67.8 … … 
Barrington Hills 4,202 3,915 4,209 2.7 … 83085 … 3.1 … 58.2 … 2.17 
Bartlett 19,373 36,706 41,208 2.3 … 79718 … 1.9 … 38.3 … 0.31 
Batavia 17,076 23,866 26,045 2.3 … 68656 … 3.6 … 42.6 … 1.20 
Beach Park 9,513 10,072 13,638 3.5 … 56553 … 3.7 … 14.9 … 0.24 
Bedford Park 566 574 580 1.9 … 49722 … 2.1 … 14.4 … 54.91 
Beecher 2,032 2,033 4,359 3.2 … 51250 … 4.0 … 16.3 … … 
Bellwood 20,241 20,535 19,071 9.5 … 52856 … 7.2 … 11.9 … 0.69 
Bensenville 17,767 20,703 18,352 4.1 … 54662 … 6.5 … 19.1 … 2.09 
Berkeley 5,137 5,245 5,209 5.3 … 58984 … 6.4 … 19.5 … … 
Berwyn 45,426 54,016 56,657 5.9 … 43833 … 7.9 … 17.2 … 0.42 
Big Rock … … 1,126  … … … … … … … … 
Bloomingdale 16,614 21,675 22,018 3.9 … 67365 … 2.7 … 34.4 … 1.03 
Blue Island 21,203 23,463 23,706 8.0 … 36520 … 13.3 … 11.7 … 0.84 
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 Population Unemployment Median House Income Poverty Edu: 4yrs colg. Emp/Res Ratio 
Municipalities 1990 2000 2010 2000 2009 2000 2007 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 
Bolingbrook 40,843 56,321 73,366 4.9 … 67852 79199 4.1 … 29.2 … 0.67 
Braceville 587 792 793  … … … … … … … … 
Braidwood 3,584 5,203 6,191 3.6 … 54375 … 5.5 … 9.1 … … 
Bridgeview 14,402 15,335 16,446 3.6 … 42073 … 7.2 … 9.1 … 1.71 
Broadview 8,713 8,264 7,932 7.7 … 47651 … 6.4 … 16.6 … 2.53 
Brookfield 18,876 19,085 18,978 4.2 … 52636 … 4.3 … 26.0 … 0.41 
Buffalo Grove 36,427 42,909 41,496 2.1 … 80525 … 2.3 … 55.9 … 0.76 
Bull Valley 574 726 1,077 0.3 … 92693 … 2.3 … 52.7 … … 
Burbank 27,600 27,902 28,925 5.5 … 49388 … 5.1 … 9.3 … 0.41 
Burlington 400 452 618 2.9 … 53438 … 5.7 … 18.8 … … 
Burnham 3,916 4,170 4,206 10.2 … 39053 … 9.8 … 12.4 …  
Burr Ridge 7,669 10,408 10,559 1.6 … 129507 … 2.8 … 58.2 … 2.10 
Calumet City 37,840 39,071 37,042 8.0 … 38902 … 12.2 … 13.9 … 0.62 
Calumet Park 8,418 8,516 7,835 8.7 … 45357 … 11.5 … 13.4 … 0.42 
Campton Hills … … 11,131  … … … … … … … … 
Carol Stream 31,716 40,438 39,711 3.4 … 64893 … 3.4 … 32.0 … 0.94 
Carpentersville 23,049 30,586 37,691 5.9 … 54526 … 8.5 … 12.2 … 0.37 
Cary 10,043 15,531 18,271 3.2 … 76801 … 1.3 … 40.9 … 0.72 
Channahon 4,266 7,344 12,560 3.7 … 71991 … 1.7 … 18.6 … 0.58 
Chicago 2,783,726 2,896,016 2,695,598 10.1 … 38625 45505 19.6 … 25.5 … 1.12 
Chicago Heights 33,072 32,776 30,276 11.1 … 36958 … 17.5 … 12.3 … 1.32 
Chicago Ridge 13,643 14,127 14,305 3.8 … 44101 … 10.0 … 13.8 … 0.87 
Cicero 67,436 85,616 83,891 9.6 … 38044 40626 15.5 … 6.1 … 0.57 
Clarendon Hills 6,994 7,610 8,427 1.1 … 84795 … 0.6 … 65.0 … 0.50 
Coal City 3,907 4,797 5,587 4.6 … 51921 … 3.1 … 13.8 … … 
Country Club Hills 15,431 16,169 16,541 7.9 … 57701 … 5.5 … 22.8 … 0.24 
Countryside 5,716 5,991 5,895 3.8 … 45469 … 3.7 … 23.0 … 1.99 
Crest Hill 10,643 13,329 20,837 4.2 … 45313 … 4.8 … 11.9 … 0.65 
Crestwood 10,823 11,251 10,950 5.3 … 45813 … 4.6 … 14.9 … 1.30 
Crete 6,773 7,346 8,259 2.9 … 67671 … 1.6 … 28.0 … 0.58 
Crystal Lake 24,512 38,000 40,743 3.6 … 66872 … 3.5 … 36.2 … 1.08 
Table 24. Cont. 
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 Population Unemployment Median House Income Poverty Edu: 4yrs colg. Emp/Res Ratio 
Municipalities 1990 2000 2010 2000 2009 2000 2007 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 
Darien 18,341 22,860 22,086 2.4 … 74836 … 2.2 … 43.5 … 0.51 
Deer Park 2,887 3,102 3,200 2.6 … 149233 … 0.6 … 61.7 … … 
Deerfield 17,327 18,420 18,225 1.8 … 107194 … 1.6 … 68.5 … 2.23 
Des Plaines 53,223 58,720 58,364 3.9 … 53638 … 4.6 … 24.7 … 1.64 
Diamond 1,077 1,393 2,527 5.1 … 43750 … 8.6 … 9.0 … … 
Dixmoor 3,647 3,934 3,644 16.4 … 26677 … 30.3 … 7.4 … … 
Dolton 23,930 25,614 23,153 7.2 … 48020 … 8.4 … 15.4 … 0.46 
Downers Grove 46,858 48,724 47,833 2.8 … 65539 … 2.3 … 46.4 … 1.61 
East Dundee 2,721 2,955 2,860 2.6 … 61219 … 4.8 … 32.3 … 1.74 
East Hazel Crest 1,570 1,607 1,543 7.6 … 43000 … 8.7 … 11.2 … … 
Elburn 1,275 2,756 5,602 3.7 … 67788 … 4.1 … 34.4 … … 
Elgin 77,010 94,487 108,188 5.8 … 52605 51246 8.1 … 20.5 … 1.02 
Elk Grove Village 33,429 34,727 33,127 3.1 … 62132 … 2.0 … 31.6 … 2.68 
Elmhurst 42,029 42,762 44,121 2.8 … 69794 … 2.5 … 45.1 … 1.32 
Elmwood Park 23,206 25,405 24,883 3.9 … 47315 … 5.2 … 19.5 … 0.33 
Elwood 951 1,620 2,279 2.8 … 53125 … 4.6 … 10.5 …  
Evanston 73,233 74,239 74,486 7.0 … 56335 69303 11.1 … 62.4 … 1.15 
Evergreen Park 20,874 20,821 19,852 4.0 … 53514 … 4.2 … 28.1 … 0.86 
Flossmoor 8,651 9,301 9,464 3.7 … 94222 … 2.8 … 61.0 … 0.68 
Ford Heights 4,259 3,456 2,763 28.9 … 17500 … 49.0 … 4.3 … 4.33 
Forest Park 14,918 15,688 14,167 3.5 … 44103 … 7.0 … 36.3 … 0.83 
Forest View 743 778 698 6.2 … 46000 … 5.2 … 8.7 … … 
Fox Lake 7,478 9,178 10,579 3.4 … 46548 … 6.4 … 15.4 … 0.60 
Fox River Grove 3,551 4,862 4,854 2.1 … 66469 … 7.1 … 33.3 … 0.39 
Frankfort 7,180 10,391 17,782 3.3 … 83055 … 2.3 … 40.7 … 1.28 
Franklin Park 18,485 19,434 18,333 6.9 … 46688 … 7.1 … 11.3 … 2.49 
Geneva 12,617 19,515 21,495 2.7 … 77299 … 2.2 … 53.2 … 1.33 
Gilberts 987 1,279 6,879 0.8 … 87847 … 0.6 … 25.4 … … 
Glen Ellyn 24,944 26,999 27,450 2.1 … 74846 … 2.8 … 58.8 … 0.96 
Glencoe 8,499 8,762 8,723 1.9 … 164432 … 2.3 … 79.7 … 0.92 
Glendale Heights 27,973 31,765 34,208 4.4 … 56285 … 6.1 … 26.7 … 0.61 
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Glenview 37,093 41,847 44,692 2.3 … 80730 … 2.0 … 55.9 … 1.11 
Glenwood 9,289 9,000 8,969 4.2 … 53894 … 3.7 … 27.9 … 0.49 
Godley 322 594 601 9.1 … 42857 … 14.2 … 3.8 … 0.54 
Golf 454 451 500 0.0 … 131742 … 0.9 … 82.3 … … 
Grayslake 7,388 18,506 20,957 2.3 … 73143 … 3.0 … 50.8 … 0.70 
Green Oaks 2,101 3,572 3,866 3.2 … 127905 … 1.7 … 59.2 … … 
Greenwood … 244 255 0.8 … 56250 … 7.2 … 23.2 … … 
Gurnee 13,701 28,834 31,295 2.3 … 75742 … 3.0 … 47.8 … 1.14 
Hainesville 134 2,129 3,597 3.3 … 69937 … 3.9 … 36.6 … … 
Hampshire 1,843 2,900 5,563 1.8 … 58519 … 2.9 … 18.8 … … 
Hanover Park 32,895 38,278 37,973 4.5 … 61358 … 6.1 … 20.2 … 0.34 
Harvard 5,975 7,996 9,447 6.8 … 44363 … 9.1 … 15.2 … 0.86 
Harvey 29,771 30,000 25,282 14.9 … 31958 … 21.7 … 8.2 … 1.05 
Harwood Heights 7,680 8,297 8,612 3.3 … 43288 … 4.6 … 16.7 … 1.07 
Hawthorn Woods 4,423 6,002 7,663 0.6 … 132720 … 1.9 … 60.2 … 0.21 
Hazel Crest 13,334 14,816 14,100 7.6 … 50576 … 8.4 … 22.1 … 0.54 
Hebron 809 1,038 1,216 4.2 … 46607 … 5.1 … 9.1 … … 
Hickory Hills 13,021 13,926 14,049 3.0 … 54779 … 5.5 … 21.3 … 0.48 
Highland Park 30,575 31,365 29,763 2.8 … 100967 … 3.8 … 61.6 … 1.03 
Highwood 5,331 4,143 5,405 1.7 … 42993 … 7.0 … 27.1 … … 
Hillside 7,672 8,155 8,157 6.9 … 50776 … 6.3 … 20.4 … 1.71 
Hinsdale 16,029 17,349 16,816 2.6 … 104551 … 3.2 … 68.6 … 1.66 
Hodgkins 1,963 2,134 1,897 3.5 … 36090 … 15.5 … 6.5 … 3.15 
Hoffman Estates 46,561 49,495 51,895 3.2 … 65937 … 4.4 … 35.9 … 1.00 
Holiday Hills 807 831 610 4.5 … 57857 … 0.0 … 14.4 … … 
Homer Glen … … 24,220  … … … … … … … … 
Hometown 4,769 4,467 4,349 5.2 … 39512 … 3.0 … 8.6 … … 
Homewood 19,278 19,543 19,323 4.1 … 57213 … 4.3 … 40.9 … 0.93 
Huntley 2,453 5,730 24,291 4.9 … 60456 … 2.8 … 22.6 … 1.34 
Indian Creek 247 194 462 2.6 … 88206 … 0.9 … 51.4 … … 
Indian Head Park 3,503 3,685 3,809 2.5 … 63250 … 2.3 … 37.8 … … 
Table 24. Cont. 
 
 135 
 
 Population Unemployment Median House Income Poverty Edu: 4yrs colg. Emp/Res Ratio 
Municipalities 1990 2000 2010 2000 2009 2000 2007 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 
Inverness 6,503 6,749 7,399 1.8 … 141672 … 1.5 … 53.9 … 0.46 
Island Lake 4,449 8,153 8,080 2.7 … 63455 … 2.6 … 23.6 … 0.24 
Itasca 6,947 8,302 8,649 5.4 … 70156 … 4.7 … 32.8 … 4.64 
Johnsburg … 5,391 6,337 2.0 … 69864 … 1.3 … 27.3 … 0.54 
Joliet 76,836 106,221 147,433 6.5 … 47761 54864 10.8 … 18.6 … 0.99 
Justice 11,137 12,193 12,926 6.0 … 50254 … 7.3 … 12.9 … 0.23 
Kaneville … … 484  … … … … … … … … 
Kenilworth 2,402 2,494 2,513 0.9 … 200001 … 1.1 … 89.4 … … 
Kildeer 2,257 3,460 3,968 0.9 … 137498 … 0.5 … 64.9 … … 
La Grange 15,362 15,608 15,550 2.8 … 58918 … 2.6 … 41.6 … 0.43 
La Grange Park 12,861 13,295 13,579 4.4 … 80342 … 4.0 … 55.0 … 1.12 
Lake Barrington 3,855 4,757 4,973 3.7 … 106951 … 2.0 … 56.4 … … 
Lake Bluff 5,513 6,056 5,722 1.6 … 114521 … 1.1 … 72.9 … 1.48 
Lake Forest 17,836 20,059 19,375 6.7 … 136462 … 2.1 … 73.8 … 1.65 
Lake in the Hills 5,866 23,152 28,965 3.0 … 73312 … 2.1 … 32.5 … 0.23 
Lake Villa 2,857 5,864 8,741 3.9 … 65078 … 3.7 … 36.9 … 0.89 
Lake Zurich 14,947 18,104 19,631 1.4 … 84125 … 2.5 … 43.8 … 1.00 
Lakemoor 1,322 2,788 6,017 4.8 … 56217 … 8.7 … 16.6 … … 
Lakewood 1,609 2,337 3,811 1.5 … 111172 … 1.7 … 55.3 … … 
Lansing 28,086 28,332 28,331 4.6 … 47554 … 5.4 … 18.2 … 0.82 
Lemont 7,348 13,098 16,000 5.3 … 70563 … 3.6 … 32.0 … 0.83 
Libertyville 19,174 20,742 20,315 2.2 … 88828 … 3.5 … 56.1 … 1.84 
Lily Lake … 825 993 2.4 … 77139 … 0.6 … 27.9 … … 
Lincolnshire 4,931 6,108 7,275 4.4 … 134259 … 1.6 … 66.4 … 6.06 
Lincolnwood 11,365 12,359 12,590 1.9 … 71234 … 2.9 … 48.2 … 1.68 
Lindenhurst 8,038 12,539 14,462 2.6 … 74841 … 1.6 … 37.8 … 0.20 
Lisbon 216 248 285  … … … … … … … … 
Lisle 19,512 21,182 22,390 2.5 … 65821 … 3.6 … 50.0 … 1.88 
Lockport 9,401 15,191 24,839 2.5 … 59179 … 3.5 … 22.6 … 0.68 
Lombard 39,408 42,322 43,165 4.5 … 60015 … 3.8 … 36.0 … 1.20 
Long Grove 4,740 6,735 8,043 2.8 … 148150 … 2.6 … 57.1 … 0.59 
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Lynwood 6,535 7,377 9,007 5.8 … 56554 … 5.8 … 22.2 … … 
Lyons 9,828 10,255 10,729 7.9 … 44306 … 6.3 … 14.7 … 0.27 
Manhattan 2,059 3,330 7,051 3.0 … 55559 … 3.6 … 19.2 … … 
Maple Park 641 765 1,310 6.1 … 49583 … 5.8 … 15.6 … … 
Marengo 4,768 6,355 7,648 4.8 … 50214 … 4.4 … 14.0 … 0.96 
Markham 13,136 12,620 12,508 13.3 … 41592 … 16.9 … 10.6 … 0.86 
Matteson 11,378 12,928 19,009 5.6 … 59583 … 4.4 … 25.4 … 1.50 
Maywood 27,139 26,987 24,090 11.7 … 41942 … 13.4 … 10.3 … 1.11 
McCook 235 254 228 1.6 … 43125 … 1.8 … 11.1 … … 
McCullom Lake 1,033 1,038 1,049 4.7 … 54500 … 5.5 … 6.4 … … 
McHenry 16,177 21,501 26,992 2.8 … 55759 … 4.6 … 22.1 … … 
Melrose Park 20,859 23,171 25,411 6.0 … 40689 … 10.2 … 9.6 … 2.06 
Merrionette Park 2,065 1,999 1,900 4.5 … 36278 … 7.5 … 15.7 … … 
Mettawa 348 367 547 2.2 … 127388 … 4.6 … 56.9 … … 
Midlothian 14,372 14,315 14,819 6.3 … 50000 … 7.0 … 14.4 … 0.52 
Millbrook … … 335  … … … … … … … … 
Millington 470 458 665  … … … … … … … … 
Minooka 2,561 3,971 10,924 3.8 … 75249 … 2.2 … 28.6 … … 
Mokena 6,128 14,583 18,740 3.5 … 74703 … 1.0 … 34.7 … 0.70 
Monee 1,044 2,924 5,148 1.8 … 58625 … 3.4 … 17.1 … … 
Montgomery 4,267 5,471 18,438 1.4 … 51028 … 3.7 … 19.6 … 1.82 
Morton Grove 22,408 22,451 23,270 2.1 … 63511 … 2.7 … 34.4 … 1.00 
Mount Prospect 53,170 56,265 54,167 3.5 … 57165 … 4.6 … 35.4 … 0.74 
Mundelein 21,215 30,935 31,064 3.0 … 69651 … 4.6 … 39.9 … 0.73 
Naperville 85,351 128,358 141,853 2.8 … 88771 96548 2.2 … 60.6 … 1.06 
New Lenox 9,627 17,771 24,394 1.9 … 67697 … 2.4 … 26.2 … 0.46 
Newark 840 887 992  … … … … … … … … 
Niles 28,284 30,068 29,803 3.7 … 48627 … 5.4 … 24.8 … 1.59 
Norridge 14,459 14,582 14,572 4.3 … 47787 … 3.9 … 15.6 … 0.89 
North Aurora 5,940 10,585 16,760 3.0 … 58557 … 3.0 … 30.7 … 0.59 
North Barrington 1,787 2,918 3,047 3.3 … 146251 … 2.8 … 62.6 … … 
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North Chicago 34,978 35,918 32,574 8.3 … 38180 … 15.1 … 14.8 … 1.55 
North Riverside 6,005 6,688 6,672 4.4 … 43856 … 4.7 … 24.0 … 1.34 
Northbrook 32,308 33,435 33,170 2.0 … 95665 … 2.3 … 62.2 … 2.16 
Northfield 4,635 5,389 5,420 1.1 … 91313 … 1.6 … 68.1 … 2.83 
Northlake 12,505 11,878 12,323 6.2 … 48406 … 8.4 … 7.7 … 1.76 
Oak Brook 9,178 8,702 7,883 3.6 … 146537 … 2.1 … 60.7 … 8.96 
Oak Forest 26,203 28,051 27,962 3.8 … 60073 … 3.6 … 22.5 … 0.49 
Oak Lawn 56,182 55,245 56,690 4.0 … 47585 … 5.4 … 20.9 … 0.82 
Oak Park 53,648 52,524 51,878 3.2 … 59183 … 5.6 … 62.1 … 0.64 
Oakbrook Terrace 1,907 2,300 2,134 0.8 … 59148 … 3.3 … 44.5 … 8.62 
Oakwood Hills 1,498 2,194 2,083 2.6 … 68182 … 5.0 … 30.3 … … 
Old Mill Creek 73 251 178 6.5 … 82426 … 2.7 … 44.0 … … 
Olympia Fields 4,248 4,732 4,988 5.4 … 94827 … 4.6 … 56.0 … 1.58 
Orland Hills 5,510 6,779 7,149 3.3 … 61884 … 5.3 … 19.4 … 0.35 
Orland Park 35,720 51,077 56,767 2.8 … 67574 … 3.1 … 31.7 … 0.87 
Oswego 3,876 13,326 30,355  …  … … … … … 0.59 
Palatine 39,253 65,479 68,557 3.2 … 63321 66689 4.8 … 41.4 … 0.70 
Palos Heights 11,478 11,260 12,515 2.6 … 69907 … 3.2 … 38.8 … 1.45 
Palos Hills 17,803 17,665 17,484 3.3 … 52329 … 3.4 … 24.2 … 0.48 
Palos Park 4,199 4,689 4,847 2.3 … 78450 … 4.5 … 45.2 … … 
Park City 4,677 6,637 7,570 5.7 … 36508 … 8.0 … 16.0 … 0.35 
Park Forest 24,656 23,462 21,975 5.3 … 47579 … 6.7 … 26.9 … 0.37 
Park Ridge 36,175 37,775 37,480 1.9 … 73154 … 2.4 … 46.2 … 1.09 
Peotone 2,947 3,385 4,142 2.8 … 56404 … 0.8 … 21.3 … … 
Phoenix 2,217 2,157 1,964 9.9 … 29643 … 22.9 … 7.0 … … 
Pingree Grove 138 124 4,532 13.5 … 45313 … 0.0 … 5.2 … … 
Plainfield 4,557 13,038 39,581 3.9 … 80799 … 1.8 … 33.9 … 0.80 
Plano 5,104 5,633 10,856  … … …  … … … 0.68 
Plattville … … 242  … … …  … … … … 
Port Barrington* 665 788 1,517  … … …  … … … … 
Posen 4,226 4,730 5,987 8.7 … 49470 … 7.1 … 8.1 … … 
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Prairie Grove 654 960 1,904 3.3 … 93361 … 1.3 … 38.1 … … 
Prospect Heights 15,239 17,081 16,256 3.6 … 55641 … 4.3 … 28.5 … 0.55 
Richmond 1,016 1,091 1,874 3.0 … 52361 … 6.5 … 21.0 … … 
Richton Park 10,523 12,533 13,646 6.3 … 48299 … 7.0 … 25.4 … 0.36 
Ringwood … 471 836 2.8 … 71250 … 0.9 … 20.6 … … 
River Forest 11,669 11,635 11,172 4.0 … 89284 … 2.7 … 69.7 … 0.79 
River Grove 9,961 10,668 10,227 4.9 … 40050 … 5.9 … 14.3 … 0.85 
Riverdale 13,671 15,055 13,549 12.2 … 38321 … 18.4 … 11.7 … 0.64 
Riverside 8,774 8,895 8,875 2.4 … 64931 … 3.0 … 51.1 … 0.43 
Riverwoods 2,868 3,843 3,660 1.9 … 158990 … 3.2 … 65.6 … 2.55 
Robbins 7,498 6,635 5,337 22.9 … 24145 … 35.5 … 8.5 … … 
Rockdale 1,709 1,888 1,976 7.1 … 39954 … 9.3 … 7.4 … … 
Rolling Meadows 22,591 24,604 24,099 2.6 … 59535 … 5.1 … 31.0 … 1.73 
Romeoville 14,074 21,153 39,680 4.4 … 60737 … 1.9 … 19.3 … 0.75 
Roselle 20,819 23,115 22,763 2.5 … 65254 … 2.0 … 34.0 … 0.53 
Rosemont 3,995 4,224 4,202 2.6 … 34663 … 14.9 … 17.5 … 9.92 
Round Lake 3,550 5,842 18,289 3.9 … 59359 … 5.1 … 16.1 … 0.27 
Round Lake Beach 16,434 25,859 28,175 6.8 … 54706 … 5.9 … 12.9 … … 
Round Lake Heights 1,251 1,347 2,676 7.9 … 44896 … 10.0 … 11.2 … … 
Round Lake Park 4,045 6,038 7,505 6.6 … 58051 … 6.8 … 21.3 … 1.14 
Sandwich 5,567 6,509 7,421 … …  … … … … … 0.89 
Sauk Village 9,926 10,411 10,506 7.7 … 46718 … 9.6 … 8.6 … 0.34 
Schaumburg 68,586 75,386 74,227 3.1 … 60941 61818 3.0 … 38.9 … 1.79 
Schiller Park 11,189 11,850 11,793 5.3 … 41583 … 9.2 … 14.4 … 1.51 
Shorewood 6,264 7,686 15,615 2.7 … 76842 … 2.0 … 33.6 … 0.32 
Skokie 59,432 63,348 64,784 4.0 … 57375 66088 5.4 … 42.6 … 1.37 
Sleepy Hollow 3,241 3,553 3,304 1.5 … 91279 … 1.8 … 41.5 … … 
South Barrington 2,937 3,760 4,565 1.9 … 170755 … 2.6 … 62.6 … … 
South Chicago Heights 3,597 3,970 4,139 5.7 … 39639 … 6.7 … 6.7 … … 
South Elgin 7,474 16,100 21,985 2.9 … 67323 … 3.0 … 25.3 … 0.56 
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South Holland 22,105 22,147 22,030 6.0 … 60246 … 4.6 … 25.6 … 1.16 
Spring Grove 1,066 3,880 5,778 1.9 … 80542 … 2.4 … 28.7 … 1.51 
St. Charles 22,501 27,896 32,974 2.3 … 69424 … 3.4 … 42.9 … 1.62 
Steger 8,584 9,682 9,570 6.4 … 43275 … 8.5 … 10.5 … 0.36 
Stickney 5,678 6,148 6,786 4.5 … 42772 … 5.8 … 8.9 … 0.84 
Stone Park 4,383 5,127 4,946 8.7 … 39787 … 15.2 … 4.1 … … 
Streamwood 30,987 36,407 39,858 4.0 … 65076 … 3.0 … 26.5 … 0.37 
Sugar Grove 2,005 3,909 8,997 3.8 … 75856 … 1.8 … 33.3 … … 
Summit 9,971 10,637 11,054 8.3 … 38132 … 16.2 … 7.3 … 0.76 
Symerton 110 106 87 8.7 … 60357 … 0.0 … 5.1 … … 
Third Lake 1,248 1,355 1,182 2.0 … 96719 … 2.7 … 54.9 … … 
Thornton 2,778 2,582 2,338 3.1 … 46778 … 2.9 … 12.2 … … 
Tinley Park 37,121 48,401 56,703 2.8 … 61648 … 2.5 … 24.8 … 0.65 
Tower Lakes 1,333 1,310 1,283 2.2 … 130388 … 2.1 … 64.5 … … 
Trout Valley … 599 537 0.7 … 99297 … 3.4 … 60.6 … … 
Union 542 576 580 1.1 … 56528 … 5.2 … 13.7 … … 
University Park 6,204 6,662 7,129 6.2 … 50652 … 9.1 … 25.4 … 1.40 
Vernon Hills 15,319 20,120 25,113 3.0 … 71297 … 2.9 … 54.3 … 1.77 
Villa Park 22,253 22,075 21,904 3.7 … 55706 … 4.8 … 23.7 … 0.88 
Virgil … 266 329 4.3 … 78252 … 0.4 … 10.2 … … 
Volo … 180 2,929 30.0 … 45833 … 33.0 … 5.9 … … 
Wadsworth 1,826 3,083 3,815 3.2 … 86867 … 2.2 … 38.1 … … 
Warrenville 11,333 13,363 13,140 1.9 … 62430 … 1.6 … 39.8 … 0.78 
Wauconda 6,294 9,448 13,603 3.8 … 57805 … 4.0 … 24.0 … 1.17 
Waukegan 69,392 87,901 89,078 9.7 … 42335 45548 13.9 … 16.3 … 0.88 
Wayne 1,541 2,137 2,431 2.5 … 115338 … 0.6 … 53.8 … … 
West Chicago 14,796 23,469 27,086 3.8 … 63424 … 9.3 … 21.9 … 1.08 
West Dundee 3,728 5,428 7,331 2.3 … 62540 … 3.7 … 36.8 … 1.64 
Westchester 17,301 16,824 16,718 4.2 … 58928 … 2.5 … 30.8 … 0.87 
Western Springs 11,984 12,493 12,975 1.7 … 98876 … 0.9 … 66.4 … 0.51 
Westmont 21,228 24,554 24,685 4.5 … 51422 … 5.8 … 35.0 … 1.01 
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Wheaton 51,464 55,416 52,894 3.5 … 73385 … 3.6 … 57.3 … 0.89 
Wheeling 29,911 34,496 37,648 2.7 … 55491 … 5.3 … 32.1 … 1.18 
Willow Springs 4,509 5,027 5,524 5.5 … 58322 … 6.2 … 23.6 … 2.15 
Willowbrook 8,598 8,967 8,540 2.8 … 56725 … 2.0 … 44.0 … 1.16 
Wilmette 26,690 27,651 27,087 2.6 … 106773 … 2.3 … 72.6 … 0.70 
Wilmington 4,743 5,134 5,724 6.6 … 45659 … 5.2 … 10.2 … … 
Winfield 7,096 8,718 9,080 1.6 … 89060 … 3.0 … 45.9 … 0.82 
Winnetka 12,174 12,419 12,187 1.2 … 167458 … 1.4 … 84.4 … 0.98 
Winthrop Harbor 6,240 6,670 6,742 3.3 … 62795 … 3.1 … 18.2 … 0.21 
Wonder Lake 1,024 1,345 4,026 2.6 … 59712 … 2.7 … 15.5 … 0.13 
Wood Dale 12,425 13,535 13,770 4.5 … 57509 … 4.1 … 19.6 … 1.93 
Woodridge 26,256 30,934 32,971 3.3 … 61944 … 3.8 … 39.0 … 0.47 
Woodstock 14,353 20,151 24,770 4.2 … 47871 … 7.2 … 22.9 … 1.09 
Worth 11,208 11,047 10,789 4.9 … 42723 … 9.3 … 11.2 … 0.43 
Yorkville 3,925 6,189 16,921 … … … … … … … … 1.04 
Zion 19,775 22,866 24,413 6.0 … 45723 … 11.9 … 15.7 … 0.48 
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Rogers Park 63,484 54,991 8.3 4.6 31,602 21.3 32.0 
West Ridge 73,199 71,942 5.7 3.1 41,144 14.3 35.6 
Uptown 63,551 56,362 8.2 3.6 32,328 24.9 39.5 
Lincoln Square 44,574 39,493 5.6 3.2 40,898 11.4 38.1 
North Center 31,895 31,867 4.7 2.6 51,758 8.6 48.1 
Lake View 94,817 94,368 3.0 1.4 53,881 8.7 70.8 
Lincoln Park 64,320 64,116 4.5 1.4 68,613 8.6 78.0 
Near North Side 72,811 80,484 6.0 2.9 57,811 15.2 67.4 
Edison Park 11,259 11,187 3.4 1.9 57,083 2.4 30.2 
Norwood Park 37,669 37,023 3.0 1.8 53,402 4.3 24.7 
Jefferson Park 25,859 25,448 3.2 1.9 49,640 4.9 22.1 
Forest Glen 18,165 18,508 2.8 1.6 68,269 2.6 43.2 
North Park 18,514 17,931 7.8 2.4 49,208 10.5 37.5 
Albany Park 57,655 51,542 7.3 4.2 40,711 17.7 19.0 
Portage Park 65,340 64,124 4.8 2.8 45,117 8.0 18.5 
Irving Park 58,643 53,359 5.8 3.3 42,037 11.3 22.4 
Dunning 42,164 41,932 5.0 2.9 49,367 5.2 16.7 
Montclare 12,646 13,485 6.4 3.8 46,636 5.6 14.9 
Belmont Cragin 78,144 78,684 7.3 4.3 43,159 11.2 9.9 
Hermosa 26,908 25,010 11.5 6.9 38,159 16.7 8.1 
Avondale 43,083 39,262 8.9 5.3 36,677 17.4 12.4 
Logan Square 82,715 72,791 8.2 4.7 36,245 19.8 24.0 
Humboldt Park 65,836 56,323 17.8 10.9 28,728 31.1 5.3 
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  Population Unemployment Median Household Income Poverty Education: 4yrs college 
Chicago City Communities 2000 2010 2000 2007 2000 2000 2000 
West Town 87,435 82,236 6.9 3.9 38,915 20.7 34.7 
Austin 117,527 98,514 17.4 10.6 33,663 24.1 8.7 
West Garfield Park 23,019 18,009 22.1 12.8 23,121 35.9 5.0 
East Garfield Park 20,881 20,559 22.9 13.8 24,216 35.2 7.7 
Near West Side 46,419 54,881 18.9 7.7 29,588 37.5 38.3 
North Lawndale 41,768 35,912 25.8 16.3 18,342 45.2 7.0 
South Lawndale 91,071 79,288 11.7 6.8 32,320 26.5 4.7 
Lower West Side 44,031 35,769 9.1 5.3 27,763 27.0 9.3 
Loop 16,388 29,283 4.5 1.4 65,128 11.9 64.4 
Near South Side 9,509 21,390 9.1 5.4 34,329 32.3 42.5 
Armour Square 12,032 13,443 6.1 3.4 22,756 31.1 16.7 
Douglas 26,470 18,238 31.6 12.1 24,835 41.2 25.5 
Oakland 6,110 5,918 26.4 15.7 10,739 52.5 9.5 
Fuller Park 3,420 2,942 16.4 10 18,412 34.6 5.9 
Grand Boulevard 28,006 21,929 24.4 15.2 14,178 46.9 9.9 
Kenwood 18,363 17,841 13.4 6.5 36,612 24.0 44.7 
Washington Park 14,146 11,717 24.8 15 15,160 51.6 5.9 
Hyde Park 29,920 25,681 7.3 2.5 35,991 16.5 65.0 
Woodlawn 27,086 23,740 19.8 11.5 18,266 39.4 12.7 
South Shore 61,556 52,010 15.2 9.2 27,748 27.1 18.2 
Chatham 37,275 31,065 13.0 7.6 32,341 17.7 19.0 
Avalon Park 11,147 10,148 8.3 4.9 44,344 8.4 21.7 
South Chicago 38,596 31,198 18.2 11.2 28,279 29.7 12.5 
Burnside 3,294 2,916 18.4 11.2 34,790 29.1 12.1 
Calumet Heights 15,974 13,812 9.2 5.4 46,326 11.9 26.2 
Table 25. Cont. 
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  Population Unemployment Median Household Income Poverty Education: 4yrs college 
Chicago City Communities 2000 2010 2000 2007 2000 2000 2000 
Roseland 52,723 44,619 17.4 10.4 38,237 17.6 14.0 
Pullman 8,921 7,325 17.2 10.6 30,966 22.4 11.6 
South Deering 16,990 15,109 11.9 7.1 34,789 19.6 10.4 
East Side 23,653 23,014 12.5 7.5 39,724 12.4 7.1 
West Pullman 36,649 29,651 14.0 8.3 40,478 22.0 10.3 
Riverdale 9,809 6,482 33.5 21.7 13,178 56.3 2.7 
Hegewisch 9,781 9,454 7.9 4.7 43,665 10.6 10.8 
Garfield Ridge 36,101 34,513 6.5 3.8 45,436 10.1 11.4 
Archer Heights 12,644 13,363 6.7 3.9 39,431 6.4 8.2 
Brighton Park 44,912 45,368 11.5 6.9 36,245 17.3 6.9 
McKinley Park 15,962 15,612 8.7 5.3 36,010 13.1 9.6 
Bridgeport 33,694 31,935 7.7 4.6 35,535 18.1 16.9 
New City 51,721 44,311 14.9 8.7 25,647 34.5 6.1 
West Elsdon 15,921 18,139 7.1 4.2 45,310 6.9 9.1 
Gage Park 39,193 39,894 10.6 6.2 36,463 19.0 5.8 
Clearing 22,331 23,139 4.9 2.9 45,533 6.9 11.3 
West Lawn 29,235 33,355 7.3 4.3 47,017 7.4 11.4 
Chicago Lawn 61,412 55,628 15.7 9.3 35,983 19.8 9.4 
West Englewood 45,282 35,505 24.5 15.5 26,693 32.1 4.8 
Englewood 40,222 30,654 25.8 16.1 18,955 43.8 5.2 
Greater Grand Crossing 38,619 32,602 18.6 11.4 27,916 28.5 12.4 
Ashburn 39,584 41,081 8.8 5.2 53,633 6.9 19.0 
Auburn Gresham 55,928 48,743 16.7 10.2 34,238 20.6 10.4 
Beverly 21,992 20,034 5.8 3.4 66,823 4.0 49.8 
Washington Heights 29,843 26,493 12.9 7.8 43,201 12.4 16.4 
Table 25. Cont. 
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  Population Unemployment Median Household Income Poverty Education: 4yrs college 
Chicago City Communities 2000 2010 2000 2007 2000 2000 2000 
Mount Greenwood 18,820 19,093 4.4 2.4 57,493 3.9 20.9 
Morgan Park 25,226 22,544 8.5 4.9 53,133 11.5 27.2 
O'Hare 11,956 12,756 4.1 4.3 43,542 8.0 29.3 
Edgewater 62,198 56,521 6.7 3.5 35,766 17.1 41.9 
Updated with Census 2000 SF-1 and Census 2010 PL94-171 totals 
 
Table 25. Cont. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR COMMUNITIES WITH A JOINT 
VENTURE  
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Pre-Survey: Situation Awareness Study  
 
 
AWARE     These questions refer to your level of awareness on intraregional/intercommunity dependence 
 
 
 
For the following questions, please check the box that best 
describes your answer: 
Not at all 
Aware 
Slightly 
Aware 
Somewhat 
Aware 
Moderately 
Aware 
Extremely 
Aware 
 
Are you aware of how many of your residents work in your 
community and how many of them work in other communities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of how much your community can be affected 
by decision making processes in nearby communities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of the (intercommunity) interaction between 
households the various sectors of economic activity in the 
region?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of whether is your community an employment 
center or a bedroom community? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of the characteristics of the flows of goods and 
services between sectors in your community and other 
communities within the metro area? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of the amount of income your community 
receives at the expense of other communities and vice versa?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you aware of the patterns of spatial interdependence 
between communities in the Chicago metro area, including 
yours? (i.e., how dependent on other communities you are) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
READ     A Joint venture is meant by both formal and informal agreements that are voluntarily established between local 
governments (for example between two or three cities or comparable government units) that are intended to 
encourage development and improve economic/fiscal conditions. These can take a variety of forms, such as 
land development planning, infrastructure development, affordable housing, interlocal agreements for services, 
worker training program, marketing programs, or any other.  
  
 HAVE YOUR AGENCY OR COMMUNITY ESTABLISHED A JOINT VENTURE?        YES        NO      
 If the answer is ‘YES’, please refer to Survey 1.  
 If the answer is ‘NO’, please refer to Survey 2. 
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SURVEY 1 
PART I   1. Please, check the municipalities/communities that your local government has relied or collaborated with in the last 2 years. 
                 If you select Chicago City, please check (next page) the communities (if any specific) that you have collaborated with.  
 Addison 
 Algonquin 
 Alsip 
 Antioch 
 Arlington Heights 
 Aurora 
 Bannockburn 
 Barrington 
 Barrington Hills 
 Bartlett 
 Batavia 
 Beach Park 
 Bedford Park 
 Beecher 
 Bellwood 
 Bensenville 
 Berkeley 
 Berwyn 
 Big Rock 
 Bloomingdale 
 Blue Island 
 Bolingbrook 
 Braceville 
 Braidwood 
 Bridgeview 
 Broadview 
 Brookfield 
 Buffalo Grove 
 Bull Valley 
 Burbank 
 Burlington 
 Burnham 
 Burr Ridge 
 Calumet City 
 Calumet Park 
 Campton Hills 
 Carol Stream 
 Carpentersville 
 Cary 
 Channahon 
 Chicago City 
 Edgewater 
 Chicago Heights 
 Chicago Ridge 
 Cicero 
 Clarendon Hills 
 Coal City 
 Country Club Hills 
 Countryside 
 Crest Hill 
 Crestwood 
 Crete 
 Crystal Lake 
 Darien 
 Deer Park 
 Deerfield 
 Des Plaines 
 Diamond 
 Dixmoor 
 Dolton 
 Downers Grove 
 East Dundee 
 East Hazel Crest 
 Elburn 
 Elgin 
 Elk Grove Village 
 Elmhurst 
 Elmwood Park 
 Elwood 
 Evanston 
 Evergreen Park 
 Flossmoor 
 Ford Heights 
 Forest Park 
 Forest View 
 Fox Lake 
 Fox River Grove 
 Frankfort 
 Franklin Park 
 Geneva 
 Gilberts 
 Glen Ellyn 
 Glencoe 
 Glendale Heights 
 Glenview 
 Glenwood 
 Godley 
 Golf 
 Grayslake 
 Green Oaks 
 Greenwood 
 Gurnee 
 Hainesville 
 Hampshire  
 Hanover Park 
 Harvard 
 Harvey 
 Harwood Heights 
 Hawthorn Woods 
 Hazel Crest 
 Hebron 
 Hickory Hills 
 Highland Park 
 Highwood 
 Hillside 
 Hinsdale 
 Hodgkins 
 Hoffman Estates 
 Holiday Hills 
 Homer Glen 
 Hometown 
 Homewood 
 Huntley 
 Indian Creek 
 Indian Head Park 
 Inverness 
 Island Lake 
Itasca 
 Johnsburg 
 Joliet 
 Justice 
 Kaneville 
 Kenilworth 
 Kildeer 
 La Grange 
 La Grange Park 
 Lake Barrington 
 Lake Bluff 
 Lake Forest 
 Lake in the Hills 
 Lake Villa 
 Lake Zurich 
 Lakemoor 
 Lakewood 
 Lansing 
 Lemont 
 Libertyville 
 Lily Lake 
 Lincolnshire 
 Lincolnwood 
 Lindenhurst 
 Lisbon 
 Lisle 
 Lockport 
 Lombard 
 Long Grove 
 Lynwood 
 Lyons 
 Manhattan 
 Maple Park 
 Marengo 
 Markham 
 Matteson 
 Maywood 
 McCook 
 McCullom Lake 
 McHenry 
 Melrose Park 
 Merrionette Park 
 Mettawa 
 Midlothian 
 Millbrook 
 Millington 
 Minooka 
 Mokena 
 Monee 
 Montgomery 
 Morton Grove 
 Mount Prospect 
 Mundelein 
 Naperville 
 New Lenox 
 Newark 
 Niles 
 Norridge 
 North Aurora 
 North Barrington 
 North Chicago 
 North Riverside 
 Northbrook 
 Northfield 
 Northlake 
 Oak Brook 
 Oak Forest 
 Oak Lawn 
 Oak Park 
 Oakbrook Terrace 
 Oakwood Hills 
 Old Mill Creek 
 Olympia Fields 
 Orland Hills 
 Orland Park 
 Oswego 
 Palatine 
 Palos Heights 
 Palos Hills 
 Palos Park 
 Park City 
 Park Forest 
 Park Ridge 
 Peotone 
 Phoenix 
 Pingree Grove 
 Plainfield 
 Plano 
 Plattville 
 Port Barrington 
 Posen 
 Prairie Grove 
 Prospect Heights 
 Richmond 
 Richton Park 
 Ringwood 
 River Forest 
 River Grove 
 Riverdale 
 Riverside 
 Riverwoods 
 Robbins 
 Rockdale 
 Rolling Meadows 
 Romeoville 
 Roselle 
 Rosemont 
 Round Lake 
 Round Lake Beach 
 Round Lake Heights 
 Round Lake Park 
 Sandwich 
 Sauk Village 
 Schaumburg 
 Schiller Park 
 Shorewood 
 Skokie 
 Sleepy Hollow 
 South Barrington 
 South Chicago Heights 
 South Elgin 
 South Holland 
 Spring Grove 
 St. Charles 
 Steger 
 Stickney 
 Stone Park 
 Streamwood 
 Sugar Grove 
 Summit 
 Symerton 
 Third Lake 
 Thornton 
 Tinley Park 
 Tower Lakes 
 Trout Valley 
 Union 
 University Park 
 Vernon Hills 
 Villa Park 
 Virgil 
 Volo 
 Wadsworth 
 Warrenville 
 Wauconda 
 Waukegan 
 Wayne 
 West Chicago 
 West Dundee 
Westchester 
 Western Springs 
 Westmont 
 Wheaton 
 Wheeling 
 Willow Springs 
 Willowbrook 
 Wilmette 
 Wilmington 
 Winfield 
 Winnetka 
 Winthrop Harbor 
 Wonder Lake 
 Wood Dale 
 Woodridge 
 Woodstock 
 Worth 
 Yorkville 
 Zion 
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Organization 1 Organization 2 Organization 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Organization 1 Organization 2 Organization 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
CITY OF CHICAGO COMMUNITIES 
 Rogers Park 
 West Ridge 
 Uptown 
 Lincoln Square 
 North Center 
 Lake View 
 Lincoln Park 
 Near North Side 
 Edison Park 
 Norwood Park 
 Jefferson Park 
 Forest Glen 
 North Park 
 Albany Park 
 Portage Park 
 Irving Park 
 
 Dunning 
 Montclare 
 Belmont Cragin 
 Hermosa 
 Avondale 
 Logan Square 
 Humboldt Park 
 West Town 
 Austin 
 West Garfield Park 
 Loop 
 Near South Side 
 Armour Square 
 Douglas 
 Oakland 
 Fuller Park 
 
 Grand Boulevard 
 Woodlawn 
 South Shore 
 Chatham 
 Avalon Park 
 South Chicago 
 Burnside 
 Calumet Heights 
 Roseland 
 Pullman 
 South Deering 
 East Side 
 West Pullman 
 Riverdale 
 Hegewisch 
 Garfield Ridge 
 
 Kenwood 
 Washington Park 
 Hyde Park 
 Archer Heights 
 Beverly 
 Washington Heights 
 Mount Greenwood 
 Morgan Park 
 O'Hare 
 Edgewater 
 South Lawndale 
 Lower West Side 
 East Garfield Park 
 Near West Side 
 North Lawndale 
 McKinley Park 
 Bridgeport 
 New City 
 West Elsdon 
 Gage Park 
 Clearing 
 West Lawn 
 Chicago Lawn 
 West Englewood 
 Englewood 
 Greater Grand 
Crossing 
 Ashburn 
 Auburn Gresham 
 Brighton Park 
 
PART II In this section, please write in the top three government or non-government organizations that you have relied on the most  
                  when carrying-out your city's overall economic development activities during the past year. Consider the full range of                 
                  organizations, including local, county, state and federal government agencies, and regional agencies, non-profit organizations   
                 and business.  
 Organization 1 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
Organization 2 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
Organization 3 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
For the following questions, please use the following scale: 
 
 
 
Not at All A Little Somewhat Quite a Bit Very Much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Concerning the JOINT VENTURE your community has most 
recently established, to what extent your community relies on 
these organizations to: 
Discuss the monetary costs of the joint effort ………………………… 
Develop a shared policy goal among the cities ……………………….. 
Negotiate the benefits of the agreement ………………………………. 
Monitor inputs and ouputs of the joint venture ………………………. 
Enforce the joint venture  …………………………………………….. 
 
3. Concerning your community's OVERALL economic 
development activities, to what extent does your community 
rely on these organizations to: 
Provide policy expertise and technical assistance …………………….. 
Facilitate policy setting and implementation ………………………….. 
(e.g. distribute tasks, coordinate)  
Minimize the risks of starting new ventures ………………………….. 
Communicate with other cities in the region …………………………. 
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Provide financial resources ………………………………………….... 
 
PART III Now, we have questions on the joint venture(s) your community has established or is in the process of establishing. 
REMINDER: A Joint venture is meant by both formal and informal agreements that are voluntarily established between local 
governments (for example between two or three cities or comparable government units) that are intended to encourage development and 
improve economic/fiscal conditions. These can take a variety of forms, such as land development planning, infrastructure development, 
affordable housing, interlocal agreements for services, worker training program, marketing programs, or any other.  
3. Please check each policy listed below 
that your community uses to encourage 
development (check all that apply)? 
4. Which of the 
following policies is 
the focus of the most 
recent joint venture 
your community has 
established (check all 
that apply)? 
5. For the policies checked 
under question 2, to what 
extent are the investments 
that apply to the joint venture 
difficult or easy to adapt to 
other projects, services of 
activities? 
Very                                     Very 
Easily                             Difficult 
 
  1          2          3          4          5 
6. To what extent is it easy or 
difficult to measure the inputs 
and outuputs, and monitor the 
costs, benefits and outcomes of 
the joint venture policies 
checked under question 2? 
 
Very                                     Very 
Easily                             Difficult 
 
  1          2          3          4          5 
Land & Infrastructure 
Land acquisition and assembly              
Land use Planning for industry             
Recreation amenity development          
Roadway infrastructure expansion        
Sale of land                                            
Site development                                   
Solid waste collection                            
Improved/expanded parking                  
Inventory of developable land               
Utility management                               
Water distribution                                   
 
Business-Community Relations 
Business liaison committees                  
Business linkage program                      
Developing industry cluster strategy     
Export assistance program                     
Marketing brochures                              
Purchase advertisements                        
Regional promotion activities                
Solicit foreign business                          
Special events planning                          
Industrial/commrcl. site promotion        
Trade shows                                           
Visits to prospective firms                     
 
Community & Regional Resources  
Affordable housing construction           
Entrepreneurship training                       
Historic/cultural development                
Inspection/code enforcement                 
Job training for workforce                     
Job linkage program for residents          
Leadership development                        
Lobbying                                                
Non-profit organization development    
Public health programs                          
Rehabilitation of buildings                    
Revenue sharing                                     
Tourism development                            
 
Financial Incentives 
Tax abatements to businesses                
Low interest loans to businesses            
OTHER:   ___________________         
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PART IV We now have some questions on the relations between communities that are part of the joint venture, and the reasons 
 why your community has established or is establishing a joint venture. 
7. What are the names of the communities that are a part of 
the most recent joint venture? 
 
Community #1        
Community #2      
Community #3      
Community #4       
Community #5       
 
8. Prior to this joint venture, had your community established other 
formal or informal agreements with these communities? 
 
Yes No 
Community #1                                              
 
Community #2                                              
 
Community #3                                              
 
Community #4                                              
 
Community #5                                              
 
 
9.  In the past 2 years, how often has your community communicated 
with other communities in the region to discuss economic 
development issues? 
 
1-2 Times 3-10 Times Monthly Weekly Daily 
A Year A Year 
                                                                                                            
 
 
 
10. While the joint venture was being established, what 
percentage of the discussion about the joint venture activities 
was devoted to: 
 
                                      [<20%]  [20-40%] [40-60%] [60-80%]  [>80%] 
 
Project costs                                                                               
 
Project benefits                                                                          
 
Rules that govern the                                                                  
               joint venture 
 
11. How much money, if any, is contributed by your community for the 
joint venture? (approximate within last year)   
                                                                                  $ ____________________ 
 
12.  In general, why was this joint venture 
established? (Check all that apply) 
 
 To improve your community's 
economic advantage 
 To decrease service delivery costs 
 Change in political climate 
 To increase scale economies  
 To secure resources that your city 
cannot otherwise obtain  
 State/federal financial incentives  
 External fiscal pressures 
(e.g. restrictions on revenue raising) 
 To address the actions of other communities 
that are harmful to yours  
 Third party agreed to oversee 
the agreement 
 To attain public visibility, goodwill or 
prestige 
 To implement problem solving 
activities 
 Government management is improved 
 
 
13. When was the joint venture established? 
(Check only one box) 
 
 Currently being established  
 Less than 2 years ago  
 Between 2 and 5 years ago  
 More than 5 years ago 
 
14. How are the terms of the agreement 
specified? (Check all that apply) 
 
 Explicitly verbalized and discussed 
over the phone  
 Verbalized through face-to-face 
contact 
 Written down in detail 
 Legally binding or contractual 
documents 
 
 
15. Is there a governing board? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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PART VI These questions refer to intergovernmental relations and barriers to establishing joint ventures. 
16. For the following statements, please check the box that best describes your 
perceptions of regional intergovernmental relations within the past 2 years: 
 
Never 
 
Rarely  
 
Sometimes 
 
Usually 
 
Always 
Local governmental officials in the Chicago metro area are committed to positive 
change for the entire region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Chicago metro area, it is expected that local officials in one jurisdiction keep 
those in other jurisdictions informed of changes that may affect them 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local governmental officials from different jurisdictions in this region fulfill 
promises and commitments they make to one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic problems in the Chicago metro area are addressed jointly by local 
officials across the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local officials from various jurisdictions across this region frequently communicate 
face-to-face with one another and/or via phone calls or email 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Chicago metro area, local governmental officials from different jurisdictions 
trust one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After receiving resources from other local governments, communities provide equal 
or more resources in return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. To what extent do the following act as a barrier to establishing joint 
ventures? 
 
 
 
Rarely  
 
Sometimes 
 
Usually 
 
Always 
Difficulty dividing up benefits that result from an agreement 
     
Difficulty in formulating rules that govern the agreement      
Lack of agreement among communities on development goals      
Lack of agreement on the ways work/services are to be provided      
Lack of agreement on how inputs and outputs will be monitored      
Potential that some communities will not uphold the agreement.      
18. To what extent does collaboration translates into 
better outcomes and capacity and consensus building 
in the local economic development process for your 
community? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
Institutional collective action among communities of the 
Chicago metro area makes our communities and the 
region itself stronger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My community has benefited from economic 
development cooperation engagement with other 
communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experimentation, learning, change and consensus 
building is easier through establishing a cooperative 
agreement than otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rich social networks generated by institutional 
collective action represent a great resource of 
institutional capital through which new initiatives are 
taken more rapidly and legitimately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative approaches in local economic 
development initiatives in your community achieve more 
effective and durable outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on actual facts and tangible outcomes, it is better 
to pursue economic development in a cooperative 
environment than under a competitive advantage 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
PART VII Demographic Profile 
19. Sex:  
          Male  
          Female 
20. Age: 
            21 
          22 to 34 
          35 to 44 
          45 to 54 
          55 to 64 
            65 
          Decline 
 
21. Ethnicity: 
          Hispanic or Latino 
          Not Hispanic or Latino 
22. Race: 
          American Indian or Alaska Native 
          Asian 
          Black or African American 
          Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
          White 
23. Did you grow up in the Chicago metro area?  
          Yes               No 
 
24. Education (Specialization) 
          No Diploma / Less than High School 
          High School/GED 
          Some College 
          Associate Degree (_____________________) 
          Bachelor Degree (_____________________) 
          Master Degree (_____________________) 
          Ph.D. (_____________________) 
          Professional Degree (_____________________) 
25. Did you purse your degree in the Chicago metro area? 
          Yes               No 
 
Brief Agency Profile 
26. Is the leading economic development agency in your community/municipality a public-private partnership? 
          Yes               No 
27. Is the leading development official or manager a full-time director? 
          Yes               No 
28. Do you have an updated strategic development plan in force (less than 2 years old)? 
          Yes               No 
29. What are the most popular policies in your community/municipality?  
          Demand-side policies               Supply-side policies 
30. What is the current development budget of your community/municipality?  ____________________ 
31. Do you expect an increase in the development budget in the next years? 
          Yes               No 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR COMMUNITIES WITHOUT A 
JOINT VENTURE  
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PART 1 
 
  In this first section there are some questions on the barriers to establishing joint ventures with 
other communities, intergovernmental relations in your region, and the type of development 
policies that your community has adopted. A joint venture is meant by both formal and 
informal agreements that are voluntarily established between local governments (for 
example between two or three cities or comparable government units) that are intended to 
encourage development and/or improve economic and fiscal conditions. These can take a 
variety of forms, such as land development planning, infrastructure development, affordable 
housing, or interlocal agreements for service delivery. 
 
 
1. What are the reasons for not establishing a joint venture with 
another community? (Check all that apply) 
 
There is no need to secure additional resources 
Your community has limited resources to provide to other 
communities 
Coordination with other communities is difficult 
Organizations not affiliated with your community take 
responsobility for those development efforts 
3. Which of the following is used by your community as a 
development policy?  (Check all that apply) 
 
Land & Infrastructure 
Land acquisition and assembly   
Land use planning for industry  
Recreation amenity development 
Roadway infrastructure expansion 
Your community can adequetly undertake development efforts by 
itself 
The geographic distance between communities is too great 
OTHER: 
 
2. Which of the following increase your community's interest in establishing a joint 
venture?  (Check all that apply)  
 
Governance 
City management is improved 
Relation is written down in detail 
Standard operating procedures are established Formal 
channels of decision making are followed  
Third party oversees the agreement 
 
Resources  
External fiscal pressures (e.g. restrictions on revenue rising)  
Need to decrease costs of service delivery 
State/federal financial incentives tied to cooperation 
Scale economies are increased 
Resources are secured that your city cannot otherwise obtain 
City's economic advantage is improved 
 
Local and Regional Interests  
Pressure from business group interests 
Harmful affects from other city actions are mitigated 
Environment is protected 
Change in political climate emphasizing more regional 
cooperation 
Public visibility, goodwill or prestige are obtained 
Problem solving activities are implemented 
Sale of land 
Site development  
Solid waste collection 
Improved/expanded parking 
Inventory of available sites 
Utility management 
Water distribution 
 
Business-Community Relations 
 
Business liaison committees  
Business linkage program  
Developing industry cluster strategy 
Export assistance program  
Marketing brochures 
Purchase advertisments 
Regional promotion activities 
Solicit foreign business  
Special events planning 
Site promotion 
Trade shows 
Visits to prospective firms 
 
Community & Regional Resources  
Affordable housing construction 
Entrepreneurship training 
Historic/cultural development Job 
training for workforce 
Job linkage program for residents 
Leadership development 
Lobbying 
Non-profit organization development 
Public health programs  
Rehabilitation of buildings 
Revenue sharing 
Tourism development 
 
Incentives 
 
Tax abatement to businesses 
Low interest loans to businesses 
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 Not At A Some- Quite Very 
All Little what A Bit Much 
 
5. For the following statements, please check the box that best describes your 
perceptions of intergovernmental relations in the immediate region: 
 
     
 
Local governments fulfill promises and commitments they make to one 
another                                              
Local governments carry out their responsibilities and obligations                                              
Intergovernmental relations are productive and generate benefits that all 
share                                                   
Local government officials from different jurisdictions trust one another                                              
After receiving resources from other local governments, communities 
provide equal or more resources in return                                              
There is competition and conflict between governments                                              
Local governments are generally cooperative                                                      
 
6. To what extent do the following act as a barrier to establishing joint  
ventures? 
 
Difficulty dividing up benefits that result from the agreement                                                       
Complexity in formulating rules that govern the agreement                                               
Uncertainty that the joint agreement will be successful                                              
Unsure of the future economic conditions of other communities                                              
Lack of agreement on development goals                                              
Lack of agreement on the ways work/services are to be provided                                               
Lack of agreement on how inputs and outputs will be monitored                                               
Potential that some communities will not uphold agreement                                              
Lack of trust in communities to follow through on their commitments                                                      
 
 
PART II In this section, please write in the top three government or non-government organizations that you have relied on the most  
                  when carrying-out your city's overall economic development activities during the past year. Consider the full range of                 
                  organizations, including local, county, state and federal government agencies, and regional agencies, non-profit organizations   
                 and business.  
 Organization 1 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
Organization 2 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
Organization 3 
(Name: Please be as specific as possible) 
For the following questions, please use the following scale: 
 
 
 
Not at All A Little Somewhat Quite a Bit Very Much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Concerning your community's OVERALL economic development 
activities, to what extent does your community rely on these 
organizations to: 
Provide policy expertise and technical assistance ……………………..   
Facilitate policy setting and implementation ………………………….. 
(e.g. distribute tasks, coordinate)  
Minimize the risks of starting new ventures ………………………….. 
Communicate with other cities in the region …………………………. 
Provide financial resources …………………………………………… 
Organization 1 Organization 2 Organization 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4     5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 156 
 
 
 
PART III Demographic Profile 
8. Sex:  
          Male  
          Female 
9. Age: 
            21 
          22 to 34 
          35 to 44 
          45 to 54 
          55 to 64 
            65 
          Decline 
 
10. Ethnicity: 
          Hispanic or Latino 
          Not Hispanic or Latino 
11. Race: 
          American Indian or Alaska Native 
          Asian 
          Black or African American 
          Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
          White 
12. Did you grow up in the Chicago metro area?  
          Yes               No 
 
13. Education (Specialization) 
          No Diploma / Less than High School 
          High School/GED 
          Some College 
          Associate Degree (_____________________) 
          Bachelor Degree (_____________________) 
          Master Degree (_____________________) 
          Ph.D. (_____________________) 
          Professional Degree (_____________________) 
14. Did you purse your degree in the Chicago metro area? 
          Yes               No 
 
Brief Agency Profile 
15. Is the leading economic development agency in your community/municipality a public-private partnership? 
          Yes               No 
16. Is the leading development official or manager a full-time director? 
          Yes               No 
17. Do you have an updated strategic development plan in force (less than 2 years old)? 
          Yes               No 
18. What are the most popular policies in your community/municipality?  
          Demand-side policies               Supply-side policies 
19. What is the current development budget of your community/municipality?  ____________________ 
20. Do you expect an increase in the development budget in the next years? 
          Yes               No 
 
 
 
